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FBIS-EEU-95-220 CONTENTS *15 November 1995*

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Envoys at Dayton Talks Submit Draft Accord *[Zagreb Radio]* 1

ALBANIA

Parties Deny Claim of Dinner With U.S. Diplomats *[ALBANIA 3 Nov]* 2
Minister: Siemens To Reconstruct Rinas Airport *[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE 3 Nov]* 2
Legislators Discuss Prosecution of Border Killings *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 8 Nov]* 2
State To Prosecute 23 *[KOHA JONE 8 Nov]* 3

BULGARIA

Greek Proposal of Military Summit Questioned *[KONTINENT 10 Nov]* 5
Geology Committee To Auction Drilling Licenses *[24 CHASA 7 Nov]* 5
Topenergy Changes Seen as Serving State Interests *[DUMA 11 Nov]* 5
Kozloduy Plant Creates Half of State's Electricity *[Sofia Radio]* 6

CZECH REPUBLIC

Klaus: Integration Into NATO 'Top Priority' *[Paris LE FIGARO 14 Nov]* 7
Article Views EU Eastward Expansion *[EKONOM 30 Aug]* 8
Inventor Doubts Tamara Ability To Detect Stealth *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 13 Nov]* 11
Inventor Fears for Life *[DENNI TELEGRAF 11 Nov]* 12
Police Foil Illegal Arms Sale by Foreigners *[PRAGUE POST 3 Oct]* 12
Bank Governor Explores Convertibility of Koruna *[PRAGUE POST 3 Oct]* 13
Skoda Pilsen, Skoda Diesel Stock Swap Considered *[PRAGUE POST 3 Oct]* 13
Prague Becoming Center for Russian Expatriates *[PRAGUE POST 3 Oct]* 15
'Substantially Lower' Wages Reported *[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY 5 Sep]* 15

SLOVAKIA

Russian Envoy Lauds Meciar for Stand on NATO *[PRAVDA 10 Nov]* 17
Schenk on EU Integration, Russia, Germany *[Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT 14 Nov]* 17
CE Official Comments on Slovak Domestic Problems *[NARODNA OBRODA 9 Nov]* 18
Kovac Accused of Abusing Powers Using SIS *[NARODNA OBRODA 11 Nov]* 20
HZDS Deputy: Kovac Lied About Son's Arrest *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 10 Nov]* 20
Meciar Responds to Carnogursky's Interpellation *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 11 Nov]* 21
Meciar Reportedly Says 'Restrictive Policy' Ended *[PRAVDA 11 Nov]* 22
Deputies Note European Criticism of Language Law *[Bratislava Radio]* 22
Churches Have 'Serious Objections' to Language Law *[PRAVDA 11 Nov]* 23
Hungarian Mayors Want Rejection of Language Law *[Budapest Radio]* 23
Duray: No Apology for Comparison to Rabin Killer *[PRAVDA 11 Nov]* 24
Ministry Terminates Activity of Option Exchange *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 11 Nov]* 24
Iraqi Ambassador Stresses Trade 'Possibilities' *[NARODNA OBRODA 11 Nov]* 24

HUNGARY

Kovacs Focuses on Balkan Tasks at WEU Session *[Budapest Radio]* 26

- Kovacs on Response to Nigerian Executions *[Budapest Radio]* ... 26
    - Opposition Criticizes Ministry *[Budapest TV]* ... 26
- MSZP MP's Visit Horn, Support Bokros' Reforms *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 14 Nov]* ... 27
- New MSZOSZ Chairman Views Policy, Prospects *[NEPSZAVA 10 Nov]* ... 27
- Civic Organizations Protest Armament Procurement *[Budapest Radio]* ... 28

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

- 'Contradictory Assessments' Made of Ohio Talks *[Sarajevo Radio]* ... 29
    - 'Strong' U.S. Pressure on Croats *[Zagreb Radio]* ... 29
- Bosnian Opposition Parties Demand Unified Nation *[Sarajevo Radio]* ... 30
    - Posavina Congress Opposes Corridor *[Sarajevo Radio]* ... 30
    - Parties Discuss Sarajevo District *[Sarajevo Radio]* ... 30
    - Muslims Reject Serb Sea Access *[SRNA]* ... 31
- Presidency Extends Support to Peace Delegation *[Sarajevo Radio]* ... 31
- Article Examines Dealing for Karadzic 'Departure' *[NIN 10 Nov]* ... 31
- Karadzic Assesses Ohio Talks, Hague Indictment *[SVET 13 Nov]* ... 33
- Newspapers, Leaders React to Hague Indictments *[Sarajevo Radio]* ... 35
- Bosnian Croat Speaker Comments on Hague Decision *[Zagreb TV]* ... 35
    - Croat Official Defends Accused *[Mostar Radio]* ... 36
- EU Official Accuses Mostar Croats of Violations *[VJESNIK 2 Nov]* ... 37
- Bugojno Croats Protest Inaccuracies in Refugee List *[Mostar Radio]* ... 38
- Croat Official Protests UN Use of Minority Label *[Mostar Radio]* ... 38
- Radio Krajina Announcement Urges 'United' Defense *[Editorial Report]* ... 38
- Belgian UN Commander on Slavonian Peace Accord *[Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE 14 Nov]* ... 39
- U.S. Envoy on Serb Commitment to Work Camp Access *[AFP]* ... 39
- Government Discusses Report on Return of Refugees *[Sarajevo Radio]* ... 40
- Serb Agency Issues Six-Month Figures on Refugees *[AFP]* ... 41
- Serb Defense Ministry Fails To Provide Supplies *[Belgrade Radio]* ... 41
- Sarajevo Electricity, Water, Gas Situation 10 Nov *[Sarajevo Radio]* ... 41
- Hungary Offers Support To UN Peacekeepers *[TANJUG]* ... 42

CROATIA

- Serb Negotiators View Agreement on East Slavonia *[Belgrade Radio]* ... 43
    - Two Years' Transition Needed *[AFP]* ... 43
    - Volunteer Guard To Withdraw *[Belgrade Radio]* ... 44
    - Serb Parties Welcome Agreement *[TANJUG]* ... 44
- Ethnic Serbs Imprisoned for 'Armed Insurrection' *[Zagreb Radio]* ... 45
- Electoral Commission Issues Final Results *[Zagreb Radio]* ... 45
- Tudjman Appoints General Blaskic To Senior Post *[Zagreb TV]* ... 45

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

- Partnership for Peace Accord To Be Signed 15 Nov *[MIC]* ... 46
    - Military Analyst on Membership *[MIC]* ... 46
- Intentions of Ethnic Albanian Coalition Questioned *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 11 Nov]* ... 46
    - Reasons for PDPA-NDP Group *[Tirana TV]* ... 47

POLAND

- Butrus-Ghali on Warsaw Visit, UN Reform *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 9 Nov]* ... 48
- Poll Shows Kwasniewski Leading Walesa by 3% *[Warsaw TV]* ... 48
- Kwasniewski Outlines Economic Program *[Paris LE FIGARO 14 Nov]* ... 49
- Walesa-Solidarity Cooperation Agreement Signed *[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC 10 Nov]* ... 50

Government Security Chief Appointed General *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 8 Nov]* 50
No Discussion of Compensation for German Expellees *[Warsaw Radio]* 51
Cabinet for Ciech Part in Oil-Sector Privatization *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 8 Nov]* 51

ROMANIA

NATO Peacekeepers' Use of Arad Airport Suggested *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 11 Nov]* 53
Chief of Staff Outlines Army's Reform Goals *[CURIERUL NATIONAL 8 Nov]* 53
Campaign To Undermine Patriciu as Opposition Leader *[ZIUA 10 Nov]* 56
Maramure Police Uncover Drug Trafficking Network *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 10 Nov]* 56

SLOVENIA

Impact of Dayton Talks on Succession Issue Feared *[DELO 10 Nov]* 58
    Meeting on Issue in Ljubljana *[Ljubljana Radio]* 58

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Second Land Army Maneuvers on Bosnian Border *[Belgrade Radio]* 59

Montenegro

Ruling Party Welcomes Agreement on East Slavonia *[SRNA]* 59

Kosovo

Albanian Party Leaders Want End to 'Passivity' *[Editorial Report]* 59
Albanian Radio Reports 'Dangerous' Troop Movement *[Tirana Radio]* 60

Vojvodina

Hungarian Leader Discusses Minority's Problems *[Budapest Radio]* 60

Envoys at Dayton Talks Submit Draft Accord

LD1411172595 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Our Mostar correspondent has learned from the Presidential Council of Herzeg-Bosnia that talks on two most sensitive issues—maps and the future constitutional setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina—are under way in Dayton. Ivan Kristic has a report:

[Krstic] It has been learned through contacts with Croat members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation—Kresimir Zubak, Jadranko Prlic, and Mato Tadic—that the organizers of the Dayton talks handed to the negotiators a general framework agreement on peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina; there are 11 annexes enclosed with it. The annexes regulate the cessation of hostilities and demilitarization, draft [territorial] settlement, organization of elections, and constitutional solutions for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croat envoys have submitted their written objections with proposals to each of these documents, bearing in mind the interests of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and securing equal rights for the Croats as a constituent nation. The Croat side is in agreement that the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina should include top international provisions and standards on human rights and liberties. It has also put forward a proposal that the future presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina should consist of three instead of nine members—representatives of the constituent nations. The constitutional proposal of the Croat side also contains precisely set-out powers and regulations on the decisionmaking process in the parliament and presidency to prevent violation of vital national interests, says a statement by the office of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.

Parties Deny Claim of Dinner With U.S. Diplomats

AU1011130695 Tirana ALBANIA in Albanian 3 Nov 95 p 3

[Report by I. Hajdari: "Milo and Mehdiu React to the Article"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Paskal Milo [deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party, PSD] and Fatmir Mehdiu [deputy chairman of the Republican Party, PR] reacted harshly yesterday [2 Nov] to the KOHA JONE article, "U.S. Diplomats Dine With the Opposition," which they considered to be conjecture. PSD Deputy Chairman Mehdiu was the first to denounce the KOHA JONE article, calling it pure speculation. He says that he has to clarify the truth about the dinner because he was one of the participants.

Mehdiu's statement reads: "The dinner was not with representatives of the U.S. State Department, but a meeting of the political party leaders with Mr. Barry Parkinson, a Canadian diplomat in Budapest." Mediu denounces the allusions of the KOHA JONE correspondents to the Nano case, saying that it was not mentioned, far less commented on by those present. As for Dosti's visit to China, the PR deputy chairman says that it was a fantasy of the correspondents, because the visit and the fear of cooperation with China was not discussed at the meeting, as the article claims.

Mehdiu demanded information on the source the correspondent refers to, as none of those present at the dinner, the Albanians, Americans, and Canadians, made any statement for the press.

The PSD's Milo reacted by denouncing the article. In his statement, he dwelt on part of the article that said Paskal Milo informed the foreign diplomats that the PD deputy chairman is to visit China and that Berisha will visit China in January. Milo described this as pure fantasy and was astonished at the courage of the correspondent, who, although not present, communicated his fantasy to others. Milo says in his statement that the correspondent did not contact him and he demanded that the correspondent reveal the source of his information.

The PSD deputy chairman did not hesitate to remind the correspondent that this is not the first time that he has distorted the facts in his articles. Milo also referred to the U.S. Embassy's denial of reports about Zibendrit's meeting with Albanian politicians in which PSD Chairman Skender Gjinushi was the victim of journalists' slanders and inventions.

Minister: Siemens To Reconstruct Rinas Airport

AU1011132995 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 3 Nov 95 p 1

[Report by D. Karaj: "Siemens Is Coming to Rinas"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Our interests in the reconstruction of Rinas airport started at the end of 1993, at the time when the German Siemens was announced the winner of the tender for the conclusion of this project," Mrs. Suzana Panariti, minister of industry, transportation, and trade, told RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE. From the moment of the signing of the technical contract between Siemens and the Albanian side, regular contacts were established between the parties, until the German Hermes Bank confirmed the necessary loan for the conclusion of the first stage of this project, which will cost about 49 million German marks or $30 million.

To wrap up everything, the decisionmakers of this project will come to Albania to hold talks with top Albanian government officials. Minister Panariti said, "It must be pointed out that there is goodwill to give the green light to German investors, especially now that our legislation stimulates and guarantees all foreign investment in Albania."

Legislators Discuss Prosecution of Border Killings

AU1311071395 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 8 Nov 95 p 3

[Report by "A.C.": "Murders at the Border: Here Is the List of 'Culprits'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The former leaders of the state and the ghosts of those killed on the border are now confronting one another. The first list of the crimes committed on the border in the years 1989-90 has now reached the Presidium of the People's Assembly. Interior Minister Agron Musaraj and two officials of the Procurator General's Office handed over the first 30 names of victims of the border together with 23 names of commandants of commissariats of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the time. All these former officials worked under the orders of former interior minister Hekuran Isai and subsequently Simon Stefani. A report by Dragoshi and data from Musaraj were the main topics at a meeting of the Parliamentary Commission for Public Order, the National Intelligence Service, and Defense. Only a few days previously, this commission had been officially deemed the prosecuting party in the case of crimes committed on the border. "A working group has been created under the Interior Ministry's wing, which will assemble the necessary documentation," Agron Musaraj said yesterday. He spoke about the details of this procedure and said that the process of establishing the names of those killed and the places where they are buried has now begun. The working group under the Interior Ministry has begun its inspection of the official documents, the orders issued after 8 May 1990, and the encoded telegrams. Musaraj says that cooperation with other bodies in assembling important evidence will help to solve this problem. The interior minister said at yesterday's meeting that "all the material necessary to enable the procurator to begin investigations will be ready within two weeks." In connection with the minister's report and his comments, Azem Hajdari, chairman of the Public Order Commission, told GAZETA SHQIPTARE that "if this procedure is followed, no information, instructions, or set of rules that led to the terrible murders of many people on the border can escape." According to Hajdari, the Interior Ministry's working group has the task of collecting documentation from every last and most remote border post in Albania. "This method of verification," he said, "is capable of catching everybody in its net, from the most senior commandant of the branch of the Interior Ministry down to ordinary privates who may have committed crimes or dragged corpses behind motor vehicles."

Meanwhile, two officials of the Procurator General's Office have passed to the commission a message from their chief, Alush Dragoshi. "The Procurator General's Office has asked all the procurators of border districts and the Tirana Procurator's' Office for data about murders on the border and during the events surrounding the embassies in Tirana, in the period 9 May 1990 to 31 March 1991," the document sent by Procurator General Dragoshi states.

Only a few days previously, Azem Hajdari had asserted on his own initiative and under the authority of the parliamentary commission he heads that he will prepare charges over the murders at the border and other murders that took place between 1989 and 1992. Meanwhile, a seven-point set of demands has been prepared for the Interior Ministry. One of these demands assumed final official form only yesterday. Accurate statistics are lacking regarding the names of those murdered, and the times and places of the crimes. There is none of the documentation that would have accompanied the bodies. There is a lack of evidence concerning the investigations of the then Interior Ministry and the State Security Service, and also regarding cases in which corpses were abused or dragged behind motor vehicles, where such incidents took place, who ordered them, and how these people communicated among themselves and with former President Alia. Only after the Interior Ministry fully considers these points will the commission headed by Azem Hajdari be ready to submit its charges in a suit that Hajdari says will also involve the help of specialized lawyers.

[Box, p 3]

Hajdari and Ruci, Moments of Irritation

Certain statements published by both sides have become the reason for moments of irritation between Hajdari and Ruci. In connection with the problem of the border murders, Ruci accuses Hajdari over some statements which, the Socialist Party leader claims, were made not only in the name of the commission but in the name of Ruci himself. The commission chairman retorted, "I have issued no statement in your name." He insisted that Ruci had been present at the meeting a few days ago at which, Hajdari claims, it was agreed to prosecute the border murders. Gramoz Ruci said yesterday that he had no objection to this prosecution, but insisted that when the matter had been discussed he had been at the meeting of the Socialist Party Management Committee. The argument between Hajdari and Ruci, nevertheless, lasted 20 minutes, before giving way to the commission's discussions of the imminent prosecutions of the murders on the border.

State To Prosecute 23

AU1411150495 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 8 Nov 95 p 2

[Report by J.G.: "Twenty-Three People Charged"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A list of killings at the border arrived yesterday at the legislature's Parliamentary Commission of Defense, Public Order, and ShIK [National Intelligence Service], headed by Azem Hajdari. The commission met for about three hours. The members argued among themselves, especially Ruci [Socialist Party secretary general] and Hajdari. Also present were Interior Minister Musaraj and two delegates from the Prosecutor's Office, Hoti and Luli.

Interior Minister Musaraj's report stressed the work done so far by the ministry's working group to gather the necessary documents, the names of those killed, and the location of their graves. Acts and orders issued after 9 May 1990 are also being checked. Though some materials have been frozen by the Prosecutor's Office (Erseke and Kukes), within two weeks all the documents will be ready.

A full report by General Prosecutor Dragoshi was also read out at the meeting. According to him, the Prosecutor's Office is giving priority, in line with the respective law, to prosecuting all those who participated in border kilings, whether aiding or abetting or even by covering up crimes from the 1989-92 period.

The list of those killed from 1989-90 has been completed with the dates of each person's death. For the first time yesterday, a complete list of those charged with the killings during that period was published. There are 23 accused and they will be put on trial soon. They are former internal affairs department chiefs, commanders, or commissars of military units, etc.

Recently the press published a series of testimonies sent to the Prosecutor's Office by the families of the deceased in Shkoder, Malesi e Madhe, Delvine, Permet, and Kolonje. The families want revenge against former President Alia and Hekuran Isai [former interior minister]. According to Hajdari, the full involvement of the parliamentary commission consists in locating the documents, otherwise, the families could never find out the truth about their relatives. The commission is widening the range of testimonies because it involves not only Alia and Ministers Isai and Stefani, but also a large number of military commanders and commissars. "They should have not allowed these killings, since from 8 May 1990 crossing the border was not considered treason against the homeland," says Hajdari. He insists that the investigation will extend beyond border killings, so as to find out the real killers of Arben Broci [student killed on 2 April 1990] and his friends.

It has meanwhile been pointed out that the archive contains the full list of those killed, which has already been published, but there are fears that other documents may be missing. In two weeks, the final lists of the victims and of those directly responsible will appear.

Greek Proposal of Military Summit Questioned

AU1311170295 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 10 Nov 95 p 16

[Commentary by Andrey Apostolov: "Do Not Trust the Greeks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During his visit to Athens in October, Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov received a proposal from his Greek counterpart to hold a trilateral military meeting between Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania. On our side, no one uttered a word against this idea. Quite the reverse, our people applauded it and it was explained that this would be something like a mini-Vienna Convention and a system open to all states. Later, it emerged that the Romanians apparently do not know that we are to meet, and when we met them in Bucharest, it was diplomatically hinted to us that it is extremely illogical for the three of us to talk when there are more of us in the Balkans, and all of us have for many years been very sensitive on the subject of private meetings.

As for the Greeks, the reason for their desire to propose the meeting is clear. This is a way of fishing in troubled waters with gullible people, that is, to demonstrate to Ankara something that does not exist, but, nevertheless, does a job—in this case, some kind of trilateral meeting. In response to the questions why Athens needs such a meeting, not a single Bulgarian military official could give a coherent answer. A month will have to go by before we can reply in the negative. During this period, I assume that the people in Ankara, Skopje, Tirana, and the capitals of the former Yugoslav republics will closely observe our military officials' diplomatic activities.

As military officers, they ought to know who belongs to which camp. Greece and Turkey are in NATO, while we are members of the Partnership for Peace trade union, and we should not swallow every piece of bait that floats our way. As well as reading the NATO doctrine, we also should read the Iliad.

Geology Committee To Auction Drilling Licenses

AU0911122395 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 7 Nov 95 p 1

[Report by Irina Kuneva: "Drilling for Oil To Begin at 10 More Sites"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 6 November the Geology Committee announced a new auction of licenses, under which foreign companies will drill exploratory wells for oil and natural gas at 10 sites.

Experts explained that the country has been divided into blocs. Each of the winning companies in the auction will receive a drilling concession covering an area of 1,000-4,000 square kilometers. According to Rumen Ognyanov, chief expert of the Geology Committee, the geological information has been prepared and the auction will be held as soon as the law on underground resources has been passed.

Exploratory wells will be drilled in the regions around Preslav, Vidin, Belogradchik, and Veliko Turnovo, and drilling will also take place in southern Bulgaria.

To date, only the U.S. company Maxus and British Gas have carried out any prospecting on dry land, and they failed to find any oil. However, the reports on their investigations carried out over four years indicate the existence of substantial petroleum deposits in Bulgaria. The blocs in which the two companies' exploratory wells are located will be including in the new auction of licenses, Georgi Georgiev, a consultant employed by the companies, explained.

Khristo Dabovski, chief of the Balkan Petroleum Association, said that, to date, foreign companies have spent $140 million on prospecting work in Bulgaria. However, the U.S. company of Texaco was the only one to discover gas near Cape Galata. Mack Kant, [name as transliterated] the Texaco representative in Bulgaria, said that the company intends to continue its operations.

In January, a technical council is due to discuss a report prepared by the Americans, following which it will become clear whether Texaco will extract gas from the field that it has discovered. According to Radi Ivanov, the chief expert of Bulgargaz, the field is not large, and bringing it into production depends on whether the gas yield will cover the cost of the equipment. However, other experts believe that the deposit is commercially viable, because when it has been exhausted, it can be converted into an underground gas reservoir. Bulgaria needs such reservoirs to store the Russian gas that is flowing through the country.

Topenergy Changes Seen as Serving State Interests

AU1511104795 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 11 Nov 95 p 7

[Commentary by Veselka Marinova: "Gas Faucet Remains in State Hands"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the time being, despite the fact that its holdings in Topenergy decreased from 50 to 30 percent, Bulgaria nevertheless has succeeded in preserving a rather significant share in its hands. Bulgargas has 25.1 percent of the shares in its hands, and the state institutions have a total of 30 percent.

At this stage, this guarantees the state interests—every important decision in Topenergy requires 75 percent of the shareholders' votes. In the present situation, the capital of all shareholders except Bulgargas amounts to 74.9 percent. In practice, this means that the faucet continues to be in the hands of Bulgargas, which is a state organization.

The state and the government took an insurance policy through the appointment of the three new members of the Topenergy leadership, all of whom are government men. Krasimir Nikolov is the chief of the prime minister's office and chairman of the Bulgargas board of directors. Rumen Ovcharov is not only Nikolov's deputy in Bulgargas, but also the second man in the Committee on Power Supply. The third appointee, Borislav Georgiev, also is a state employee. He is deputy minister of trade and foreign economic relations.

Topenergy's business plan will be reviewed in mid-December in Moscow. However, by then Bulgaria must have new regulations for applying the Concessions Bill, which should accord the national interests.

As far as the issue of the private candidates for participation is concerned, the matter is not as simple as it appears to be at first glance. For example, it is an open secret that Multigroup and Overgas Inc., have long been in the gas business. They have enough financial means, something Topenergy needs. There is a hope that the interests of the state and possible private shareholders will coincide with the interests of Topenergy, especially where big money is involved. There is a hope that this private-state hybrid will provide investments and future dividends. The money could come from the sale of gas and the possibility to obtain credits.

Because of the second element—the possibility to obtain credits—one should not ignore two other candidate-shareholders: Bulbank and the First Private Bank. The two banks already are servicing Bulgargas, while Bulbank is in the foundation of the Yamburg agreement's financial aspect.

The talks with Gasprom representatives were not easy and hardly will be any easier in the future. The important factor is to make sure that the state property continues to be state property, and that those who have been authorized to protect the state interests, indeed will do this.

Kozloduy Plant Creates Half of State's Electricity

AU0811075895 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] During the month of October, the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant produced 1.218 billion kwh of electricity. Since the start of the year, the nuclear plant has generated more than 17 billion kwh of electric power, which represents 50 percent of the total amount of electricity produced in our country.

At the moment, the Nos. 1, 3, and 4 [440-megawatt—MW] reactors and the 1,000-MW No. 6 reactor are in operation, producing 45 million kwh of electricity per day. Permission from the Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to bring the No. 2 reactor back into service is awaiting. The No. 5 reactor unit is also being prepared for startup.

Klaus: Integration Into NATO 'Top Priority'

BR1411144795 Paris LE FIGARO in French
14 Nov 95 p 6

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Xavier Gautier in Prague; date not given: "Besieged Liberal Vaclav Klaus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gautier] If Europe misses its deadline for monetary union, European integration will suffer a fresh setback. Will this delay your country's accession to the EU?

[Klaus] European integration is merely following its course. Headway is being made, but it is an awesome feat to pull off. Consequently, I would avoid speaking about it in such alarmist terms. I differentiate between our aspirations and what can be achieved.

[Gautier] Russia strongly opposes the integration into NATO of former Warsaw Pact countries. Are you worried about the support it is seemingly being given by certain countries in the West?

[Klaus] Becoming a member of NATO remains our top priority. But we must remain realistic: Russia does not want to be isolated and surrounded by countries belonging to the Atlantic alliance. If I were in Russia's place, I would hardly find such a prospect pleasing. On the other hand, we must relativize the statements made by Boris Yeltsin that are intended for internal consumption in Russia.

[Gautier] Must Prague fear a Russia whose politics appear to be growing more and more unpredictable?

[Klaus] I do not want to appear overly irresponsible, but you must understand that, from our point of view, Russia is less dangerous today than it was six years ago. I do not accept incisive statements where Moscow is concerned. In this part of the world, we remember only too well how our lives used to be governed by the iron fist of communism.

[Gautier] So you are not among those who denounce the replacement of a Cold War by a kind of "cold peace"?

[Klaus] No, because that is not the case. The second word I reject is "vacuum" used in connection with security. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact has not created a security vacuum in Central Europe. A new system is currently establishing itself. We need some time.

[Gautier] Today, Hungary would appear to have been relegated to the sidelines of the leading group of candidate EU member states, to the benefit of Slovenia. Why?

[Klaus] It is true that Hungary's position is sliding a little. Indeed it has lost its position as the most advanced [East European] country, the prime example of a nation on the road to economic reform. However, far be it from me to judge the policy of its government; all I am doing is stating a fact.

[Gautier] Has the negative progress made by Hungary not been caused by the arrival in power of a socialist government in Budapest?

[Klaus] I think not. The change of government barely affected Hungary's economic policy.

[Gautier] Former communists are also returning to power in Slovakia, Lithuania, and maybe next Sunday [19 November] Poland. Is the Czech Republic the next country on the list?

[Klaus] I do not want that to be the case. The Czech Republic constitutes an exception in many respects. However, it is true that if I look around I can see that I am now the only liberal head of government.

[Gautier] The (former communist) Social Democratic Party is credited with 25 percent of the intended vote, a figure not far removed from that attributed to your own party, the Civic Democratic Party. And a general election is scheduled to take place next June.

[Klaus] If the Social Democrats appear to be gaining ground, it is because they now occupy the whole left flank of the political scene. But theirs is a socialist movement of the old school. I personally have never recognized the difference between socialism and communism. We will win in 1996.

[Gautier] Some of your fellow citizens are of the opinion that German influence in your country is too strong, are they not?

[Klaus] I am not at all worried by such a prospect.

[Gautier] Three years after the division of Czechoslovakia, what is your assessment of this "velvet separation"?

[Klaus] It is impossible to relive the past. Too many people have still not understood that Czechoslovakia no longer exists. Slovakia is a neighbor, that is all there is to say. It is wrong to hold the view that what happens there will affect Prague in any way whatsoever.

Article Views EU Eastward Expansion

95CH0367C Prague EKONOM in Czech 30 Aug 95 pp 45-46

[Article by Prof. Jaroslav Jaks, National Economics College: "The Eastward Expansion of the European Union—Impatience Is Not Appropriate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *From the first days that opened the way to the fundamental socioeconomic transformation of the Czech Republic, it was clear to the majority of the politically thinking public that the further direction of the free and breakthrough-oriented community will be connected with full membership in the European Union [EU]. According to some semiofficial positions, it can be expected that the Czech Republic will submit its application as early as this year, although it is far from clear when this application will begin to be dealt with following the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union (in about 1997). But it is high time for the broadest interested groups in the economic and political sphere, not only government authorities, to begin very specifically dealing with the complexities of the entire process, with the opened-up problems, in order to assess the positives as well as the costs of the entire integrational maneuver.*

Following a phase of a certain transformational inward look, it is now necessary to ever more frequently consider the changes in the Czech Republic with regard to their international and, primarily, European anchorage. This is by far not merely a matter of questions of business or of general economic problems; it is only the gradual integration of the emerging democratic political-economic structures of Czech society into the integrational system of the European Union that is a passable alternative involving the long-term assurance of security and stability. In this finding, the Czech Republic is not alone; desires to go this way have already been voiced, among others, by more than 10 countries of Central and East Europe that are transforming themselves, as well as by some Mediterranean countries (Malta, Cyprus). Another 15 countries, which are already members of the EU, must individually and collectively demonstrate adequate political interest in accepting a further expansion of the union.

Factors Influencing Eastward Expansion

Even if, in our judgment, the possible expansion of the EU tends to be more of a long-term matter, extending into the 21st century, it is already possible to identify some of the factors that signaled the structure of the entire process and its problems. The common starting point, then, is the assumption that prointegrational developments will take place among both partners, that is to say, on the side of the EU, as well as on the side of the countries of Central and East Europe that have signed the Euroagreement, underlying the association with the European Community [EC]. The absolutization of only one of the poles (for example, the thesis that "we are ready, but they are not") will not do and is arrogant, not to mention that it has a long way to go in terms of actual readiness for full membership.

The first factor influencing the quality of the approach to the EU will undoubtedly be the fulfillment of the letter and spirit of the European Agreement, both in its political and also its economic (and not only commercial) portions. Even though this document still does not constitute the basis for an automatic right to membership, its broad take, which in many aspects copies the articles of Roman agreements, constitutes the fundamental prerequisites for the entire approach maneuver for the Czech Republic and for the other associating countries. Fulfillment of this agreement and the intensity of its internal fulfillment and its working out will undoubtedly even constitute a test of readiness for full membership. It is only possible to hope that, in view of its strategic-security importance, this process will be centrally conceived and monitored by a correspondingly important method. Excessive "subsidiarity," leaving the entire implementation process to the sector level and leaving an opening for possible conflicts of interest, would slow down and possibly even endanger the fulfillment of the Euroagreement. Certainly, production of a "white book" covering the fulfillment of the Euroagreement, which would be expressly supraministerial in character with verifiable target dates, would be beneficial. This will also require the clarification of a number of internal economic-political conceptual questions, including the role played by the state.

Although during the period during which the Euroagreements were being signed and prepared (the beginning of the 1990's) the EC/EU was not expressing any political will aimed at full membership in integrating institutions, subsequent development (and pressure) in the countries of Central and East Europe contributed to a shift even within the EU. The session of the European Council in Copenhagen (June 1993) and then particularly at Essen (December 1994) approved the "strategy of preparation for membership" on the part of countries of Central and East Europe. This line will undoubtedly be the key strategic determinant for the rapprochement—in addition to the Euroagreement. The appropriate documents provide ample information on how the EU and its member states visualize future relationships. There was again a reminder of the necessity to fulfill fundamental economic and political conditions for membership, and it was very symptomatic that the criterion that stresses "the capabilities of the union to take on new members in a way that would preserve the integrational momentum and internal cohesiveness" was reiterated. There was again a reminder of the necessity to "purposefully continue on the course of reform" in the economy and politics, and this necessity was considered to be "key."

White Book

The European Council in Essen, in addition to dealing with the development of so-called structural relationships in extraeconomic sectors of integrational collaboration (collaboration and meeting of chiefs of governments, sector ministers, including justice and interior), placed extraordinary emphasis on preparing the integration of association partners into a unified domestic market. Because the countries of Central and East Europe that fulfill conditions for membership will also become participants in the domestic market of the union, the "preparation for the domestic market stands at the center of the strategy for preparation for membership." This is certainly a new element in the approach by the EU to the transformation countries that can, on the one hand, bring membership in the EU closer, but can also delay it as a result of the gradual deformation of an "interim phase," which is very close to the so-called European Economic Area (relationship between the EC and the EFTA). The importance of the domestic market was once more confirmed by the European Council in June 1995 (at Cannes), as a result of the approval of the appropriate White Book.

The White Book, which expresses the "preparations among the associated countries of Central and East Europe for integration into the domestic market of the union," is an important document expressing a substantive schedule of preparations for the domestic market for those countries that will have the political will and material conditions to undergo the entire demanding process. The language and spirit of the extensive document contains strong stimuli for an essential programmed approach to the fulfillment of individual sectors of rapprochement with the domestic market. In the introduction, it is stressed that "integration into the domestic market must be differentiated from membership in the union." In circles of the associated countries, particularly in the Visegrad Group, the headway that has been made in adopting EU legislation is frequently stressed. The White Book cautions: "The merely formal adoption of legislation is not sufficient to achieve the desired economic results nor to assure the effective functioning of the domestic market following its further expansion. The same emphasis is, therefore, placed on the creation of appropriate structures for the realization of this legislation and the imposition of sanctions for its violations. Of the two tasks, the latter could be the more difficult."

This formulation already "wafts" of the energetic attitudes of the community institutions with regard to the participants in the entire maneuver, which cannot always be perceived correctly and can be erroneously interpreted as constituting "Brussels dirigism." In fact, what is involved here is an interest in real progress in the domestic market and not only formally legislative progress. The White Book also directs attention to a mutual integration of legislation covering the domestic market with legislation in the field of economic competition, social policy, and environmental policy. "Some portions of this legislation are vital to the functioning of the domestic market," the White Book notes. The fastest possible establishment of our own priorities and time schedules, even for conditions in the Czech Republic, will be another test of our preparedness. "Absent the essential institutional changes, the adoption of domestic market laws could end up with a completely formal adoption of legal standards."

How Is the European Union Prepared?

First of all, it is necessary to stress that the actual possible acceptance of additional new members into the EU from among the countries of Central and East Europe continues to remain connected with the fulfillment of so many complicated conditions that it essentially remains an open question—even after Copenhagen and Essen. That is why the community institutions are resisting the identification of deadlines for membership acceptance; in the best case (the summit at Corfu), it is clear that discussions will not begin until after the intergovernmental EU conference (IGC), that is to say, perhaps after 1997. It is also necessary to figure on Malta and Cyprus having a head start in integration into the process of acceptance. The question of EU readiness is connected with a whole series of objective problems and challenges that reflect the internal status of developments in the union, its key priority in conjunction with the reform of the institutional system, and other tasks that confront the IGC. The time for possible discussion of applications from East Europe will come about when the EU will be confronting the dilemma of preparing phase three of the European economic and monetary union. It is not very likely that this complicated problem could be resolved concurrently with the problem of eastern expansion.

Sometimes the associating countries tend to overestimate the role of the entire expansion maneuver within the hierarchy of EU priorities and particularly for their individual member countries. And, on the other hand, the associating countries tend to underestimate the role of the goals derived from the internal developments of the entire community complex. In this direction, Essen resulted in a number of new, and from the interest point of the Czech Republic, not overly "positive" elements. First of all, the time of the exclusive "defending" of the Visegrad Group has obviously come to an end, which is possibly detrimental specifically to the Czech Republic. The signing of Euroagreements with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and the preparation of a similar document involving Slovenia has expanded the block of candidates for membership in an extraordinary manner. It would be an illusion to expect the simultaneous acceptance of all, but, at the same time, the prospect that the EU would have to begin differentiating all the resulting consequences is also not particularly fortuitous for the union. At Essen, it was specifically stated that the above-listed Baltic countries and Slovenia would be added to those who have embarked upon the road to embrace the strategy of approach. The fulfillment of economic criteria will be only one of the viewpoints in this regard. In the event of the creation of a small block solution involving these countries, it is a question as to what is the minimum size of the block—and which countries should not be missing from it. It is not by coincidence that the official representatives of the EU or of the individual member countries evade this question and essentially give all partners with whom they are dealing a good "European" report card. The EU is primarily a political process and regarding its further expansion will follow its primarily political-security viewpoints.

It is similarly unlikely that the motivation for acceptance in the EU can be the primary interest in strengthening stability in the transforming countries or rather the acceptance of countries that are considerably unstable and have had little success in transformational matters. The EU will accept only successful reform countries, but again not without regard to the consequences of any possible unfeeling differentiation in approving applications: This could intensify the rivalry within the region of Central and East Europe. The EU will undoubtedly be "testing" its future potential members for a long time, not only with regard to how they are fulfilling partial criteria, but also whether they are demonstrating a high degree of solidarity with respect to institutions of the union, which does not exclude discrete critical constructive attitudes.

This Involves Not Only Central Europe

The Essen summit also formulated a strategy with respect to the Mediterranean, together with an eastern strategy, with an express element of fears that the eastern expansion should not overshadow other union problems. This line is being asserted particularly by France, Spain, Italy, and Greece, and the first results are already in. "The Mediterranean represents a priority area of strategic importance to the EU," it was said at Essen. From the standpoint of the impact of developments in the Mediterranean area upon some countries of the union, the effort to avert crisis situations and immigration waves can, in the coming years, result in placing this region particularly into a more advantageous "competitive position" than any region of East Europe. This is all the more so because the Mediterranean region has much broader connections in terms of its economic ties with the EU.

Expert circles in the EU are already examining the details of various scenarios of economic costs that might be connected with the expansion by the addition of countries in Central and East Europe. The impact on structural funds, on joint agricultural policy in the EU, would virtually lead to doubling the expenditures from the EU budget. That is why the process of eastern expansion is frequently connected with reforms of those policies of the EU that are financially very demanding (agricultural and structural policy). But here, there are very strong interest groups that have prevailed, for the time being, all the way through the governmental level. Even a possible renationalization of a common agricultural policy would only increase the pressure on taxpayers. All of these estimates always involve expenses for the entire group of countries in Central and East Europe, where, for example, Poland comes in for around 50 percent in these estimates (with regard to its potential as well as its economic level). And no one can visualize the first round of eastern expansion in the EU without Poland!

Therefore, even a continuously successful Czech Republic will have to (let us hope) count more on the fact that its future membership depends, to a great extent, on the acceptance of the entire block of countries of East Europe. This does not exclude the individual handling of applications. If we start out with the existing history of the integration process in (West) Europe and with the motivation for expansion, then the political and other extraeconomic viewpoints were always very important. To the extent that even the future eastern expansion becomes a fact, it is precisely other than economic viewpoints that will play an extraordinary role. Not in last place will be the perception of the EU's own security.

Even though eastern expansion is not on the agenda of the prepared intergovernmental conference, its results, particularly where reforms of the decisionmaking process are concerned, which is adapted to the community by the addition of more than 20 members, will be very considerable in terms of the subsequent fate of those interested in EU membership. The larger number of members must not endanger the action capabilities of the community and an increase in the number of so-called small countries must not increase their influence in voting procedures. This is a complicated question because the existing "power" balance between the small and large countries of the union is an essential factor involved in the acceptance of the entire integration architecture. Judging by some expert opinions, it will be realistic to prepare for a very long time of preparation for membership, a time that will be filled with specific and comprehensive acts involved in the integration of associated countries into the institutional circle and common market of the union. Mastery of the challenges posed by the competitive environment, both with respect to the EU and also with respect to the partners in the transformation region, will be more than an adequate test of economic policy and diplomacy on the part of the future applicant for membership in the union, based not only on economic competition, but also on social balance and respect for the environment.

Inventor Doubts Tamara Ability To Detect Stealth

AU1411190595 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 13 Nov 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Jaroslav Kmenta and Jan Gazdik: "Tamara Will Not Detect an Invisible Aircraft, Its Inventor Claims"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—One of the inventors of the unique Tamara radar, Vlastimil Pech, has cast doubt on whether this system would be able to monitor the flight path of the "invisible" U.S. Stealth aircraft. This capability has normally been ascribed to Tamara.

Pech claims that Tamara can register the F-117 Stealth tactical aircraft and the Northrop B-2 bomber for only a fleeting moment—when the aircraft emits a signal. However, the experts say that the crews of these aircraft communicate only rarely with the ground station or other aircraft. In combat, the crews of the U.S. aircraft adhere strictly to the regime of invisibility. So, it is impossible to detect them by using current electronic devices, including Tamara.

Vlastimil Pech confirmed that Stealth has been picked up by a passive radar system, for example, in the Persian Gulf region. "Experts from the Czechoslovak Arm, who trained soldiers in Syria to service Tamara's predecessor, the Ramona passive radar, registered a fleeting radio impulse several times. However, it was impossible to determine the aircraft's flight path or the tasks it was fulfilling," declared the inventor.

Tamara was developed as a defense intelligence device that, at a breadth of 200 km and a depth of 450 km, identifies, without emitting demasking signals, the radiolocation traffic of an adversary who wants to conceal it. With extraordinary precision, it identifies positions among ground targets, aircraft flight paths, and ships' bearings.

Tamara also recognizes whether it has already encountered a target. Its memory, distinguishing the characteristic features of the style of work of the crew of the monitored object, makes this possible. So, it is possible to tell, with a considerable degree of probability and ample lead time, several hundred kilometers before the Republic's borders are reached, how the monitored aircraft or ground target will maneuver.

These facts are also confirmed by an analysis of the exercises conducted in April by the Czech Air Force, Air Defense, and special parachute units in which Tamara was used.

Experts from the Army magazine CESKE LETECTVO [Czech Air Force] and Air Defense representatives recommended recently that Tamara be incorporated into the Republic's operations system. They maintain that the information the radar can gather about the air and ground equipment of an adversary is, in view of the small size of the Republic's territory, of invaluable importance for the tactics of our own Air Force and, therefore, for the defense of the country.

Intelligence reports on the war in the Persian Gulf confirm that Tamara can also be used effectively in military conflict. When the allied forces' command announced after the first few days of bombing Iraqi positions that many Iraqi tanks and missiles had been destroyed, the Syrians soon set them right. They had mapped Iraqi territory perfectly with the assistance of Ramona, Tamara's predecessor. Ramona did not record the radio traffic characteristic of missile bases or tank units in the locations of the alleged hits.

The Syrians told the Americans that they had bombed Iraqi mock-ups. The allies immediately revised their statistics on successful air strikes.

Of course, Pech thinks that, following the collapse of the Iron Curtain, intelligence devices like Tamara are obsolete. According to him, only systems that, like Tamara, proceed from the chronometrically hyperbolic principle have a purpose; however, they will serve as an autonomous information source for civilian air traffic control. That is, the quality and accuracy of measuring a position and determining the type of aircraft will be increased with its assistance.

In the event that traditional radars cease to function, a passive electronic system can replace temporarily the main air traffic control system. Experts from the aviation sphere say that, with the assistance of such a system, it is possible to prevent air disasters caused by civilian aircraft being mistaken for military aircraft. For example, Pech believes that Tamara could have prevented the disaster involving the Iranian A-300 airliner that was brought down in 1988 by a missile fired from the U.S. cruiser Vincennes. The flight path of the civilian aircraft was superimposed on that of an Iranian fighter aircraft.

Pech knows—evidently he is the only one—how to jam Tamara. However, the 71-year-old inventor wants to take the principle behind this idea to the grave. He would reveal it—for example, to the Americans—only if the unique radar system were sold to a country that exports terrorism. Vlastimil Pech is, therefore, concerned for his life. He adds, however, that he has already survived other events and that it is his business if he does not survive this time.

Inventor Fears for Life

AU1411200995 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 11 Nov 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "The Spiritual Father of the Tamara Radar Has Expressed Grave Concern for His Life"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The alleged spiritual father of the Tamara radar, Vlastimil Pech, expressed concern for his life yesterday. He said this on a Czech Television news program. He is concerned because he knows how to jam Tamara.

Despite this, however, he does not intend to make public his new invention for jamming Tamara, which has the reputation of being a radar capable of detecting even the U.S. Stealth invisible aircraft. The radar is a state-of-the-art defense system and, according to its manufacturer, is capable of detecting any kind of object in the air, on the ground, or on the sea. At the moment, he does not intend to reveal the principle behind his discovery to anyone. According to him, Tamara must not be sold to a country that exports terrorism. "Then, I would tell the appropriate side—for example, the United States—how it can be effectively jammed." Pech has become involved in a dispute over who the radar's spiritual father is in connection with his new invention. He has stated that he is the "spiritual father of the Tamara principle." Oldrich Barak, the president of HTT Tesla Pardubice, which manufactures Tamara, casts doubt on this, however. According to him, several dozen staff who have taken out patents on Tamara were involved in developing the radar.

Police Foil Illegal Arms Sale by Foreigners

96CH0001C Prague PRAGUE POST in English 3 Oct 95 p 1

[Article by Jan Stojaspal and Brendan McNally: "Czech Sleuths Thwart Arms Buy"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech Republic's reputation as the site of questionable arms dealing may have become less tarnished after police arrested a criminal gang for attempting to buy thousands of submachine guns destined for a war zone.

Following a nearly yearlong investigation, detectives from the Czech National police's organized-crime division recently arrested three foreigners buying 5,700 Czech-made SA 61 Scorpion submachine guns. The deal was worth Kc40.5 million ($1.56 million) and the arms were destined for an unspecified country outside of Europe, government officials said.

Those arrested 15 September include a Pole living in Vienna, an Austrian, and a Dominican living in the United States. The trio was charged with illegal trading in military goods. A fourth gang member, also a Dominican, managed to escape the police dragnet.

Interior Ministry spokesman Jan Subert claimed that the Pole was the ringleader.

"He is somebody virtually every intelligence agency in Europe knows about," Subert said. "He is known to have mediated a number of big arms deals in the past, but they've never come up with evidence to arrest him."

The two Dominicans had been posing as senior officials of the Dominican Republic Defense Ministry. Nothing is currently known by police about the Austrian, who was with the Pole at the time of his arrest.

Subert said the investigation began a year ago, after the Pole appeared in the Czech Republic. In the spring of 1995, he approached Letecke opravny Kbely (LOK), the aircraft repair company at the Kbely military airfield in Prague 9.

Vaclav Renc, commercial director at LOK, said the Pole, accompanied by two Dominicans, presented all the necessary documentation for arms sales. "It looked proper. So we called up (arms manufacturer) Ceska zbrojovka and started to arrange the deal."

Ceska zbrojovka spokesman Jiri Frenzl confirmed that "LOK approached us about buying large numbers of Scorpions. We told them, 'If you have the license, we can supply you with the weapons.'"

Ceska zbrojovka does not currently produce the Scorpion, but has large numbers of the weapon in its inventor.

Moving to carry out the deal, LOK went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and received preliminary approval on 6 June.

Although LOK possessed the general license for arms dealing, Czech law also requires state-approved licensing for each individual arms sale.

When officials applied for that license, Jaroslav Olsa, Jr., an advisor on arms control to the first deputy minister of foreign affairs, became suspicious, because the Dominican Republic traditionally has not been a buyer of Czech military hardware.

Olsa, who has gained a reputation for sniffing out bogus arms sales, decided to verify whether the Dominican Republic was actually buying the weapons.

On 4 August, he received a report from the Dominican Embassy in Bonn that the documentation was indeed bogus. The ministry froze the trade.

But the Pole did not give up, Subert said. During the next month the Foreign Ministry began receiving contradictory legal papers from other sources, some saying that the documentation was valid, some that it was false.

In early September, Olsa phoned the Dominican Defense Ministry and learned that both of the two "officials" were phonies.

Bank Governor Explores Convertibility of Koruna

96P20091A Prague PRAGUE POST in English
3 Oct 95 p 5

[Article by Maggie Ledford Lawson: "CNB Governor Calls for a Flexible Crown"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Almost on the eve of enactment of a new currency law, Czech National Bank Governor Josef Tosovsky said he remains committed to a flexible approach to currency conversion. This was his message to an audience of some 50 foreign investors on 19 September as part of a three-day conference sponsored by Wood and Co. Securities.

Allowing a floating currency exchange isn't desirable at present because the Czech Republic's "fundamentals are different from those in Germany" and other European Union countries, Tosovsky told the investors. The National Bank is the central regulatory agency in this country for monetary matters and Tosovsky has differed with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus on monetary philosophy.

Touching on a number of issues, Tosovsky predicted that the economy would accelerate in the coming year. All economic sectors are growing, he said, except transportation, which is planning, and agriculture, which is stagnant.

Tosovsky said inflation ran at about 9 percent from August 1994 to August 1995: "It's the best record in Central and Eastern Europe," but it's as much as three times higher than in some Western European countries and that's something that must be dealt with.

"Inflation has gone up gradually, but foreign-exchange reserves have increased even faster," he said. At the beginning of the year, the central bank debt had $6.2 billion in foreign exchange, whereas it now has $11.4 billion.

"Our net position is a creditor position and that is different from other countries," he said.

The trade balance went in the other direction, deteriorating to the point where imports exceeded exports by $1.8 billion in the first half of this year.

"I must confess that...how quickly the (trade) deficit has grown is a surprise, but I expected a deficit because of the need to accelerate the (economic) restructuring process," he said.

The widening of the trade imbalance has resulted mainly from increased demand for imports, he said. "The export performance was quite normal." The demand for imports and the excellent rates paid on deposit could be to future appreciation of the currency.

That in turn could lead to a lot of competitiveness, said Tosovsky.

Flexibility of the exchange rate instead of a floating rate will help keep currency appreciation from getting out of hand, he said.

Tosovsky added that eventually the Czech Republic can be slated to "more or less follow developments in the European Union—including those involving currency."

Skoda Pilsen, Skoda Diesel Stock Swap Considered

96CH0001D Prague PRAGUE POST in English
3 Oct 95 pp 6, 10

[Article by Alex Friedrich: "Skoda Diesel Resisting Skoda Pilsen Takeover Bid"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In its plan to expand its industrial holdings, Skoda Pilsen is discussing a one-for-three stock swap with Skoda Diesel's shareholders to increase its stake in the Prague engine producer. Skoda Pilsen officials say their company is aiming for a majority holding in Skoda Diesel by the end of the year.

The offer has been under consideration for over half year, said Skoda Diesel Chairman Jindrich Dolezal. He said he's against the deal under the proposed ratio and his mustering his forces against the land. "I'll go to the...or the end...of this," he said. This week Dolezal will present the firm's economic report to be other directors and ask for their support "for a program to stay independent of Skoda Pilsen." He added, "I expect they'll support this."

After all, Dolezal said, in the event of a takeover, Skoda Pilsen would change management in addition to collecting money from its subsidiaries to boost Skoda Diesel's production.

Skoda Diesel posted a loss of 70 million korunas (Sk) ($2.7 million) last year on sales of 200 million korunas. In the first half of this year, it reported a 26 million korunas in accounting losses, but a real profit of Kc4 million. The difference, officials claim, is due to Kc31 million in disputed interest payments that were written off but never paid.

More than 45 percent of Skoda Diesel is in the hands of six investment funds: Prvni privatizacni investicni fond (First Privatization Investment Fund), VUB Kupon fond VUB Coupon Fundj, Rentiersky investicni fond (Retirement Investment Fund), Investicni fond rychleho vynosu (Rapid Growth Investment Fund), Sporitelni privatizacni fond (Savings Privatization Fund), and Restitucni investicni fond (Restitution Investment Fund). The National Property Fund owns 4.78 percent and Skoda Pilsen recently acquired an 11.63 percent share through its acquisition of Liaz this summer. The remainder of shares are held by individuals and funds, most holding less than 3 percent.

Though Dolezal said he doubts the investment fund will agree to a deal with Skoda Pilsen, fund managers questioned said they'd swap if the ratio and conditions were right, and three-for-one seemed fair to those interviewed. Skoda Pilsen share value is around 601 korunas ($22.68) per share, more than three times the value of Skoda Diesel's Kc180 a share.

"It's a good deal," said Jiri Susicky, engineering sector researcher at Patria Finance. "Skoda Pilsen is a bit undervalued. Engineering stocks have been depressed in general, but Skoda Pilsen true value is not reflected in the share prices."

"Have you seen their liabilities?" He asked. "Skoda Pilsen has large debts, but it does not pay them. How can they proclaim they have a profit on the balance sheet? I think we have the same worth as Skoda Pilsen. We want one-for-one."

Susicky said Skoda Pilsen "obviously has had a lot of debts, but they've managed to reduce them. They have taken on more loans for investment projects, but it is a healthy sign...that it is expanding." The Liaz purchase "has not exhausted its borrowing capacity."

Skoda Pilsen has projected sales of Kc25 billion this year and profits should increase from last year's Kc500 million to 1.5 billion.

The acquisition of Skoda Diesel would complement Skoda Pilsen's production program, providing the company with an engine factory for the manufacture of large diesel and gasoline engines.

It would also solve the ongoing dispute the two companies have over their common Skoda name, to which Skoda Pilsen continues to claim ownership. Skoda Pilsen spokesman Karel Samec said the company has filed lawsuits against all Skoda namesakes except for auto maker Skoda Mlada Boleslav, with which it has an agreement. Samec would not disclose the conditions of the agreement or Skoda Pilsen demands on the companies, though Dolezal said the firm wants Kc60 million for a three-year right to use the name.

But Skoda Diesel refuses to budge.

"To use another name would be a loss for us," said Dolezal. "For example, in South America there are motors that we sold before World War II. People know the name of Skoda."

Dolezal said that in August he had sent at letter to the ministries of privatization and trade asking them for their position on the problem. After all, "they sold Skoda Pilsen and Skoda Diesel through coupon privatization."

The ministries in turn have left it to the two companies to fight it out between themselves.

The case "should be solved in a commercial court," said National Property Fund spokesman Milos Ruzicka.

Aside from ending the trademark headache, acquisition of Skoda Diesel would also give Skoda Pilsen access to 900 million korunas in assets Dolezal claims the company has.

But Skoda Diesel's technical development program is stagnating due to lack of funds. The company is negotiating a Kc90 million loan from the Bank of Japan to finance equipment to enable production of engine housings for Mitsubishi, for which the company is already machining tie-rods.

"We need to reach another technical level to stay in the market," Dolezal said.

He hopes, however, that Skoda Diesel will bounce back through projects such as a recently awarded $2 million contract for a generator in Indonesia, which the company will supply by the end of the year.

Prague Becoming Center for Russian Expatriates

96CH0001B Prague PRAGUE POST in English 3 Oct 95 p 3

[Article by Kathleen Knox: "Three New Russian Papers Invade Prague Newsstands"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In the club room above Prague's Beryozhka Russian restaurant, a crowd of smartly dressed Russian invitees mingled with their ambassador, Alexander Lebedyev, to toast a new arrival in the community: Pochtal'on (Postman), a Russian language monthly newspaper published in Prague and costing Kc27.

The launch in September of not Pochtal'on but of two other Russian language newspapers—Chekhia seghodnya (Bohemia Today) and Ruskyi Mir (Russian World)—has confirmed that Prague is a growing center for Russian expatriates

"It's proof they're coming here and I'm sure more will," said Pochtal'on's editor German Fradkin, at great silvery bear of a man with a booming voice. Border and Alien Police statistics show that only around 3,600 Russians have residency permits—compared with 1,188 last year—but Fradkin puts the number at around 20,000, most of them in Prague.

To be sure, Prague's Russian community is not on the same scale as that in Berlin, where an estimated 70,000 to 100,000 Russian emigres have built a "little Russia" and where their compatriots are provided with a range of services, including radio and television shows.

Instead, Russians here paint a picture of a less cohesive, more transitory community, drawn to the Czech capital by tradition as much as by the business opportunities that attract other foreigners. Understandably, by tradition they mean an emigration during an earlier age rather than the decades of Soviet troop presence.

"From the 1920's, Prague was always one of the main cities for Russian emigres," Fradkin said. He wants his neighbor, which has a print run of 6,000 and is owned by the company Smecrom, to give a helping hand to the "new Russians" who are on the move here. Though some question how a relatively small and splintered market will support three new papers, Fradkin and his team believe their different target audiences—Chekhia seghodnya, for example, is business oriented and is also aimed at Russians back home—will ensure where survival.

Speaking in a grandly furnished chamber in the palatial Russian Embassy, press spokesman Yuryi Tsinghovatov also emphasized the old connections drawing Russians to the Czech Republic.

"The Russian colony in Prague was always big," he said. "It's not everywhere you'll find a Russian church.... People go where they have the opportunity of finding something familiar."

If the Russian presence in the Czech Republic is growing, Tsinghovatov said, it's partly thanks to newly wealthy tourists revisiting traditional playgrounds like Karlovy Vary. He said the money they spend is helping to erase memories of other guests who came in 1968 and overstayed their welcome by more than 20 years.

"More and more restaurants are printing their menus in Russian," he said, adding that a jeweler's shop at recently opened in central Prague requires its assistants to speak Russian.

Even for those who come here to work, however, Prague is often simply a stop on their way somewhere else.

"Those Russians who come here think of it as a trampoline to the West," said Oleg Uskhov, a producer at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, who is considering starting up a Russian radio show.

Uskhov said fear—legitimate or otherwise—of the mafia means Russians here are more reluctant than, say, Americans, to seek out their fellow countrymen. One of the speakers at the launch of Pochtal'on called on Russians working in the Czech Republic to respect this country's laws.

Tsingathov said, however, that organized crime elements from Russia were no more dominant in the Czech Republic than those from other countries.

'Substantially Lower' Wages Reported

95CH0369G Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 5 Sep 95 pp 1, 12

[Article by Alice Olbrichova: "Two-Thirds of the People Here Are Earning Wages Between 5,000 and 8,000 Korunas"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In more than one-half of the enterprises, the average wage this year is between 5,000 and 8,000 korunas [Kc], depending on the degree of prosperity of the enterprise. These enterprises employ two-thirds of all workers in enterprises employing the largest number of people; this span runs between Kc7,000 to Kc12,000.

Workers at enterprises that employ only a few employees earn more or less, with paychecks running on an average at Kc20,000 or even a mere Kc4,000.

Peak incomes are paid by real estate offices, banks, and insurance institutions; the worst-paid jobs are in small production facilities. Differences in income occur not only in conjunction with the size of enterprises. The general rule applies that industries located in towns pay more than agriculture in rural areas, mining jobs pay substantially more than jobs in textiles, and women get paid less than men—by as much as a third.

Even economists admit that if we recompute today's Czech wages in korunas in accordance with the rate of exchange listing by the Czech National Bank, our earnings are approximately at one-tenth of the wages earned by people in West European countries. This is confirmed, among others, by the "legendary" incomes of around Kc50,000 paid to commercial managers operating in the Czech Republic by a renowned foreign firm. Let us recall, however, that, in terms of productivity, our country lags behind developed Europe by a factor of three. It was only last year that it was possible to halt its decline and even a growth of productivity was recorded. According to some economists, this growth amounted to 2.9 percent. What is disturbing, however, is the fact that the share of investments in renewing technologies has experienced a long-term decline; in agriculture, for example, this decline is 7 percent beneath the normal level in developed market economies.

Czech wages are not only substantially lower than foreign wages, but are differentiated to a lesser degree.

Whereas abroad the differences between remuneration for qualified and simple work amount to several orders of magnitude, in this country the difference is approximately sixfold. The hourly salary of a director is around Kc150; the pay for a charwoman is not quite Kc25. We even have cheaper manpower in comparison with Hungary and Poland. Whereas employers in this country pay out additional financial resources per worker amounting to $321, in addition to wages, in Poland this amount is $370, and in Hungary it is $476. Even that is a lot for foreign employers today and so they are looking about elsewhere—for example, in Ukraine. The share of Czech wages in costs is low—it represents only 9 percent—thanks to which it has been possible to hold down inflation. According to economists, it is a pleasure to note that people have once more begun to save money. They are also spending more for services and goods. Wages, which, when recomputed in constant prices, are only reaching the 90-percent level of their 1989 amounts, now account for 47.2 percent of total income for the population. A not insignificant amount is represented by incomes from restituted property, inheritances, gifts, and the proceeds of securities.

Russian Envoy Lauds Meciar for Stand on NATO

AU1411200495 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
10 Nov 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Jan Skoda: "Ambassador Sergey Yastrzhembskiy: The Brave Slovak Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Russian side appreciates the high dynamics of political relations with Slovakia. That is how, at an informal meeting with correspondents yesterday, the Russian ambassador to the Slovak Republic assessed the third talks this year between the government delegations of the Russian Federation and the Slovak Republic in Moscow.

Sergey Yastrzhembskiy referred to Vladimir Meciar as an example to other European leaders because of his stand on the expansion of NATO, according to which an all-European security system cannot be established today to the detriment of Russian interests and at the cost of a new partition of Europe.

The ambassador of the Russian Federation pointed out certain moments of the Slovak prime minister's visit to Moscow that remain unheralded. They include, for instance, an agreement on taking stock of the existing contractual basis, which contains 44 treaties (of more than 200 from the time of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic) that still apply to current Slovak-Russian relations. They must be added to the 68 treaties signed over the 30 months of existence of the Slovak Republic.

He described the treaty on the completion of the Mochovce nuclear power plant as one of the most complex and rejected the claims of some newspapers that it was signed under duress and blackmail. "The Russian party values highly—it can be so phrased—the political courage of the Slovak Government in deciding to sign an advantageous agreement with the Russian Federation, regardless of the pressure exerted on it," Sergey Yastrzhembskiy emphasized. On the basis of this treaty, the Slovak Republic will obtain credit from Russia to the amount of $150 million ($80 million from the Russian Government and the remaining $70 million from the Atomic Energy Ministry). Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov should sign a protocol on the $70 million in Bratislava before the end of November. According to Yastrzhembskiy, the Russian side should provide the first installment of this sum before the end of the year.

The spent fuel from the Mochovce nuclear power plant will be returned to Russia for processing, in the same way as has been done with the spent fuel from the Jaslovske Bohunice nuclear power plant. The processed spent fuel will be stored in Russia. "Eventually, we will build a storage facility in Slovakia," Yastrzhembskiy added.

Regarding the preliminary agreement on building the southern branch of a new gas pipeline from Yamal, which would pass through Slovakia en route to Hungary, Slovenia, and Italy, Yastrzhembskiy said that they want to found a joint venture with Slovgazprom on its basis. This proposal, on which the Slovak Gas Industry and Gazprom would participate, is at the assessment stage. Gazprom founded similar companies in Hungary, for instance, and in Austria. In Moscow, the Slovak Government delegation received an agreement in principle on the construction of the southern branch. It must be observed here that Slovakia received $320 million last year for the transport of 70 billion cubic meters of Russian gas.

The ambassador of the Russian Federation also pointed out the dynamics of Russian debt payments, the present volume of which he estimated at $1.4 billion. It means that it has been reduced by $300 million during the life span of the independent Slovak Republic. According to the ambassador, special technology no longer holds first rank among the commodities used in the debt repayment. A shipment of aircraft for civilian transport is topical now, and the import of a cyclotron for Slovak health care is also expected.

[Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 10 November, on page 2 in a 250-word report by J. Janto, adds that Sergey Yastrzhembskiy stated: "In relations between the Russian Federation and the Slovak Republic, there is no room for demarches."]

Schenk on EU Integration, Russia, Germany

AU1411193395 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT
in German 14 Nov 95 p 29

[Report on interview with Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk by Josef Abaffy; place and date not given: "EU Integration Remains Priority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak Government is serious about its application for EU membership, which it submitted at the EU summit in Cannes in the summer, and is sticking to it. In an interview with HANDELSBLATT, Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk pointed out that the existing irritation in other countries about the country's domestic policy problems could not change the Slovak Government's intentions regarding European policy.

Schenk starts from the assumption that, in line with the Maastricht Treaty, about six months after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference, talks between Brussels and the membership candidates, first and foremost the Central European reformist countries, would start and that this would include Slovakia. Schenk conceded, however, that, at the moment, one could only speculate about the course, the duration, and the result of the talks, particularly since the EU countries themselves do not have any concrete ideas yet of the political constitution of Europe. The economic reforms and the economic developments of Slovakia, however, leave no doubt that the country is getting ready for membership in the future EU.

The Prime Minister's Ambitious Plans

For Foreign Minister Schenk, the recent EU communique that expressed concern about—in the EU's view—dangers to democratic developments in Slovakia is a "serious matter," but "the form in which it was written was somewhat unfortunate."

He is, of course, not unaware of the controversy between the coalition and Prime Minister Meciar's government, on the one hand, and the state president—the first are calling and working for the resignation of President Kovac—on the other; yet, this was the result of the distribution of powers between the individual constitutional bodies, which the Constitution does not clarify. Slovakia must now define more precisely the powers of the constitutional bodies.

Like Prime Minister Meciar, who is not concealing his ambitions for a reform of the Constitution and the introduction of presidential democracy (with him as president), Schenk emphasized that this process was taking place in line with the regulations of the Constitution and with respect for the principles of democracy.

The foreign minister is certainly not regarding the Central European Free Trade Agreement, CEFTA, consisting of the Visegrad countries (Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) and, soon, Slovenia, as a body competing with the EU.

No "Customs Union" With Russia

The point is rather to develop the CEFTA member countries, all of which must have concluded an associate membership agreement with the EU and seeking EU membership, through liberalized trade to a stage that can create the joint basis for cooperation leading to EU integration: "We think that integration into the EU can take place in more than one dimension." EU integration must not lead to new "zones," to a division of EU regions into rich and poor countries. "The zone of prosperity must not stop at Slovakia's borders."

Foreign Minister Schenk made a point in emphasizing that, between the Russian Government—Prime Minister Meciar recently visited Moscow—and Slovakia, there had been no talks or even agreements on any kind of "customs union." "No such proposal was made; nor are we interested in turning this into a new problem with the EU." If anything, one could talk about "industrial free zones" in Russia, where Slovak firms could become active.

Schenk defended, however, the desired intensification of economic relations between Slovakia and Russia. Russia is by far Slovakia's most important supplier of raw materials, both regarding energy sources and minerals, which leads to a bilateral trade balance deficit for Slovakia of—recently—$1.2 billion. This must and can be reduced through better export opportunities for Slovak firms, Schenk said.

Schenk noted that another controversial issue between Bonn and Bratislava was currently being discussed, but that there was no compromise in sight, at least not in the short term; [this is] the dispute about the translation of the name "Federal Republic of Germany" into Slovak. In the opinion of the government in Bratislava, it would read as (retranslated into German) "German Federal Republic" ("German" used as an adjective), while Bonn traditionally insists on the use of the noun. According to Schenk, this was a purely linguistic problem that Bonn turned into a political problem.

Agreements With Bonn Put on Ice

The minister rejects the criticism that Slovakia returned to the methods of the Cold War with this policy; if other countries with Slavic languages yielded to Bonn's ideas, they failed to respect the rules of the Slavic languages. Schenk noted, however, that a solution could be found "with a certain amount of goodwill on both sides," but it seems as if the Slovak side wanted to insist in its own linguistic form. Until the problem is solved, several contracts and agreements between Bonn and Bratislava, which are ready to be signed, will remain on ice.

CE Official Comments on Slovak Domestic Problems

AU1411160295 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 9 Nov 95 pp 1, 3

["Exclusive" interview with Miguel Angel Martinez, chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, by Juraj Alner in Bratislava; date not given: "Miguel Angel Martinez: The Only Problem of Slovaks Is That They Believe Themselves a Problem"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Alner] Some Europeans are convinced that a confrontation with Russia cannot be avoided, and one must get ready for it. Others say that everything in our power must be done to avoid such a confrontation. You belong to the latter group.

[Martinez] The former group necessarily arrives at the conclusion that Russia must be isolated. They believe that we must get ready for another Cold War, possibly even a hot war. I believe that is completely erroneous. [passage omitted]

[Alner] Slovakia is located on a very sensitive border. We have heard questions asked about whether Russia plays some role in making strategic decisions regarding our future.

[Martinez] I have no doubt at all that Slovakia belongs in the first round of the future expansion of the European Union.

[Alner] Slovakia is an active member of the Council of Europe.

[Martinez] It is a 100-percent European country.

[Alner] Slovak domestic policy has been frequently criticized—and even directly in the EU.

[Martinez] It could be that those criticizing are not properly informed. Slovakia has only one problem: Very few people know Slovakia. Since time immemorial, everybody got to know Prague or Budapest. But only an initiated few knew something about the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia. It is necessary now that as many people as possible come to Slovakia and see it. They will see a European nation and a democratic society.

[Alner] The criticism is not aimed at society but, rather, at specific aspects of the political reality.

[Martinez] We encounter problems in all parts of Europe. Democracy per se is not firmly consolidated. Slovakia is neither worse nor better than the other states undergoing the transformation from a totalitarian to a democratic state.

[Alner] If I understand you correctly, you consider the present difficulties only problems of the transformation period.

[Martinez] I am absolutely optimistic. A couple of weeks ago I spoke in Bratislava about the existence in Slovakia of some institutional tensions, which are harmful. I also said that I hope you would be reasonable enough to eliminate these tensions. I believe that those in power have more instruments for doing so than those in the opposition. Tensions exist also in my country. Some of them are very acute. I am absolutely convinced that they will be dealt with in your country within the constitutional framework and according to democratic principles.

[Alner] How do you believe the relationship between the president and the government coalition can be resolved?

[Martinez] It is bad. I do not wish to discuss it. I only hope that it will be dealt with rationally, intelligently, and democratically.

[Alner] You have been dealing with the minority situation. I will refer to your renowned statement that the state has the right to expect complete loyalty from members of a minority, and minorities have the right to full-fledged participation in the life of the state.

[Martinez] I believe that there are efforts to find a solution to this problem. Slovakia is one of the states that signed the Council of Europe Framework Agreement on the Protection of Minority Rights. You are either the third or the fourth country to have ratified the convention. The only thing I can hope for is that other countries will follow suit. I cannot be critical of a country that did what we want other countries to do. Those who did not sign should be criticized, and those who did not ratify. That is the majority.

[Alner] The agreement was signed by 23 states, but only four ratified it.

[Martinez] I have again recommended magnanimity, flexibility, and reasonableness to all. I recommended the same thing also to the representatives of various minorities whom I met. There is only one problem that cannot be solved. It is the fact that a minority is and always will be a minority.

[Alner] Are you also of the opinion that, in a normally operating state, a minority has a natural advantage over the majority?

[Martinez] In my country, there are several minorities that understand it is a privilege to be one of their members. They are a combination of two cultures, while the majority nation has only one culture. They can benefit from their double culture as long as they do not want to isolate themselves in some form of ghetto and thereby become foreigners in their own country. I have always emphasized this to the representatives of minorities. They should not make the mistake of depriving themselves of their natural privilege and under the pretext of remaining their "old selves" become as if a foreign element on the "foreign body" of the majority nation.

[Alner] The Hungarians in Slovakia criticize the model of alternative education and the language bill. What you say is just theory. This, however, is the reality.

[Martinez] I do not know the details of these issues. Nonetheless, I know that the Slovak Government and the parliament asked the Council of Europe for experts and declared that they would accept the recommendations of these experts. Therefore I remain optimistic that a feasible solution will be found.

[Alner] Concerns that Slovakia has many enemies everywhere have been incessantly voiced in government coalition circles. Even the domestic criticism allegedly is an expression of a certain enmity.

[Martinez] The only problem of Slovaks is that they believe themselves a problem. They are not a problem for other Europeans. Slovakia is a good country, and the Slovaks good people. You have problems but, as I said, we have them, too.

Kovac Accused of Abusing Powers Using SIS

AU1411193695 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 11 Nov 95 p 2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "Special Parliamentary Body for Supervising the SIS: President Abused His Powers; President's Spokesman: The Exact Opposite Is True"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—A three-member group of deputies from the Special Parliamentary Body for Supervising the Slovak Information Service [SIS], headed by its chairman, Igor Urban, visited the Office of the President yesterday to familiarize itself with documents, on the basis of which it was to examine whether the SIS engages in unlawful activity. As Igor Urban told correspondents after the visit, they did not meet with the president but were received by Jan Findra, head of the Office of the President, who made available to them the president's letter to the SIS director, as well as Ivan Lexa's reply to the president. Jan Findra did not submit any other documents. According to Igor Urban, these letters did not contain any evidence of legal breaches by the SIS. Quite the contrary, it has been confirmed that the president of the Slovak Republic was engaging in activities beyond the framework of his constitutional powers. Igor Urban backed this up with an excerpt from the president's letter to the Special Parliamentary Body for Supervising the SIS: "In a letter dated 13 September, in accordance with Article...(reference to the Law on the SIS), I asked the SIS director for information concerning a possible threat to the security of the Slovak Republic through the limitation of freedom of decisionmaking of the president of the Slovak Republic and other constitutional officials. I also requested information that could possibly lead to discrediting, blackmailing, and compromising constitutional officials...." Igor Urban cannot make out for which of his powers, or for which activity, the president needs compromising information about constitutional officials. At its extraordinary meeting yesterday, the Special Parliamentary Body for Supervising the SIS concurred in this view, on the understanding that it would adopt its final standpoint next week, following legal consultations. Igor Urban added that, even if they lodged the matter with the General Prosecutor's Office, the president would not be criminally liable because, under the Constitution, the head of state can only be prosecuted on charges of high treason.

In an interview for NARODNA OBRODA, Vladimir Stefko, the president's spokesman, categorically rejected Igor Urban's claim that Slovak President Michal Kovac had requested from the SIS director compromising materials about constitutional officials. "The exact opposite is true: The president asked [the parliamentary body for supervising the SIS] to examine whether the SIS collects and accumulates information of this kind because he justifiedly suspects that SIS members are exceeding their legal powers," Vladimir Stefko stressed. Asked why the president did not receive the deputies in person, the spokesman explained that the president was preparing to receive a foreign guest, Simon Wiesenthal. Vladimir Stefko contested Igor Urban's claim that, in his request addressed to the SIS director and the Special Parliamentary Body for Supervising the SIS, the president was relying only on so-called open sources and added that, had this been the case, he would not have turned to the Special Parliamentary Body. He did so because he expected the Special Parliamentary Body to perform its control duties vis-a-vis the SIS, which he considers logical, Vladimir Stefko said in conclusion.

HZDS Deputy: Kovac Lied About Son's Arrest

AU1411151095 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 10 Nov 95 p 4

["Open letter" from HZDS Deputy Dusan Macuska, chairman of the parliamentary commission investigating the causes of the "constitutional crisis" of March 1994, to President Michal Kovac; issued in Bratislava on 9 November]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed Mr. President,

Since your inauguration as president, I have been observing your moralizing, your lecturing to the whole of society on the law, justice, the rule-of-law state, morals, Christian ethics, and tolerance. I would not object to all this if I did not have ample information about you and your activities. Other citizens also avail themselves of a great many findings about you. They can surely form their own opinion about your morals, given that to this day you have not apologized to them for your statement that Michal Kovac Jr. is not your son. Similarly, you have not apologized to them for your claim, which was legal and logical nonsense, that the international arrest warrant had been issued for your son Michal Kovac as a witness.

Do not underestimate the citizens of Slovakia, do not think that they can tolerate a lie!

Stop deceiving citizens who do not have enough information about why you refuse to appear before the parliamentary commission of inquiry and why you insist that it first submit its questions to you in writing. If you were an honest man and politician, you would be able to appear at any time before any parliamentary commission of inquiry and would not have to demean yourself by asking for questions formulated in advance. I know why you cannot appear before the parliamentary commission, but you should find enough courage to tell other citizens your reasons.

Mr. President, allow me to remind you of your preelection campaign against Roman Kovac, the other candidate for the presidency. Speaking to us, the chairmen of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] district presidiums and HZDS deputies, who were to decide which of the two of you should be the final HZDS candidate for the post of president, in the Natali restaurant in Banska Bystrica, you tried to persuade us by means of promises what kind of a president you would be if we chose you. Even then I doubted whether I should give my vote to a candidate ready to beseech us and make promises in such a humiliating way. And what I did not like at all was when you asked all those present whether they would vote for you and immediately recorded the names of those who said that they would not. I was the first on your list.

If you want to know why I did not vote for you, it was because, in your campaign against Roman Kovac, you resorted to a dishonest ploy. You kept stressing to everyone present that, although the HZDS had nominated two candidates, of the two of you Mr. Meciar had expressed the wish that he would welcome you as president rather than Roman Kovac. You knew that this was a lie, just as you know that your present statements about your son Michal Kovac are lies.

Just as you used dishonest methods to become president, now you are using the same sort of lies to stay president.

Bratislava, 9 November 1995

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 10 November on page 2 carries a 300-word report by Zita Sujova entitled "According to Stefko, Macuska's Letter Is Another Attack in a Series." The report states: "Speaking to NARODNA OBRODA, Vladimir Stefko, the president's spokesman, did not rule out that President Kovac would officially react to Deputy Dusan Macuska's letter, although, in his opinion, this would be a waste of the president's time and would keep the employees of his office from doing their jobs. In connection with Macuska's claim that the president has not yet apologized to citizens for denying his son, Vladimir Stefko said that this entire affair is fabricated. 'I was present when, replying in Michalovce to a citizen's question whether the Michal K. Jr. involved in the Technopol affair was his son, the president replied with a smile that there are many Michal K. Jrs. and that this case does not concern his son because his son has nothing in common with the Technopol affair,' Vladimir Stefko stressed."]

Meciar Responds to Carnogursky's Interpellation

AU1411204895 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 11 Nov 95 p 2

["Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's Response to an Interpellation by Jan Carngursky": "Only Nincompoops Incapable of Winning Elections Need To Misuse the Secret Services"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Law 46/93, the Government of the Slovak Republic determines the overall strength of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] and, on the recommendation of the director, approves its status. To this extent, and according to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, you can interpellate me. The powers of the government do not extend beyond this.

The interpellation includes your own personal moral problem and the problem of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]. I have always been against any misuse of the secret and security services against any politically active person or entity. Only nincompoops incapable of winning elections need to resort to this. I believe that my magnanimity towards you gives me the right to ask you several questions.

Why did you speak in 1992 about my arrest, while I have not been accused of anything?

Why did you in the coalition initiate a parliamentary investigative commission against me in the Slovak National Council?

Why did you tolerate in your party and coalition activities that should "produce" evidence against me that I am an StB [former State Security] or KGB agent?

Why did you include Deputy Langos on your election slate, renowned for his heroic deed in Mosnov?

Why does Deputy Javorsky enjoy your support although he manipulated facts and lied in matters of the administration of the Defense and Security Committee of the Slovak National Council?

Why did the KDH and the SIS cooperate so closely in Slovakia?

Why did you promote the former Federal Security Information Service [FBIS] deputy director, a renowned "Meciarbasher," to state secretary at the Education Ministry?

Why did you keep quiet when people close to your deputy installed an FBIS agent as my bodyguard?

Why did you not object when SIS agents were placed in my Government Office and on my election slate?

Why did you rationalize the FBIS and SIS activities against the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]?

Why did you render politically legitimate the misuse of the secret service against myself as the prime minister and against Ivan Gasparovic?

Why did you ignore the OKO [Special Supervisory Body of the parliament for supervising the SIS] report in the National Council of the Slovak Republic and create a precedent that it is not necessary to be in the commission to reject its results?

Why, in the interests of an immediate advantage, do you never respect your principles?

Why do you deceive the public regarding my participation in the case of Michal Kovac Jr. (or Sr.)?

Why do you lie about my associates?

Why do you not tell the truth about how you obtained the campaign bid from the HZDS election team?

Why do you want to teach me to be afraid of you, for even if I were a beggar, I would consider you a poor man?

Why do you threaten people with prison and punishments?

Why do you employ methods verging on fascism?

There are many more whys!

There is a fitting saying in Slovakia: "What you do not want done unto you, do not do unto others."

At first, I was only smiling about how you are desperately trying to fit me into the cause of Michal Kovac. Now, however, it has become boring.

In sympathy,

[signed] Vladimir Meciar, Slovak prime minister

Meciar Reportedly Says 'Restrictive Policy' Ended

*AU1411213595 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
11 Nov 95 p 2*

[Article by "PA": "Vladimir Meciar: Restrictive Policy Has Ended"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—In his regular Friday [10 November] interview for Slovak Radio, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar said that he is confident that the draft state budget for next year would be submitted to the National Council of the Slovak Republic by 15 November. However, some passages will still have to be discussed. This concerns the financing of capital investment projects, the requirements of the army, which will have to be considered, and support for young families looking after children, which the government wants to increase. The year of austerity [rok skromnosti; term often used by Meciar to characterize 1996] means, according to the prime minister, that restrictive policy has ended. However, a few things remain to be sorted out—debt repayment, recovery of the building industry and engineering production, and saving resources for development impulses. "I therefore think that the appeal for a year of austerity is an appeal for moderation, for a reasonable look at the development of the state," Vladimir Meciar said.

Deputies Note European Criticism of Language Law

*LD1511112195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 0900 GMT 15 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The 11th session of the National Council has been continuing in Bratislava since 0900 hours. Today's agenda contains the government-sponsored bill on state language and the amendment to the Consumer Protection Act. Parliamentary correspondents Jarmila Tosecka and Zuzana Stukovska report from the National Council.

[Tosecka] Before the deputies started debating the government-sponsored state language bill, Deputy Speaker Augustin Marian Huska addressed the parliament according to Article 19 of the Procedural Order. Huska said the liberal and socialist groups represented in the European Parliament are preparing a draft resolution concerning the Slovak Republic. The resolution will be presented at the coming session of the European Parliament.

The draft very briefly expresses concerns about dangers posed to democracy in Slovakia. In this context the draft mentions above all the efforts to expel Democratic Union deputies from parliament, the efforts to push the head of state out of office, the course of the investigations into the case of Michal Kovac Jr., and the introduction of the state language bill, which will allegedly deprive 11 percent of the population in Slovakia of the possibility of using their language as a language of official communication.

The European Parliament's draft resolution demands that this law, which is on the National Council's agenda today, be withdrawn from the agenda.

Augustin Marian Huska described the aforementioned information as one-sided. No one should be able to take away from a sovereign parliament the right to pass a law other states have had for a long time. Let us display before our people and the foreign public a peaceful, civilized, and democratic solution to this problem, the Slovak parliament deputy speaker said in the conclusion of his speech.

Responding to the speech by Augustin Marian Huska, Milan Knazko from the Democratic Union noted that the resolution states the truth. Although we did not write it, we agreed that it should be included in the deliberation of the European Parliament.

[Stukovska] This was followed by an explanation by Culture Minister Ivan Hudec of the state language bill. He gave an assurance, among other things, that the bill will not affect the rights governing the use of national minorities' languages and that the concerns that Czech films will be dubbed are unfounded.

He emphasized, however, that the state has a duty to make sure that each citizen of the Slovak Republic masters the state language. In conclusion, he said he believes that once the bill has gone through the Slovak parliament, it will convince all those who have been hitherto influenced by political arguments, and that the bill will not hurt anyone. At the same time he asked the National Council to support the bill. [passage omitted]

At 0950 hours, [National Council] Speaker Ivan Gasparovic opened the debate. Thus far, 26 deputies have submitted written applications to speak in the debate.

Churches Have 'Serious Objections' to Language Law

AU1411150795 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Nov 95 p 1

[Article by "ad": "Church Has Objections to Language Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Church representatives have serious objections to the bill on the state language, which they communicated to Ministry of Culture representatives at a joint meeting early this week. Representatives of the Slovak Bishops Conference and of the Reformed Christian Church and the Orthodox Church disagree with the wording of Article 1, Section 2, under which the use of liturgical languages should be regulated by special provisions.

This raised doubts as to whether these are to be state or church provisions. The church representatives therefore proposed that "the law should regulate neither the use of liturgical languages nor the language of the churches' internal agenda." The church representatives pointed out, furthermore, that Article 3, Section 2, Letter C is at variance with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and could damage Slovakia's good name abroad. The wedding ceremony is performed in the liturgical language and the formulation "the agenda of the churches destined for the public, including the act of concluding the bond of matrimony, is conducted in the state language" is unacceptable to the churches. They therefore proposed that the wording of this passage be changed to "...destined for public legal bodies, including the act of concluding the bond of matrimony." The church representatives voiced the conviction that the submitters of the bill as well as deputies would consider their objections in approving the bill.

Hungarian Mayors Want Rejection of Language Law

LD1411221495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak parliament will discuss the language bill tomorrow. Sixty-five mayors of the Zitny Ostrov [a stretch of land in southern Slovakia between the branches of Danube with large ethnic Hungarian population] region asked the deputies to reject it. Ildiko Nagy reports:

[Nagy] In a stand adopted today, the board of the Zitny Ostrov region, which comprises 110 villages, warns the Slovak parliament on behalf of the local governments [the board] represents that the bill on the state language violates the constitution in many points. The constitution guarantees the use of minority languages in official communication while the language bill excludes this possibility. The bill to be adopted is in contradiction with the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty and a number of international documents signed by Slovakia. It interferes with citizens' private life, controlling, for instance, the language of weddings, information provision, and exchange. It also meddles in the issues of education and school book publishing. It contains meaningless restraints on the further development of the Slovak language. Proceedings and administration cannot be carried out in the language of the minorities, even on local level and where they make up the majority of the inhabitants, and this cannot be reconciled with the mission of local governments.

Duray: No Apology for Comparison to Rabin Killer

AU1511095895 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Nov 95 p 5

[Unattributed report in the "Monitor" rubric, reprinted from the 10 November issue of the Hungarian-language daily UJ SZO: "Duray Will Not Apologize"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak Government issued a statement, in which it voiced the expectation that the Coexistence chairman would publicly apologize for his statement regarding the cabinet (at a news conference on 7 November, Miklos Duray stated that "assassins of the type who took the life of Rabin are in our government.") We asked Miklos Duray whether he intends to meet this expectation, and we also asked his coalition partners for their view.

Miklos Duray, Coexistence chairman: "I do not have the feeling that I should apologize for the above statement because it was well considered and made with the knowledge of the situation in mind. It is quite obvious that Yithaq Rabin was murdered by a person who belongs to forces that are categorically opposed to any agreement and reconciliation with Palestinians. It also is quite evident that forces are in Slovakia in the government today that are definitely opposed to reconciliation with Hungarians. Quite the contrary, they seek their gradual decimation. The analogy is clear and I therefore do not know for what I should apologize."

Laszlo A. Nagy, chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party: "Prior to the passage of the language law, promising cooperation between Slovak and Hungarian opposition parties is in the offing. The Slovak opposition has publicly pledged to oppose the bill in parliament and to appeal together with us to the Constitutional Court in the case of its passage. In this situation, I consider Miklos Duray's statement extremely unfortunate. The nationalistic press will use it for a campaign not just against the Coexistence chairman, but against the entire Hungarian Coalition and against Hungarians in Slovakia."

Bela Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement: "I consider such ill-considered statements deplorable. (...) It must be clear to us what we will achieve, and not achieve, with such statements. And we must also see whether we will improve the fate of Hungarians in Slovakia in this way, or make it more difficult."

Ministry Terminates Activity of Option Exchange

AU1411151395 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 11 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by Stanislav Tomanek: "Playing the Dead Bug?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Among the well informed, it no longer is a secret. The Bratislava Option Exchange [BOB] has not been permitted to operate any further as organizer of the public market. Under the provisions of the Law on Securities, BOB is under an obligation to terminate its activity on the day of the delivery of the Slovak Finance Ministry's decision. This decision was sent away already on 3 November, but BOB representatives "do not know anything." We tried to contact them, and the spokesmen assured us they would react as soon as they find out about the matter.

We wanted the responsible BOB representatives to deliver their opinion, but we did not manage to get through the "screen" of spokesmen. We believe that, when one of the organizers of the public market with securities goes out of operation, the public should know about it. The position of a dead bug surely is not fitting for financiers. When they intend to play for time, it is peculiar. The Ministry of Finance apparently had compelling reasons for signaling a halt to one of the two Slovak stock exchanges. The shareholders have a right to know what will happen next. Because of the feeble activity of the Bratislava Securities Exchange, BOB was supplanting some activities of that institution. As a result, trading in options logically accounted for only a negligible share of trading on the public market. The bulk of trading was accounted for by one-day options, and trading in options with an expiration period beyond one day was negligible. The ministry thus correctly concluded that the operation of a specialized organizer of trading in options and futures has no justification. Or, to put it in simpler terms, the current needs of the capital market in Slovakia do not require trading in options and futures concentrated in a specialized entity. However, the public and shareholders should also get to know the view of BOB officials.

Iraqi Ambassador Stresses Trade 'Possibilities'

AU1511072095 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 11 Nov 95 p 7

[Article by "bap": "Iraqi Ambassador: The Embargo Has Lasted for Five Years, But It Will Not Last Forever"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—At a meeting with members of the Slovak-Iraqi Society, 'Abd al-Razzaq Muhammad Salih, Prague-based ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Iraq to the Slovak Republic, expressed great satisfaction with his "introductory" meetings in Bratislava the day before yesterday. On Thursday, 9 November, the Iraqi ambassador presented his credentials to President Michal Kovac. He also met with Parliament Chairman Ivan Gasparovic, Jozef Sestak, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and deputy Irena Belohorska (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia), who recently visited Baghdad on the occasion of the referendum on confidence in Saddam Husayn.

During the inaugural audience, Michal Kovac stressed that Slovakia feels bound by the decisions of the UN Security Council on anti-Iraqi sanctions. According to the Iraqi diplomat, however, it is possible even now to cooperate in areas that are not affected by the embargo. This concerns, first and foremost, trade in commodities from the humanitarian sphere.

"If we wait for the embargo to be lifted and if our experts do not start meeting today to assess old bilateral agreements and prepare new ones, we will lose a lot of time," Ambassador Salih told the meeting of the Slovak-Iraqi Society. Regarding this, he mentioned that Slovak Economy Minister Jan Ducky's visit to Baghdad is being prepared. "The embargo has lasted for five years, but it will not last forever," the Iraqi ambassador said. [passage omitted]

According to Ambassador Salih, Iraq is now waiting for the semi-annual report of UN Chief Inspector Rolf Ekeus and hopes that the sanctions of the international community could be lifted. "Should some countries insist on the extension of the embargo for various reasons, it will no longer be a UN Security Council resolution but the decision of one or two states," Ambassador Salih said, clearly hinting at the United States, which rejects the abolition of the sanctions because Iraq still has not met all the conditions of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 11 November on page 12 carries a 500-word interview with Iraqi Ambassador 'Abd al-Razzaq Muhammad Salih by Boris Latta entitled "The Embargo Will Not Last Forever." In the interview, the date of which is not given, the ambassador asserts that Iraq has complied with "all conditions" of the UN Security Council resolutions and that the sanctions should therefore be lifted. Speaking about possibilities of Iraqi-Slovak cooperation, the ambassador says: "The embargo will not last forever. That is why we do not want to sit with our arms folded. Even today, we can cooperate in areas that are not included in the UN sanctions. We could trade, for example. To be specific, we would need paper for the production of exercise books or wood for the production of pencils. Education is free in Iraq, but the state is short of money. But children need exercise books, they want to write.... At the same time, we are trying to prepare the ground for the expansion of our contacts so as to be able to carry out our plans in the economic, scientific, cultural, but also sports spheres as soon as the sanctions are lifted. We have a great deal to build on. Activities that proved to be successful should be resumed and norms that have been rendered obsolete by time should be replaced by new ones. We have discussed the creation of the most optimal concept for mutual relations. One of the first steps should be a reciprocal visit by official delegations to Bratislava and Baghdad. In addition to politicians, the delegations should also comprise experts from various fields."]

Kovacs Focuses on Balkan Tasks at WEU Session

LD1411221795 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The crisis of the whole Yugoslav region must be resolved, Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs stressed at the ministerial session of the West European Union [WEU] in Madrid. Gyorgy Foris reports:

[Begin recording] [Foris] [Passage omitted] The Bosnian crisis and its management, or hopefully the management of its settlement, were the focus of the debate. What did you conclude from the debate regarding the stage of preparations?

[Kovacs] In the debate there was obvious satisfaction of the WEU member states and the associated partners with the achievements made so far; that is, the hitherto partial agreements. Everyone expressed readiness to contribute to furthering the peace process.

It was stressed by several contributors that the Yugoslav crisis was still far from a genuine settlement. At the moment we are in the period of sorting out things.

In my contribution, I emphasized that the aim was much more than just the creation of peace in Bosnia, for the crisis of the whole region must be resolved and in a way that prevents the breaking out of further similar crises. Therefore, international law; humanitarian, human, and minority rights; economic, restoration, and security policy; and disarmament tasks must be carried out with close cooperation of the various international organizations, which should contribute according to their competences. [end recording]

Kovacs on Response to Nigerian Executions

LD1311193895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 13 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Believe it or not, Nigeria has recalled its ambassadors from the United States, South Africa, and the 15 countries of the EU. The decision was, in fact, a response to similar measures taken by the Western states, the reason for which was the execution of nine human rights activists in the African country. [passage omitted]

The Hungarian stance is not yet known. On Saturday [11 November] the foreign affairs state secretary said that the decision was still being considered.

Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs is on the telephone line. Mr. Foreign Minister, has the Hungarian stance been arrived at yet? [passage omitted]

[Kovacs] The international community, including the EU, United States, and Canada took or signalled the intention of taking only political measures. This is what the Hungarian Government did when it raised its voice against the death penalty, and now it very strongly condemns the execution and demands the reinstatement of democratic norms in Nigeria. The question arises as to why Hungary does not recall its ambassador from Lagos like the EU countries.

[Announcer] Why not?

[Kovacs] There are two basic reasons. One is that the embassy in Lagos represents Hungary not only in Nigeria but in the whole of western Africa. It is known that, after the closure of missions to reduce expenditure, we have three embassies left in the whole of Africa. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] So our relations with the other African countries would break up.

[Kovacs] Exactly. This is one reason. The other reason is that, unlike the embassies of the EU countries, our embassy consists of two diplomats only. There is an ambassador and a low-ranking diplomat, so the recalling of the ambassador would practically paralyze the work of the whole embassy. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Another question. Are there any economic considerations in the fact that the Hungarian Government did not react more strongly?

[Kovacs] There is no direct economic consideration. Of course Hungary endeavors to promote its economic interests, but there was no such direct consideration in this case.

[Announcer] Why has what you have just said not been given greater publicity; that is, has not been published in the daily papers?

[Kovacs] I believe that it will be published in tomorrow's papers. We were informed of the execution on Sunday [12 November; as heard]. We did not call an extraordinary government session for this purpose on Sunday; I believe this is understandable.

Opposition Criticizes Ministry

LD1411210795 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The representation of the interests of the Hungarian community in Romania was raised in pre-agenda contributions in parliament today. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] In their pre-agenda contributions parliamentary deputies from the opposition parties were united in attacking the government. According to their opinion, the reactions by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are slow, since, for example, the Hungarian ambassador to Nigeria has not been recalled as a protest against the execution of nine Nigerian opposition politicians.

The foreign affairs state secretary [Istvan Szent-Ivanyi] said that the Hungarian Government had joined the protests and that it had not said the final word in the matter of recalling the diplomat.

The Foreign Ministry was also attacked for the poor representation of the interests of the Hungarian community beyond the borders. According to one of the deputies of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party, the biggest harm we can do to Hungarians beyond the borders is the fact that we are continuously stressing our helplessness and our lack of means to help.

In his response State Secretary Istvan Szent-Ivanyi warned that the government had to take Hungary's real weight into consideration. In his view, the most appropriate thing to do in the matter of the violation of law in Romania is to take the matter to the Council of Europe.

MSZP MP's Visit Horn, Support Bokros' Reforms

AU1511093995 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 14 Nov 95 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Group of Nine MP's Visit Horn, Support Bokros"]

[FBIS Translated Text] MAGYAR HIRLAP has learned that, before the parliamentary group of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] discussed the draft budget submitted by Finance Minister Lajos Bokros, a group of nine MSZP deputies paid a visit to Prime Minister Gyula Horn. The group consisted partly of deputies who organized the reform circles at the time of the change in the regime, such as Jozsef Geczi, and partly of deputies who are members of the National Assembly's economic and budgetary committees, such as Laszlo Puch. We have learned that the Socialist deputies made it clear to Horn that the pragmatic groups within the MSZP parliamentary group continue to support him and are not in favor of separating the positions of party chairman and prime minister. In exchange, they asked Horn to support Finance Minister Bokros and to do everything in his power for the success of the economic reform process started in March 1995. (After former finance minister Laszlo Bekesi's resignation, it was the former reform circle deputies who proposed the nomination of Lajos Bokros.)

One of the participants in the meeting told us that this group has nothing to do with the collection of signatures initiating the reelection of the leadership of the MSZP group in the National Assembly. In their view, the MSZP should now deal with genuine issues, primarily with the consistent continuation of the economic reform, rather than with personnel and organizational affair and with fulfilling personal ambitions. According to the members of this group who call themselves pragmatic, despite all his mistakes, it is necessary to continue to support Bokros for the success of the stabilization program.

New MSZOSZ Chairman Views Policy, Prospects

AU1411082595 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 10 Nov 95 pp 1, 4

[Interview with MSZOSZ Chairman Laszlo Sandor by Marianna Mucsanyi in Budapest on 9 November: "Laszlo Sandor Is the New MSZOSZ Chairman"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Mucsanyi] Most employees want to know how the Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ] will act in the current tense situation and whether the MSZOSZ will participate in the demonstrations of the coming weeks.

[Sandor] The change in the MSZOSZ leadership does not mean that we need a basic change in the direction of our policy, but we must find a correct percentage between lobbying and the use of direct trade union means. After doing our utmost at the negotiating table, we must also make use of the opportunities inherent in the strength of our members. It has become clear today that the current form of interest representation, a form that has been valid since the change of the regime, has become hollow. There has been no agreement in the Interest Coordination Council for months. Therefore, if we fail to come to an agreement on prices and wages at the upcoming meeting on 13 and 15 November, we will work out an action program. One can only retreat as long as this is justified. We think that there is a more just way of distributing Hungary's current low income, too.

[Mucsanyi] According to Laszlo Mate, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], the trade unions became more radical after the departure of the former MSZOSZ chairman Sandor Nagy, and the demands of the trade unions have become unrealistic.

[Sandor] The departure of Sandor Nagy has nothing to do with the radicalization; the trade unions are obliged to react strongly because of the prevailing situation. We should return to the genuine representation of interests and discard the method that has been characteristic of the MSZOSZ in recent months, namely that we had to legitimize edicts in the Coordination Council. I think the demands are justified, but both sides must admit that we are not talking about equally serious problems. The demands of health care and social welfare employees are the most justified among the many justified demands. [passage omitted]

[Mucsanyi] The government claims that the trade unions should accept the fact that Hungary is currently in an economic and financial policy crisis. As the MSZOSZ chairman, would you be ready to compromise in order to achieve an agreement?

[Sandor] We must reach sensible compromises. Lacking a national agreement, spontaneous and uncontrollable processes might begin, processes that could make the life of people living on wages and salaries even more difficult. I think, however, that the members, and not the chairman, should decide on acting, and this is why I said before that we would ask the opinion of MSZOSZ members on a possible series of actions if no agreement is reached at the next meeting of the Coordination Council. [passage omitted]

[Mucsanyi] Your previous statements show that the relations among the government, the ruling party, and the MSZOSZ are not very good.

[Sandor] We will reexamine our relations with the MSZP in the next two months, because strong contacts with a single party are incompatible with our efforts to integrate groups with various system of values. I stress, however, that there are no organizational links between us and the MSZP. As for the often-mentioned agreement, this was signed by the social democratic platform of the MSZOSZ.

[Mucsanyi] Does this mean an open split with the party?

[Sandor] No. It is rather an opening toward others. In addition to the social democratic platform, a Christian democratic group definitely has a place in our organization. These platforms could cooperate with the parties. However, I would not like to anticipate the decisions of the MSZOSZ Federal Council; we will also work out the conditions of cooperation with the parties, the parliamentary groups, and the deputies in the next two months. We must clearly formulate the advantages of supporting one party or another in the elections, and we must also stipulate this in a contract. [passage omitted]

Civic Organizations Protest Armament Procurement

LD1411202295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today 32 civic organizations have protested against armament. The demonstration was organized by the Alba Circle [nonviolent movement for peace]. Its spokesman, Tamas Csapody, cited surprising facts regarding armament in Hungary. Attila Peter Nagy reports.

[Nagy] The spokesman of the Alba Circle said the state spends 20 percent of the money paid by taxpayers on arms. Tamas Csapody is of the view that statistics are false and Hungary spends a much larger percent of its GDP on arms procurement than what the government admits.

[Begin Csapody recording] Policymakers do not talk about this. The Defense Ministry and the Hungarian Government simply do not disclose the real rates. This is enormous armament for a peaceful country in peacetime. Armament on this incredible scale is totally unnecessary for Hungary.

'Contradictory Assessments' Made of Ohio Talks

AU1411210595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Nov 95

[Report by Envera Selimovic from New York]

[FBIS Translated Text] Contradictory assessments (?keep coming in) from Dayton. The talks are entering their final phase, some sources say; others claim that the road to an agreement is still a long one, while still others assess that everything could be over by the middle of next week. This is perhaps the most realistic assessment.

Secretary of State Christopher is in Dayton today. It was rumored that he was going because certain agreements would be signed. However, yet another assessment is probably more realistic: Christopher has gone to Ohio to boost the negotiations, which are running out of steam in the final phase. Namely, sources close to the negotiations claim that the stances of the Bosnian and Serb delegations are still very far apart. Christopher is supposed to meet with Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic. The most difficult issues remain to be solved: elections, the constitution, and the maps. Stances on constitutional solutions have been coordinated to a certain extent; however, there seems to be no progress on crucial issues regarding the maps, a U.S. official said. Hundreds of maps have been drawn; changes have been drawn in and erased several times over, one of the legal experts stated. If a solution is not found, the Bosnian Government will insist on the Contact Group proposal. Bosnian representatives do not even want to discuss the issue of the Serb entity's access to the sea. It is also highly unlikely that they will agree to the return of Sanski Most, which is also one of the Serb delegation's demands.

No compromise has been reached regarding the two corridors, the Brcko and Gorazde corridors. However, the crucial problem of the negotiations could fit into three words: Sarajevo, Sarajevo, and Sarajevo again, a high-ranking Pentagon official said. The issue is no longer only territorial division. The crucial issue is the constitutional and legal status of the city and the issue of who has authority in it. The Serbs are rejecting the possibility of a single city administration. Holbrooke offered for Sarajevo to be a separate federal city, outside the territory of any entity, while Foreign Minister Sacirbegovic threatened that the delegation would rather withdraw from the negotiations than agree to a division of Sarajevo. In all of this, the status of foreign troops around the city is also uncertain. Parallel to the negotiations, Congress is warning President Clinton that he may well succeed in Dayton, but that he will have to face Congress and the U.S. public who oppose deploying U.S. troops in Bosnia.

'Strong' U.S. Pressure on Croats

LD1411221395 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] It has been announced by the Office of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, which is in constant contact with the Croat delegation in Dayton, that the U.S. Administration is intending to bring the talks to an end, and strong pressure is being exerted on the Croats. Ivan Kristic reports from Mostar:

[Begin Kristic recording] In its contacts with the Croat negotiators in Dayton — Kresimir Zubak, president of the Presidential Council of Herzeg-Bosnia and president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation; Dr. Jadranko Prlic, prime minister of Herzeg-Bosnia and federal vice president; Mato Tadic, minister of justice in the Herzeg-Bosnia government and in the government of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation — the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia has learned that the Croat negotiators are under strong pressure to make various concessions, starting from the demand that they refrain from insisting on the continued existence of Bosanska Posavina within the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and agree to a personnel structure for the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina that fails to take into account criteria previously agreed upon with the Bosniak side.

These direct pressures are being combined with rigged media reports about the indictment of Croat officials in Bosnia-Herzegovina just as decisive negotiations are under way on the border between the two entities and the structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Disinformation has thus been spread that President Zubak agreed to the issuing of the indictment against Croat officials in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Hague Tribunal. This is completely unfounded, even absurd, the Office of the Presidential Council of Herzeg-Bosnia has announced.

Croats in the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation will be very resolute in representing the interests defined by the political bodies of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a statement by the Office of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia says. [end recording]

Bosnian Opposition Parties Demand Unified Nation

AU1411210995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Nov 95

["Joint statement" by the Social Democratic Party, the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Democrats, the Muslim Bosniak Organization, the Republican Party, and the Croatian Peasants' Party, issued on 14 November]

[FBIS Translated Text] We support the agreement on the federation and, since the Dayton negotiations are entering a crucial and decisive phase, we believe that it is our duty to once again acquaint the public and warn the ruling parties that no one has the authority to accept any solution that does not guarantee the maintenance of the sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that will not secure a lasting and just peace in the region.

Starting out from the historic significance and responsibility before history and the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the consequences that could be the result of a move or stance that has not been carefully thought out, we believe that the establishment of a corridor in Posavina is unacceptable because it is in the function of a definite division of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory and will create the conditions for the secession of parts of Bosnia- Herzegovina and their annexation to other states. The establishment of the corridor is a direct negation of the sovereignty and integrity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which legalizes the results of genocide and aggression against the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Only an integral and unitary state can guarantee freedom of movement on its territory, which excludes the need to establish a corridor. Accepting any corridor means accepting the partition of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its disappearance as a state; it represents direct betrayal and negation of our four-year struggle. That is why no one has the right or legitimacy to make such a move. Moreover, a territorial division between the so-called entities along the 51 to 49 percent ratio rewards the aggressor for aggression and maintains the ratio of power at the time when the Contact Group proposed the plan.

We demand that Sarajevo remain a single and ethnically undivided city as the capital of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would have the status of a district with the functions of a canton, and would be under international supervision with maximum freedom for the legitimate authorities. Agreeing to partition Sarajevo along ethnic lines would mean rewarding the aggressor, which would make life in the city impossible; this would a cultural and civilizational disgrace for Europe and the entire world. We are demanding that the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina remain under international supervision for a year or two, after which the central government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina would take over. Without this, there can be no guarantee against secession and the destruction of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The possible ignoring of the issues stressed here and the concluding of a peace agreement on such principles will not lead to peace and prosperity, because this model has not been applicable anywhere, and not even the forces of the strongest military alliance will be able to implement it. Unfortunately, this will result in the continuation of the war at some later date.

Signed by the Social Democratic Party, the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, the Republican Party, the Muslim Bosniak Organization, and the Croatian Peasants' Party.

Posavina Congress Opposes Corridor

AU1411212195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Council of the Congress of Bosnian Posavina has issued a statement that reads as follows:

The Council opposes any division of Bosnian Posavina and the acceptance of the so-called corridor. The Council demands that Bosnian Posavina be returned to all Posavina citizens, with the exception of those who have dirtied their hands. Moreover, they demand full freedom of movement throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and want the entire territory of Bosnian Posavina to be included in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Parties Discuss Sarajevo District

AU1411212295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The delegations of the city councils of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats [UBHSD] held a meeting in Sarajevo today. The delegations were headed by Safet Halilovic and Dzevded Ibrisimovic.

The talks centered on a joint stance and coordination of stances on issues pertaining to the setting up of the district of Sarajevo in accordance with the Federation Constitution. Full accord was reached in stances regarding the establishment of district authorities and an integral, undivided city on the basis of electoral results and equal legal representation of all Sarajevo citizens in the district's institutions.

The talks, moreover, also touched upon the functioning of the Novo Sarajevo Municipal Assembly; an agreement was reached on the solution to this problem within the comprehensive framework of solutions to problems in the Sarajevo district.

Muslims Reject Serb Sea Access

LD1511093995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1918 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Cleveland, 14 Nov (SRNA) — The Muslim delegation at the Dayton talks is refusing to accept the [Bosnian] Serb Republic's demand for access to the sea and to give back the occupied Sanski Most. It is also opposed to the widening of the Serb corridor through Posavina [northern Bosnia] to 20 km.

According to sources close to the Serb negotiating team, the Muslim side is demanding a corridor between Sarajevo and Gorazde and is threatening to leave the talks if Sarajevo is divided.

The chief negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, has put forward a proposal envisaging Sarajevo as "an open federal city belonging to neither of the two entities." The Serb side is rejecting all proposals providing for unified city authorities. [passage omitted]

Presidency Extends Support to Peace Delegation

AU1411193195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency held a session today. In the absence of President Alija Izetbegovic, who is attending negotiations in Dayton, the session was chaired by Presidency member Ejup Ganic, deputizing for President Izetbegovic.

The agenda of today's session focused on the agreement on the revitalization of the federation signed in Dayton. It was agreed that a proposal should be submitted to the republican and constituent assemblies and the Government of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to mobilize their commissions, expert teams, and other personnel potentials so that the appropriate legal documents and instruments are prepared and adopted in time for the next assembly session. In this way, it would be possible to maintain the planned dynamic of implementing the Dayton agreement.

The Presidency extended support to the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation participating in the Dayton peace talks. It moreover supports its efforts to contribute to the establishment of just peace in our country. The Presidency also supports activities regarding the organized return of refugees and expelled persons to Jajce, Bugojno, Stolac, and Travnik, and demands that the relevant authorities observe the planned deadlines so that the process can stabilize and so that all refugees and expelled persons may return to their homes throughout the territory of the federation.

The Presidency at today's session also appointed a number of judiciary officials and reviewed several other issues.

Article Examines Dealing for Karadzic 'Departure'

AU1511100295 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 10 Nov 95 pp 12-13

[Article by Dragan Janjic of AIM, Alternative Information Network: "The Silk Braid"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, and General Ratko Mladic, their military commander, will — judging from circumstances — not be able to resist for long the strong pressure exerted on them to withdraw from their positions. Karadzic's departure from the political scene is not a question of months any longer, but probably a question of weeks, whereas the position of Gen. Mladic — who apart from influence in the army also has credibility among the population — is somewhat more favorable.

U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated — and the White House officially confirmed his statement — that the United States required the withdrawal of both Karadzic and Mladic and that was not willing to send its troops to Bosnia as long as the two of them still held their positions.

Before leaving for the talks in Dayton, Milosevic had a series of consultations with Bosnian Serb leaders concerning personnel changes in the military and political leadership in Pale. Sources close to the Bosnian Serb leadership, sources considered very reliable, claimed that an agreement on Karadzic's and Mladic's resignation had in principle been agreed upon. Karadzic and his assistants required that Karadzic's resignation be made as painless as possible, without big shocks, which Milosevic agreed to.

According to the scenario agreed upon in Belgrade, the election for the central bodies of the future "Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina," and the expected election in the "Serbian Republic," which would follow the Dayton agreement, would be used as the framework for a "silent" replacement of both Karadzic and Mladic. The two of them and Momcilo Krajisnik, the president of the Bosnian Serb parliament, promised Milosevic that they would not run for positions in the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the election, but they insisted on having one of the positions in the Serbian Republic. This would create the image in the public that everything had been a normal reshuffle in the leadership, so that Karadzic could retain at least some power.

According to the agreement the political and military leadership of the Bosnian Serbs made with Milosevic, only Nikola Koljevic, the present vice president, and Aleksa Buha, the present foreign minister, would retain their positions. They are also members of the Serbian negotiating team in Dayton.

Late Denial

Immediately after Christopher required Karadzic's and Mladic's resignation, the Bosnian Serb authorities, represented by Miroslav Toholj, their foreign minister, issued a statement by which he let the United States know that it was not supposed to teach the Serbs what democracy is. The first response from Pale to the claims about the existence of an agreement between Milosevic and Pale about "the silent departure" of Karadzic and Mladic, which were published by Yugoslav and international media, came with a two-day delay.

The Information Ministry issued a statement on 4 November 1995 in which the claims about the agreement about Karadzic's and Mladic's withdrawal were denied, but it was not explicitly stated that Karadzic and Mladic would retain their positions. Empty phrases about the democratic right of a nation to elect its leadership were used. It is also significant that neither Karadzic nor Mladic issued their personal statements.

A day earlier, on 3 November 1995, Radovan Karadzic's press office issued a statement which said that Karadzic "was receiving numerous telegrams of support." However, only one telegram, which was sent by the Vojvodina branch of Karadzic's Serbian Democratic Party, was cited. During the last several days, the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA published several statements issued by the chairmen of town assemblies that are still under the control of the Bosnian Serbs, in which support for Karadzic was expressed. The statement of the press agency and the not very numerous supporting statements make a relatively unconvincing impression, and it is not very likely that they will impress anybody. These are the first signs of the panic that is slowly beginning to spread among the Bosnian Serb leadership.

The fact that Pale responded with a full two-day delay to the statement about the existence of the agreement with Milosevic about a reshuffle in the military and political leadership allows the conclusion that there is such an agreement — despite the denials. Karadzic realized later on that things in Dayton had started to unfold in another direction, and that the agreement he had with Milosevic was not that firm any longer, as apart from the requirement for their resignation, the United States also began to mention with increasing intensity the International Court for War Crimes in The Hague. This forces the conclusion that the idea about "the silent departure" of the Pale leadership does not exist any longer.

There is speculation in Belgrade that in Dayton Washington has required that Milosevic extradite Karadzic and Mladic to the International Court for War Crimes in The Hague, and that this is the condition for the removal of the sanctions from Serbia and Montenegro. Christopher said on 2 November that the United States could not agree to sending its troops within the NATO force to Bosnia as long as Mladic and Karadzic, who were charged with war crimes, held their positions. He did not, however, mention their extradition to the court in The Hague as the condition for the materialization of the agreement on Bosnia, so this requirement is still a matter of speculation.

The sources close to the Bosnian Serb leadership claim that there is no possibility of extraditing Karadzic and Mladic to the International Court for War Crimes in The Hague, and that Milosevic cannot promise such a thing. Before leaving for Dayton, there were allegedly agreements with Milosevic concerning this problem, but Karadzic made the protection from extradition a condition for his resignation.

Observers in Belgrade believe that the latest decision about the withdrawal of police forces from front lines, which was published on 4 November, should also be made in connection with internal changes and the expected reshuffle. It is considered that Karadzic's main support is the police, so that the decision to withdraw the police from front lines is interpreted as the wish not to "dilute" its forces, but to concentrate them in the towns of vital importance for the control of power. This decision was fiercely opposed by the military leadership, who claimed that it considerably affected the defense. This has intensified the rivalry between the military and civilian authorities and made uncertainty grow.

The Replacement

Milosevic has not succeeded during the last months in deposing Karadzic, because he did not have a man in the political leadership who would be ready to become the new Bosnian Serb leader and his puppet. The change of the situation in the field and the fall of the Serbian military power during the October defeats in western Bosnia have first of all resulted in the readiness of Momcilo Krajisnik, the chairman of the Bosnian Serb Parliament, and Nikola Koljevic, the vice president of the Serbian Republic, to remain silent regarding sharp attacks from Belgrade on Karadzic.

The sources close to the Bosnian Serb authorities claim that Milosevic has decided to replace Karadzic by Koljevic, and that it was the Serbian president who required that Koljevic be the leader of the Pale delegation in the Dayton negotiations. According to these sources, Koljevic refused to directly require Karadzic's resignation, but silently accepted the game and gradually started to take on the role of the new first man with strong support from Belgrade.

Karadzic himself is aware of the fact that everything is over, and the most he can hope to get is to have some kind of influence and remain "in the shadows," with the possibility of influencing political circumstances in the Bosnian Serb entity within the future "Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Basically, he wishes that the agreement about the "voluntary departure" reached with Milosevic be materialized, and hopes that the Serbian president will not be forced to change his mind in Dayton.

Karadzic Assesses Ohio Talks, Hague Indictment

AU1411142895 Novi Sad SVET in Serbo-Croatian 13 Nov 95 p 4

[Report including "exclusive" interview with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic by Zoran Markovic in Pale; date not given: "I Will Not Accept Any Agreement in Dayton if It Gives the Serb Towns of Kljuc, Sanski Most, Prijedor, and Brcko to the Muslims"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, the capital of the Bosnian Serbs — as the CNN correspondent from Bosnia, Christiane Amanpour, likes to call this town above Sarajevo — strikes me in the first days of the fourth winter of war, and under a surprising November snow, as far quieter and more apathetic than during my previous visits. While the war was raging on in the surrounding hills and in the suburbs of Sarajevo, Pale seemed alive, full of people, soldiers, foreign reporters, blue helmets, and humanitarian workers from all over the world. Now the town is almost deserted. At the same time almost 200,000 people are crammed into Banja Luka, people who have fled Jajce, Mrkonjic Grad, Kljuc, Drvar, Glamoc, [Bosansko] Grahovo, Sipovo, and the other towns that the Serb Republic [Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] army lost in the Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army]-Croat offensive over the previous two months. The traces of NATO attacks in Pale are more noticeable on the faces of the people than on the facilities hit, since the latter have all either been repaired or completely knocked down and cleared away.

"All this is just a bad joke," a young man tells me in Cafe Zora. "It turns out that we have been at war for all these years just to have Arkan [Serbian paramilitary leader Zeljko Raznatovic] turn up after all that and tie our men to trees and slap their faces. If only he had managed to defend something. Where were he and Karadzic when everything was lost in two days? And now after all that, Slobo [Milosevic] and the Americans are supposed to be telling us what to do. Slobo, who erected a border along the Drina, who let them bomb us, he is supposed to draw the map for us! What am I going to do? Get my papers and head across the Drina to Serbia. I have heard that you can get a passport with a German visa for 3,000 German marks, and then I will go to my cousin in Stuttgart. I am fed up. Fuck the Turks [derogatory Serb term for Bosnian Muslims], fuck the Serbs, fuck Slobo, Radovan [Karadzic], and Alija [Izetbegovic]."

A similar mood can be felt everywhere in this town, which once represented the symbol of the pride and resistance of the Serbs on this side of the Drina. The downfall, which began with the NATO air strikes, and continued with the defeats in western Bosnia, with Karadzic's agreement to return to being under Milosevic's rule, and finally with the realization that, under the U.S. plan, they would remain in the same state with those against whom they had been fighting for four years. There is also an interesting change in the terminology: Hardly anyone I have met has used the words "Turks" and "balija" [another derogatory Serb term for Bosnian Muslims]. Most people say Muslims (even though they still do not capitalize it).

"Ever since the peace agreement with Milosevic was signed, and particularly since the talks in Ohio began, Radovan Karadzic has been running a mile at the sight of reporters. They say that he went berserk when he heard that they were after his head in Dayton. They also say that Sonja [Karadzic's daughter] and Ljiljana [his wife] were even worse. They think the world would come to an end if the two of them were to stop running things around here," a young man tells me. He used to be an assistant at Sarajevo University. He helped me a lot this spring when I was writing a report on Sonja and Ljiljana Karadzic, "the mistresses of war and peace and the rulers of the Serb Republic."

I was lucky. The Serb Republic president was in the mood for an interview, but "just a few questions. This is no time for too much talk."

[Markovic] How do you assess the progress at the Dayton talks so far? Have you heard from Messrs. Buha and Koljevic?

[Karadzic] We support the U.S. peace initiative, and I have said so many times. I believe that peace cannot be reached without the active help of the United States. You could see that we could have reached an agreement very nicely last winter when Mr. Carter was here.

I expect that our delegation led by Mr. Milosevic will stand firmly behind the agreements reached with Richard Holbrooke in Belgrade and Geneva.

[Markovic] You have not answered my question: Have you heard from Messrs. Koljevic and Buha?

[Karadzic] The agreement, as you know, is that none of the delegations are to reveal to the public details of the negotiations while they are in progress, so we will not do so either, regardless of how curious you reporters might be. I can tell you that, as far as I know, the talks are progressing normally and the signing of the agreement can be expected in a few days.

[Markovic] It is said that the Americans are demanding that the constitutional arrangements should include a provision that would prevent General Mladic and yourself from running in future elections, as The Hague Court has brought charges against you.

[Karadzic] That is speculation by the U.S. press. Nobody knows what the final version of the constitutional arrangements will include. Nobody knows; Richard Holbrooke does not know and neither does Mr. Christopher. If my function is preventing the Serb people from living in peace on its territory and in its state, then — and you can write this down — that is the least of the problems. I did not get into all this for myself. I did not lack personal happiness before the war, nor did I lack financial security and professional engagements.

[Markovic] Does Gen. Mladic feel the same way?

[Karadzic] You will have to ask him that. I am speaking for myself.

[Markovic] In last week's "Ask the President" program on Banja Luka Radio, you accused part of the army leadership for losing the municipalities in western Bosnia. How are relations now between the civilian and military authorities in the Serb Republic?

[Karadzic] There have been many problems, irresponsible behavior, even betrayal in the ranks of both the civilian and the military authorities. It is clear to everyone that the NATO attacks had grave consequences on both our state and our army. What had to happen in the army happened, the assembly deputies had their say, and I have nothing more to add to that.

[Markovic] What are you going to do if Milosevic signs a plan in Dayton that will be humiliating for the Serb Republic, giving the Muslims everything that they have captured and other things that they are asking for? What if the plan gives Kljuc, Mrkonjic Grad, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Brcko to the adversary?

[Karadzic] Before our delegation departed for the United States it was agreed that such plans would not be accepted. Any peace that takes the towns you have mentioned from the Serbs is not peace as far as we are concerned, and I will not accept such a plan. However, as far as I know, this will not happen.

[Markovic] If peace were to come and one day you find yourself face to face with Alija Izetbegovic in the presidency or assembly of the future Bosnia-Herzegovina, how will you behave?

[Karadzic] We will see. Let us wait until peace is concluded. There is still a lot of work to be done. It will be easy then to work out how Izetbegovic and I will talk.

[Markovic] Are you afraid of being handed over to The Hague Court and of the possible sentence?

[Karadzic] When a man has a clear conscience and when he knows that he has acted according to the interests of his people and in line with God's commandments, then he has nothing to be afraid of. Worse things have happened to the Serbs, and even worse things could yet happen, God forbid, for us to talk now about whether I am afraid of some court.

[Markovic] How do you assess the activities of the so-called Patriotic Front in Banja Luka, and the accusations directed at you even from people who were until recently your political allies, such as Nikola Poplasen?

[Karadzic] Ever since we formed the Serb Republic, some people have been working to set Pale people against Krajina people, Herzegovina people against Semberija people, brother against brother. My policy has been from the beginning to care equally for every part of the Serb Republic and to feel equally unhappy about every loss. Now everyone is trying to prove that I am neglecting Banja Luka for Serb Sarajevo and so on, which is not true. When our people start living in peace, when the refugees return to their homes, and when we start working on the reconstruction of the country, then we will see who was a greater patriot, who was a greater radical, and who loves his country more.

[Markovic] You are accused in Serbia of making a pact with clericalism and the church and turning the Serb Republic into a theocracy.

[Karadzic] And who is saying that? The Communists are, those who have forsaken the cross, who have knocked down and burned down churches, who have pulled the beards of priests and sworn at God and the patriarch. Over the whole world children have religion in school and the soldiers are given a chance to take communion. Only our Communists think that this is clericalism and creating a theocratic state. If they had listened to the advice of Patriarch Pavle from the start, they would not have led the country and the people into this situation. We have built the Serb Republic under the worst of war conditions into a modern and civilized country in which there is freedom of religion, and our people want such a state.

[Markovic] It is said that the fighters here are angry with you for letting Arkan into the Serb Republic "to shave their heads and slap their faces," and for expressing gratitude to him finally in front of the "Tigers" [Arkan's paramilitary formation] even though he managed to defend neither Sanski Most nor Mrkonjic Grad.

[Karadzic] Those who know what little help we got from Serbia over the last year will understand why we were happy when Arkan arrived. It is not true that his fighters were of no use at all. When he arrived, our army was in complete chaos there, and he managed to consolidate the front lines and helped save Prijedor and Banja Luka.

[Markovic] Just one more question: I do not think you have described anywhere yet what your first meeting with Slobodan Milosevic was like after such a long break.

[Karadzic] Listen, even when our leaderships had a break in relations, I never once said an ugly word about Mr. Milosevic. I think that politics is a job for serious people, one that is done with one's head and not emotions. That is normal. We have had disagreements. But we have sorted out those disagreements and now we are cooperating again. We shook hands in a normal fashion and talked about what we had to do for the Serb people in these hard times. There are far more important things in life and politics than people's vanity and spite.

Newspapers, Leaders React to Hague Indictments

AU1411183195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Nov 95

[Report by Nada al-Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first news about the indictments in The Hague was announced yesterday night on all the newscasts on state television. The news was announced briefly and without any comment. [Words indistinct] are today more detailed. VJESNIK, VECERNJI LIST, and SLOBODNA DALMACIJA have published the integral text of the indictment, listed all the accused by name, but have singled out Dario Kordic and Tihomir Blaskic. VJESNIK has devoted half a page to the headline: Kordic and Blaskic on the List of Accused. VECERNJI LIST has literally cited a part of the indictment, which says that the crimes of which they are suspected are so numerous and grave as to have either killed or expelled almost the entire Muslim population in the Lasva River valley. SLOBODNA DALMACIJA is the only paper to publish a commentary that asks why these people were indicted precisely at the time of the Dayton peace talks. Or, the paper asks, is this precisely the reason, in order to apply pressure for the implementation of the peace agreement on the ground? The paper assesses that it has probably been decided that the indicted individuals are the main obstacles to the federation.

The first reactions of opposition leaders are interesting. Stipe Mesic, president of the Independent Croatian Democrats, believes that the indictment will serve both the Croats and Bosniaks, because naming the perpetrators removes collective responsibility from the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, Mesic explicitly claims that the six Herzegovina Croats have found themselves on The Hague's list because of Zagreb's mistaken policy, which they implemented blindly. According to Mesic, and I quote, those who created conditions for the crimes should also be tried.

The Croatian Party of Right 1861 says that the list is incomplete, while Drazen Budisa's Croatian Social Liberal Party is surprised by some of the names on the list, thogh some have been expected to appear for some time.

Only the ruling Croatian Democratic Community declined to comment. The party's secretary general, Zlatko Canjuga, said that the president's adviser for internal policy, Ivic Pasalic, should issue a statement on the subject. That is what we were told in [words indistinct] Zlatko Canjuga. However, Dr. Pasalic believes that this is the responsibility of the party's secretary general.

Bosnian Croat Speaker Comments on Hague Decision

LD1411193795 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 14 Nov 95

[Interview with Ivan Bender, speaker of the Croat parliament in Herzeg-Bosnia, by unidentified correspondent — live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] Our guest this evening is Mr. Ivan Bender, who is at the Siroki Brijeg studio. Good evening, Mr. Bender.

[Bender] Good evening to all Croatian TV viewers.

[Correspondent] How do you in Herzeg-Bosnia comment on the Hague indictment?

[Bender] There is a certain concern; protests and appeals are arriving from everywhere, but the situation is under control. I would like to stress that Kordic and Blaskic are honorable and honest people who, conscientiously and responsibly, have done their jobs within the framework of their tasks and authority.

I would like to stress that everyone, legally speaking, is innocent until proven otherwise; I hope this will be the case this time as well.

[Correspondent] What do you intend to do?

[Bender] We are going to take all legal measures for the legal and other protection of all persons, particularly top officials of the Croat people. I would hereby wish to call on all our soldiers and policemen to remain in their posts, do their jobs until the crisis is over, trust the Croat delegation, and trust Croat political representatives.

I am convinced that the Croatian delegation, led by the president of all the Croats, will again find the most favorable solution, which will satisfy all the Croats. I hope this will be done by political means, but by the same token, should it be necessary, we are ready and capable of solving problems also in other ways.

[Correspondent] Mr. Bender, thank you very much.

Croat Official Defends Accused

LD1411192395 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] As the Dayton negotiations reach their final stage, and Croatian officials in Bosnia-Herzegovina face charges, we have invited Vladimir Soljic, member of the presidential council and defense minister of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, to our news program.

In recent days, Mr. Soljic, we have witnessed significant developments. In Dayton the peace negotiations on Bosnia- Herzegovina have reached their final stage. A delegation of the Croat people of Bosnia-Herzegovina is also taking an active part in them. At the same time the international war crimes tribunal has charged Croat officials from Bosnia-Herzegovina. What is the reason behind this timing?

[Soljic] Who knows how many times we have looked forward to or been saddened, in seeing plans and maps for Bosnia-Herzegovina, ranging from Cutillero's, which we have almost forgotten, to the Vance-Owen plan and the one signed aboard the Invincible, as well as the Contact Group's plan and these plans coming from Dayton? [passage omitted]

[Announcer] The Croatian side has so far been the most cooperative party in the entire peace process. We have also accepted the latest agreements from Dayton on the further establishment of the federation, on the return of refugees. At the same time this report comes from The Hague.

[Soljic] I would first like to say that the agreements have stirred up a great deal of interest and even a little confusion among some people. I would say there is nothing out of the ordinary in this. These agreements do not undermine the Croat position. There is still perfectly enough room for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina to exercise full equality. Our government has thus endorsed these agreements and drawn up plans for their implementation.

As for the reports from The Hague, I would approach them from some distance. This is where perhaps the root lies of all these developments in this area. It is known that Croatian history is hard and full of blood, that we have experienced many bitter things in many events, including even war crimes. You can only imagine that, for example, no one has been charged with, let alone sentenced for killing the tens of thousands of disarmed soldiers and civilians, who were killed with no trial. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] The Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina were involved in a war of defense. Everything we demanded for ourselves we recognized as something the other two peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina were also entitled to. What is our present position in securing our interests?

[Soljic] One should recall what each of these three peoples, I refer to their leaderships, set as their goals, how much they have sacrificed so far, and what they have achieved. I believe that an answer to these three questions makes it perfectly clear that the Croat leadership set the most realistic goals, that it was not going to be a loser in this war. As far as the current state of affairs goes, I believe that the Croats will be genuine winners, as they do not want anything more than what belongs to them anyway.

[Announcer] One of the indictments raised by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague refers to General Blaskic. Being his direct superior, what do you, in your capacity as defense minister of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, think of Blaskic?

[Soljic] It was only in this war that I met him first. Speaking of Gen. Blaskic, I believe he is undoubtedly an honorable and knowledgeable man who has personally suffered a great deal in this war. He has lost his father, who was fighting on the front line at the age of 60. He had a clear task — to defend Croat territory, as opposed to attacking non-Croat territories. He has carried out this task successfully. Whatever he did he did it following orders. He also worked in line with plans and issued orders accordingly. All of this is available to those who are in charge of this. It is of particular importance, I mean this situation about Gen. Blaskic, to say that it was precisely he who demanded, at the conclusion of his orders or as part of his orders, that his soldiers act in every situation in keeping with international warfare law, i.e. in keeping with the conventions that regulate this area.

I would not talk about the others. People from some other bodies will probably say something about them, or they themselves can speak. As far as I know they are people of a similar mold. I can therefore make the same statement, that they are people from enclaves, encirclements, so it is very unlikely that they could have carried out aggressions, as some are trying to imply, or that they committed crimes during this. If they nevertheless did commit crimes, I do not want to back anyone's crimes. All the more so if the same yardstick is applied to everyone who has committed crimes, whether they be Serb, Muslim, or Croat. All I can do at this moment is to call on HVO [Croatian Defense Council] soldiers to stay calm and follow their orders alone. [passage omitted]

EU Official Accuses Mostar Croats of Violations

AU1411204795 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 2 Nov 95 p 4

[Report by Mario Marusic; "Who Is Against Understanding"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a session of the EU Ministerial Council in Luxembourg, after serious accusations were made against the Croat side, pronouncing them guilty of violating the Mostar Memorandum of Understanding, Hans Koschnick, EU administrator of Mostar, received wholehearted support from EU members for his demand to completely and consistently implement the document regulating the two-year mandate.

Indeed, Koschnick put down the accusations against the Croats to "a policy of rejecting a solution by the leaders of the Herzegovina Croats," and added that he had, until then, been given many promises about strong support for the project of the Europeanization of Mostar from the Government of the Republic of Croatia, which also lends full support for the project of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. Koschnick asked the EU foreign ministers to relieve him of his obligations in Mostar if the EU will be satisfied only with the rebuilding of Mostar.

Koschnick thinks that, over the past 15 months, the EU administration of Mostar has made (only) "little progress in brokering a rapprochement between the warring national groups in Mostar" and that the reason for this is not the lack of good will among the people of Mostar but, for the most part, "the policy of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croat leadership to reject solutions." Koschnick emphasized freedom of movement for all national groups as the main prerequisite to the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding, and that the "Croatian police do not allow citizens from the eastern part of the town unrestricted access to EU premises despite promises made by the federation president."

This situation can no longer be tolerated, said Koschnick in the speech delivered in Luxembourg. Furthermore, "it is again the Croatian police who stand in the way of many steps necessary for the implementation of the second stage of forming of a joint police." The EU administrator further contends that the problem of the return of refugees to Mostar could also be solved "if the Croatian side were not an obstacle."

Those who are well-versed in the Mostar circumstances will have a different point of view. Things are not as simple as Koschnick described in his Luxembourg speech, when he stated that the Croats, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats, are to blame. The two-year mandate of the EU administration is drawing to a close, and this could be the reason behind Koschnick's nervousness, perhaps even behind his way of dodging responsibility for a possible failure. However, unlike Koschnick, Solana, chairman of the EU Ministerial Council, does not think that "little progress" was made in Mostar, but that "the administrator and his aides did an outstanding job."

On the other hand, we must consider the indisputable facts that Mijo Brajkovic, mayor of the western part of Mostar, talked about. Regarding refugees, said Brajkovic, we cannot allow refugees to start returning to the western part of Mostar because, 16,000 people who were forced into exile by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army live there at presenmt. In other words, it will take a coordinated and continuing process on the level of the federation, just as in the forming of joint police forces.

Unfortunately, in his Luxembourg speech Koschnick did not talk about the responsibility of the Muslim-Bosniak side for the collapse of the agreement on the electric power supply for the valley of the Neretva River, in which the EU administration was ready to invest 12 million German marks, and the implementation of which would solve the problem of electric power supply for the entire region. He did not (or did not want to) talk about the incessant media war, and tensions raised by the Bosnian media from the eastern part of Mostar, which "organize" forceful crossings and the movement of Bosniaks from the eastern part of the town to the western part.

Before, the EU administrator used to say that Mostar was not and could not be an island in the federation.

Does he think — and it seems he does — that the Herzegovina Croats, i.e. their leadership, are both against the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and against confederation with the Republic of Croatia?

Bugojno Croats Protest Inaccuracies in Refugee List

LD1411202995 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bugojno [Croat] municipal council, which is based in Livno, issued a statement today in connection with the return of refugees to Bugojno. Here is a report by Zeljko Mihaljevic:

[Mihaljevic] The Bugojno municipal council, which is temporarily based in Livno, sent a statement today to the refugees' office in Mostar. It sets out a couple of basic objections to the list of Croat families allowed to return to Bugojno, which was drawn up by the local Bosniak authorities in Bugojno and signed by the local leader there, Dzevad Mlaco.

A certain number of families on the list were never either refugees or displaced people, because during the entire time before and during the war, and now, they have been and still are living in Bugojno.

The second objection relates to the families that returned to Bugojno after the signing of the Washington agreements, who have been living in this town for over a year now but who are also on the list.

The Bugojno municipal council takes the view that all this indicates that no serious consideration is being given to a general return of Croat refugees to Bugojno, at least as far as the Muslim authorities in Bugojno are concerned, especially as the list includes five families who died before the war. To put it bluntly, more than one-third of the families from Bugojno on the list can in no way be treated as returnees in accordance with the Dayton agreement.

The statement concludes, and I quote: We sincerely advocate a general return of all displaced persons without deception and procrastination. This is the first precondition for the revitalization of the federation and peace in this area, the Bugojno municipal council statement concludes.

Croat Official Protests UN Use of Minority Label

LD1411183695 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Slobodan Bozic, head of the office for cooperation with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], has sent a letter to the UN mission for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The letter says:

Either mistakenly or on purpose, at yesterday's news conference given by the United Nations and which was conducted by Mr. Ivanko, it was mentioned that Dario Kordic [president of the Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, in Bosnia] and General Tihomir Blaskic [Bosnian Croat army commander] are the official leaders of the Croat minority in Bosnia.

On behalf of the Croat people and the government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, I protest against your statement in the sharpest terms. Above all, you ought to have known that the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina are a constituent part of it and, according to the constitution, they are equal with the other two peoples and in no way a minority group.

Bearing this sensitivity, recent events and the normal desire for peoples to be satisfied in national terms, and the fact that this is an exceptionally sensitive question of national pride, you have no right to use such expressions, even if this was an oversight, without apologizing. We protest, above all, in the name of the truth, and we expect you to find a way of apologizing publicly, Bozic's letter says.

Radio Krajina Announcement Urges 'United' Defense

AU1411172695

[FBIS Editorial Report] Every day at approximately 1900 GMT, before the daily interview with Banja Luka area officials, (Clandestine) Radio Krajina in Serbo-Croatian broadcasts the following announcement:

"Proud people of Krajina!

"They have threatened us for days, months, and years, and offered us the status of slaves, men without honor and pride, but to no avail. The proud and defiant people of Krajina have never accepted a status as second-rate citizens, and that has enraged them. They think modern weapons and mercenaries from all over the world can take our freedom and dignity. They are wrong! Flags of freedom have always flown over Krajina, and the patriotic masses grew into a mighty and invincible army that crushed all aggressors. We will do the same today! The courageous defenders of Krajina now act as one, defending the honor and dignity of the Serb nation. This is not a Desert Storm, but the Krajina massif, where nobody has ever conquered the Serb nation. Only if we are united in our defense, shoulder to shoulder, armed with consciousness and responsibility, and facing the history of our nation, can we survive and defeat the enemy. Let us show them that we are prepared and able to resist their mercenaries, and remain in control of what is ours."

Belgian UN Commander on Slavonian Peace Accord

BR1411163495 Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 14 Nov 95 p 2

[Interview with General Freddy Van de Weghe, commander of UN Forces in East Slavonia, by Christophe Lamfalussy on 13 November, place not given: "We Have Taken Serb Objections Into Account"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Today General Freddy Van de Weghe, commander of UN forces in East Slavonia, intends to bring together the Croatian and Serb generals to make practical arrangements for the implementation of the peace agreement signed in Erdut. On Monday night he allowed LA LIBRE BELGIQUE to interview him.*

[Lamfalussy] Your reaction?

[Van de Weghe] Relief, first of all. Tensions have risen considerably over the last few days with the arrival of Croatian troop reinforcements. It is obvious that the major Serb objections have been taken into account.

[Lamfalussy] Which ones?

[Van de Weghe] We no longer speak of reintegration into Croatia. Obviously, in practice, it will be so. But it will be much easier to make the people accept it. Moreover, the presence of Croatian police at the border (with Serbia — LA LIBRE BELGIQUE editorial note) is no longer mentioned explicitly.

[Lamfalussy] The Security Council must designate an international force: a UN force or a NATO force. Which one of the two would be most effective?

[Van de Weghe] It would be nice if the troops that are currently here could stay. It is the wish of the local authorities. But it is first and foremost a political decision.

[Lamfalussy] How will the international force be able to handle the return of Croatian refugees and the departure of the Serbs who recently settled in Slavonia at the same time?

[Van de Weghe] It is too early to say. But people here are more reassured. First, the war option has been avoided. Second, one has the impression that the international community is giving guarantees this time, and that it will ensure the protection of civilians. It is certain that the Serbs will depart, just as it is a fact that the majority of Croatians will not return because they have a house or employment elsewhere. The local authorities must provide complete and objective information so that people know what their prospects and guarantees are.

[Lamfalussy] Hearing you say all that, one has the impression that the agreement comes from the top, and that every single detail must still be worked out....

[Van de Weghe] That is true. A draft that preceded the peace agreement was more detailed than the one that was signed on Sunday [12 November]. Clearly Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman are there to round off the corners, but most question marks remain. For example, in the field of demilitarization: This is a process in which all parties must collaborate, and I would even say, in which they should take the initiative. But also on the return of the refugees, property rights, border patrols....

[Lamfalussy] Is a new mandate for the Belgian Blue Helmets in the pipeline?

[Van de Weghe] Logically the mission should provide greater motivation. We should be less likely to experience events like those of the last few months. Rotation is scheduled for December. We need a new battalion.

U.S. Envoy on Serb Commitment to Work Camp Access

AU1011172395 Paris AFP in English 1700 GMT 10 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nov 10 (AFP) — Bosnian Serb leaders gave John Shattuck, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Human Rights, a committment Friday for "free and full access" to work camps where non-Serbs are being held.

"I've secured a commitment for free and full access by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to all places where such people are being either held or put into forced labour," Shattuck said after a meeting with Serb leaders in Banja Luka.

The U.S. official arrived in Bosnia earlier this week on a mission to investigate reports of atrocities carried out by Serb forces against Moslems in eastern and northern Bosnia.

After meeting the mayor of Banja Luka and a minister of the Serb's rebel government in Bosnia, Jovo Rosic, Shattuck said he was pleased with the commitment made by the Serbs.

But he added: "It's important to turn that commitment into action and to see that those people are released and allowed to return to their families."

Shattuck said he also raised the issue of mass graves in Serb- held Bosnia. "I asked if there were any mass graves here. I was told that there were not but I was not given any assurance... a clear indication that there were not," he told reporters.

The last weeks before a nation-wide cease-fire came into effect on October 12, there was an upsurge in ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs in the Banja Luka area, a Bosnian Serb stronghold.

Several thousand Moslems and Croats were forcibly expelled from their homes. Many hundreds of draft-age non-Serbs were also reported to be in detention or forced labour camps in Serb-held parts of Bosnia.

Special envoy to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in the former Yugoslavia Anne-Willem Bijleveld, said on Friday that "ethnic persecution is still continuing and the violence that goes with it."

However, Shattuck said he did not obtain details of places of detention. "As far as large places of detention are concerned, I did not get any specific indication there are such places, nor has the ICRC identified such places," he said.

"The people seem to be in smaller groups dispersed throughout the area and that's why they've been difficult to identify," he added.

Shattuck went on to say that Banja Luka mayor, Predrag Radic, had "himself indicated that he did not feel there was a legal basis for that forced labour to be continued."

He said he expected "a lot of help" with the release of civilians. "I think everyone agrees that it's very important, that it is an issue that is at the centre of the Dayton talks right now and... we'll certainly press forward to make certain that it happens," he said.

The presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia are meeting in Dayton, Ohio for marathon peace negotiations as part of U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the war in Bosnia.

In a separate development, the Bosnian Serbs announced the opening of an office in the Greek capital, Athens. The bureau will have responsibility for transporting Greek humanitarian aid to the Serbs's rebel state in Bosnia, Republika Srpska [Serb Republic].

Greece has been alone among EU member states in forging close ties with their Orthodox brethren in the Balkans. A Greek government spokesman said Athens was "ready to help all the Bosnian parties in the framework of their efforts to contribute to a peace solution to the problem" in Bosnia.

Government Discusses Report on Return of Refugees

AU1311160195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The implementation of the agreement on the return of refugees to Jajce, Bugojno, Stolac, and Travnik was the central topic of today's regular session of the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was presided over by Energy and Industry Minister Faruk Smailbegovic in the absence of Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic. A report was presented by Muharem Cero, minister for refugees and social policy, who stressed that this project has fully been coordinated at the federal level.

According to the principles, conditions, and methods of return of refugees to the aforementioned municipalities, which were signed by Minister Cero and his deputy Martin Ragus, the return of refugees will be carried out on a voluntary basis. The displaced persons and refugees can return to their previous places of abode or the residence that they either owned or had the tenant's right to live in. This renders the ownership and tenant rights equal.

The principles also state that all members of the family or legal heirs can return to their previous place of abode in case the owners or persons with the tenant's right are no long alive.

The displaced persons and refugees will enjoy the same rights as the domicile population.

Interior Minister Bakir Alispahic, who is directly involved in the implementation of the project of returning refugees together with Minister Cero, stressed that the joint police forces should ensure the safety of the refugees. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will guarantee a high level of safety to the Croat returnees, but will in turn demand from the Croat side the same treatment for the Bosniaks.

Minister Cero stressed the need for the returnees to be treated as socially disadvantaged persons, and proposed to the government to provide a financial help of 50 German marks for the next three months plus humanitarian aid for every member of the family.

Next Wednesday, another meeting will be held in Mostar to decide on final deadlines and financial funds needed for the realization of the project. In addition to the ministers and deputy ministers for refugees, social policy, and internal affairs, the meeting should also be attended by ambassadors of the countries friends of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, representatives of some international organizations, and others.

After the discussion about the return of refugees, Enver Karic, minister of education, science, culture, and sports, briefed the government on his visit to the Una-Sana Canton. He warned about very difficult conditions in education in this canton, especially in the towns of Buzim, Cazin, and Velika Kladusa.

Serb Agency Issues Six-Month Figures on Refugees

AU1311220795 Paris AFP in English 2150 GMT 13 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nov 13 (AFP) — Around 465,000 Serbs fled Croatia and western Bosnia between May and October, a Serb refugee agency said Monday.

Gojko Klickovic, director of the self-styled Serb Republic's Refugee Commission said 260,000 people had left western Slavonia in Croatia in May followed by an exodus in August from Krajina.

Western Slavonia and Krajina along with eastern Slavonia which borders on Serbia proper were seized by rebel Serbs in 1991.

In a major breakthrough for the Balkan peace process, Croatian officials and rebel Serbs on Sunday signed an agreement restoring Croatian control over eastern Slavonia, the last area of rebel-held land.

Klickovic said that between July and October 205,000 Serbs left the western zones of the Serb Republic in Bosnia when they were "occupied by Sarajevo government forces."

The refugees fled the areas as Croatian army units and Bosnian government forces pushed successfully into the lands formerly held by the secessionist Serbs who had proclaimed their breakaway republic.

Klickovic said the majority of the refugees had been sent through the Serb Republic and they had taken refuge in the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina and Kosovo in the south.

The Serb Republic was sheltering no more than 22,000 refugees from eastern Slavonia and from the Krajina region, he added.

Serb Defense Ministry Fails To Provide Supplies

LD1011191795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1733 GMT 10 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 10 Nov (TANJUG) — Predrag Radic, chairman of the war presidency of Banja Luka, said today that the Serb Republic Defense Ministry has not fulfilled its promises to secure necessary uniforms, oil, antifreeze, and other things as agreed at a session of the war presidency of Banja Luka two weeks ago.

At a news conference today, Radic recalled that the Serb Republic People's Assembly adopted conclusions on improving the living standards of the Serb Republic Army.

Radic also spoke about the extremely serious situation in connection with the huge number of refugees accommodated in Banja Luka.

For that reason, he said, Banja Luka asked the Serb Republic Finance Ministry to exempt it from paying taxes in November and December, but the ministry has not yet responded to the demand.

Speaking about electricity supply problems, Radovan Bajic, vice president of the executive committee and member of the Banja Luka war presidency, said that the situation is critical and that electricity is only available for so-called "top priority consumers" — hospitals, water supply plants, the information media, etc., while there is no electricity for industry.

"The formation of a three-member commission to be made up of Nikola Erceg, chairman of the electricity supply public enterprise, one deputy of the Serb Republic People's Assembly from Banja Luka, and Predrag Radic, president of the war presidency, has been proposed. Its task would be to enter into talks with the Croatian side (which controls the hydroelectric power stations on the Vrbas) and on the basis of reciprocity secure electricity for Krajina," Bajic said.

Sarajevo Electricity, Water, Gas Situation 10 Nov

AU1011161695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 10 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo has enough electricity, albeit not to suffice for heating as well. The situation with natural gas is the same, that is to say, there are cuts, and there is not enough water either. Edina Salanovic has the details:

[Salanovic] The breakdown on the Reljevo-Buca Potok high-voltage power line was repaired at 1410 [1310 GMT] today, so Sarajevo is supplied with only enough electricity to meet limited needs. Consumers are again cautioned to save as much as possible and to keep their consumption to the limit of 6 kWh per household. If this is exceeded, causing an overload, electricity distributors will be forced to take the undisciplined consumers off the grid for a time.

Regarding Sarajevo's natural gas supply, the situation has improved, so Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo consumers receive regular supplies most of the time. Sarajevo Gas personnel report that if the situation continues as it is today one can expect, with the necessary economical consumption by households, a better situation in gas supplies in the region of Centar and Stari Grad, the supply to which is planned for the afternoon. [passage omitted]

The Sarajevo Water Supplies Information Service reports that the Bacevo spring is working with only six wells today, which is insufficient, so water supplies are worse than in recent days. At 1200, water was received in the districts from Stupska Petlja to Bascarsija, parts of the city in the zone around the Logavina Street, and the central part of Vratnik. Bascarsija and Kovaci have been receiving water supplies all day today. The districts of Sedrenik and Grdonj will also receive them if the necessary conditions are fulfilled.

One more report for Sarajevo citizens. Klas Firm Deputy Director Enver Kazovic told us that all Sarajevans are being supplied with bread today.

Hungary Offers Support To UN Peacekeepers

LD0711190495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1824 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Budapest, Nov 7 (TANJUG)—Hungary is ready to extend logistic support to the future pecaekeeping forces in Bosnia if such a request is made by the United Nations or NATO, Spokesman for the Foreign Ministry Gabor Szentivanyi said on Tuesday.

He said this referring to recent talks between Hungarian Parliament Speaker Zoltan Gala and U.N. Secretary General Butros-Ghali in New York.

Back in 1992, Hungary allowed the stationing of AWACS planes in the country to control the no fly zone in Bosnia, and then allowed in principle UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] troops to withdraw, if needed, over Hungarian territory.

Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti repeatedly said that it would not be appropriate that armed troops from Hungary, as Yugoslavia's neighbour, take part as members of the NATO programme 'Partnership For Peace' in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, but he did not exclude the possibility that Hungarian doctors and other civilians take up some duties in Bosnia.

However, logistic support to peacekeeping forces would be acceptable for official Budapest. The country would then be actively included in the peace process, without posing too much of a burder for it, Szentivanyi said.

Serb Negotiators View Agreement on East Slavonia

AU1411180595 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Nov 95

[Article by Dragoljub Stankic on news conference by Milan Milanovic, "chief of the negotiating team"; Slavko Dokmanovic, "president of the council of the Srem-Baranja district"; Goran Hadzic, "member of the negotiating team"; and General Major Dusan Loncar, commander of the 11th Corps of the Slavonia-Baranja district, in Erdut on 14 November—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Milan Milanovic, chief of the [Serb] negotiating team, emphasized that, following the signing of the agreement, they were now insisting on the normalization of the situation in all departments.

All institutions in Srem-Baranja district will continue to perform their duties until the arrival of the UN administration. Milanovic says, however, that, even after its arrival, they will continue to work and cooperate with it to organize life jointly. The resolution that is being prepared in the UN Security Council will not abolish these institutions, was Milanovic's categoric statement.

As for the presence of the international troops and their role during the transitional period, Milan Milanovic said:

[Begin Milanovic recording] On this territory, in this sector, in this district, there used to be two battalions—the Russian and the Belgian. I can say that, from their arrival until now, they have acted very correctly and have not been partial to one side or the other, which was not the case in other sectors, where we all witnessed what happened.

The new forces that will arrive will guarantee security for the district, therefore they would be able to use force against the Croatian Army if the Croatian Army were to try to resolve the problem by force. This will happen, as the general said, from the moment that the UN Security Concil passes the resolution. [end recording]

General Major Dusan Loncar, commander of the 11th Corps of Srem-Baranja district, said that the Serbian Army has continued to perform its duty, which is to provide full security for the Serbian people on this territory until the realization of the conditions envisaged by the agreement, by which the international troops will guarantee security for the Serbian people to the same extent as the Serbian corps does.

[Begin Loncar recording] This is an opportunity to point out that this agreement, which is finally positive for the Serbian people in the region, is, I would say, exclusively the merit of the members of the Corps who, with their skill and strength, served as a deterrent and created realistic preconditions for the negotiating team, so that the negotiators had an argument behind them, namely, the force that functioned as the defense of this territory.

When the conditions of the full security and safety of citizens and peoples are created, the Corps will act in compliance with the demilitarization annex of the agreement, in the manner stipulated by this same agreement. [end recording]

The member of the negotiating team, Goran Hadzic, emphasized that the agreement was the best that could be put on paper and that all expelled Serbs from Krajina had the right to remain and live in this district normally.

Currently, there are some 200,000 people living here, while there are accommodation capacities for about 1 million. Slavko Dokmanovic, president of the council of Srem-Baranja district, emphasized that the Serbs, on the basis of the agreement signed, the resolution that is being prepared, and the annex that will work out the details, will embrace the UN administration as a sign of goodwill for the final restoration of peace on this territory and will establish full cooperation with them, which will contribute to a better organization of all aspects of life. The first results are already visible, Dokmanovic said. Secondary schools started to work yesterday, and primary schools will open tomorrow.

Two Years' Transition Needed

AU1411182995 Paris AFP in English 1732 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Erdut, Croatia, Nov 14 (AFP)—Separatist Serb leaders in Croatia's eastern Slavonia region cast doubts Tuesday [14 November] on whether they will submit to Croatian rule, saying they would decide in two years after a transition period of UN administration.

"It is difficult to say what will happen in two years," said Milan Milanovic, the main Serb negotiator who signed a peace agreement with Zagreb on Sunday. "We will watch the situation, and the respect of human rights (by Croatia) and then we will make a decision."

The Zagreb government on Sunday said the accord implies recognition of Croatian sovereignty over the territory and its reintegration into Croatia, although the text of the accord makes no direct reference to this.

The accord also provides for a 12-month transition period before the restoration of full Croatian administration and the possibility of extending it for a year "if so requested by one of the parties," according to the text.

Milanovic told a press conference here that the Serbs plan to ask for the one-year extension. "Then we will see," he added.

Although he did not specifically say his side would refuse to reintegrate into Croatia, he pointed out that the idea of reintegration was not spelled out in the accord and "this means something."

He said the rebel Serb leaders would make a decision based on the overall situation in ex-Yugoslavia and the way in which Zagreb treats Serbs living in other regions of Croatia.

The accord provides for the return of Croatians expelled when Serbs seized eastern Slavonia in 1991 but also allows the Serbs there to remain.

Milanovic said Serb leaders during the transition period "would cooperate with the Croatian government, but will not be subordinate to it."

He said the separatist area would continue to use the Yugoslav dinar during that period and the phone system would remain linked to rump-Yugoslavia which would also continue supplying eastern Slavonia with electricity.

As to the makeup of a peacekeeping force to be deployed in the area, Milanovic ruled out the force being made up exclusively of NATO soldiers and insisted that Russian troops would have to be included.

He said the force could either be made up of Russian and Belgian troops who could be backed by American soldiers, or it could be made up of NATO and Russian troops.

Goran Hadzic, another Serb negotiator, said the force would be allowed to use force if necessary.

"It should be a force to re-establish peace rather than maintain peace," he said.

General Dusan Loncar, commander of the local Serb forces, said each part of the 14-point accord needs to be spelled out clearly before being applied and "until then our army will remain combat ready to protect our people."

The accord signed Sunday was hailed by the international community and is seen as litmus test for achieving a global settlement to the Balkans conflict.

It not only averted fears of further fighting—Croatia had threatened to retake the area by force if necessary—but also eased discussions in Dayton, Ohio, where Balkans leaders are trying to thrash out a wider peace deal.

"It's really a test case," UN High Commisioner for Refugees (UNHCR) official Mans Nyberg said in Zagreb on Monday. "We see it as a very positive development if it's implemented."

Volunteer Guard To Withdraw

LD1411151095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1402 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 14 Nov (TANJUG)—Borislav Pelevic, acting chairman of the Party of Serb Unity [SSJ], said today that the Serb Volunteer Guard, an integral part of the Serb Krajina army's Srem-Baranja Corps, will withdraw when implementation of the agreement in the region begins. [passage omitted]

Speaking about the future role of the Serb Volunteer Guard, Pelevic said that it will be the last to leave the Srem-Baranja region and that it will withdraw to the Serb Republic. He also said that in case of any Croatian attack on the region, the Serb Volunteer Guard will be prepared and ready to carry out adequate measures. [passage omitted]

Serb Parties Welcome Agreement

LD1411164495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1454 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov 14 (TANJUG)—Serb parties in Zagreb on Tuesday welcomed the agreement signed on Sunday by representatives of Croatian authorities and Serbs from the Srem-Baranja region (eastern Slavonia, Baranja and west Srem).

The Serb National Party, led by Milan Djukic, said in a special statement that it wholeheartedly welcomed the agreement, which was conducive to a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The party vice president Veselin Pejnovic said that the agreement would help restore peace in all of the former Yugoslavia.

Pejnovic said the party believed that this model should be applied to all of Croatia, including Krajina and western Slavonia, because ethnic cleansing policies would otherwise be pardoned.

President of the Serb Independent Party Milorad Pupovac told a news conference in Zagreb that after a period of fears that the war would resume, the agreement represented an important, if not even final, step towards a political settlement of the region's status.

The agreement is important in many aspects, because it ensures lasting peace and leads to a normalization of all relations between Zagreb and Belgrade, Pupovac said.

He added that the most important thing was to ensure full observation of human rights in the region and open communications which would benefit both peoples.

Ethnic Serbs Imprisoned for 'Armed Insurrection'

LD1511123795 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 15 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The military court council in Gospic today sentenced the first group out of 70 arrested people of Serb nationality in the area of the Lika-Senj police department. They are accused of armed insurrection against the Republic of Croatia, in accordance with Article 235, Paragraph 1, of the Croatian Penal Code.

Milan Bubanj, Nikola Vanjeglav, Nikola Uzelac, Jovo Sorak, and Bogdan Ognjenovic were sentenced to four years' imprisonment. Radomir Stojanovic, Milan Studen, Stevo Rakic, and Branko Stakic were sentenced to three years' imprisonment. Stevo Rafajic and Bozo Vajsavljevic were sentenced to two years and six months imprisonment.

The accused Veljko Lekaj and Milan Uzelac have been freed from detention.

Electoral Commission Issues Final Results

LD1411151595 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We have just received a report from today's State Electoral Commission news conference. Zoltan Kabok reports:

[Kabok] The republic's electoral commission news conference not yet ended. Its chairman, Krunislav Olujic, has presented the official results of the elections for the House of Representatives of the Croatian Assembly.

Of the 14 state lists contesting the election, the highest percentage of votes, 45.23 percent, was won by the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ]. The joint list of five parties—the Croatian Peasant Party [HSS], the Istrian Democratic Alliance [IDS], the Croatian Independent Democrats [HND], the Croatian Christian Democratic Union [HKDU], and the Croatian Party of Slavonija and Baranja [SBHS]—won 18.26 percent.

The Croatian Liberal Democratic Party [HSLS] won 11.55 percent. The Social Democratic Party [SDP] won 8.93 percent, and the Croatian Party of Rights [HSP] 5.01 percent. [passage omitted]

Given the percentage of votes won by the HDZ, there will be 42 HDZ seats in the new assembly. The five-party list, HSS, IDS, HND, HKDU and SBHS, will have 16 seats. The HSLS 10; the SDP 8; and the HSP 4 seats. [passage omitted]

Tudjman Appoints General Blaskic To Senior Post

LD1411190595 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A statement just in from the office of the President of the Republic:

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman today passed the following decisions:

Major General Tihomir Blaskic has been appointed inspector in the Croatian Army General Inspection.

Major General Zivko Budimir has been relieved of the duty of commander of the southern front and has been put at the disposal of the presidency of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia for the post of the chief of General Staff of the Croatian Defense Council.

Colonel Ivica Tolic has been appointed acting commander of the southern front.

Partnership for Peace Accord To Be Signed 15 Nov

AU1411170795 Skopje MIC in English 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tomorrow, the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Repubic of Macedonia—FYROM] will officially become the 27th country, signatory of the "Partnership for Peace" program, the Radio Skopje correspondent reports from Brussels, calling upon sources from the Alliance.

On behalf of NATO, the document will be signed by the acting secretary-general, the Italian ambassador Balanzino. Late last night, it was supposed to be decided who will sign the document on Macedonia's behalf. This will be known after all the details are worked out and after the Macedonian ambassador is received in NATO headquarters.

As Radio Skopje reports, a brief courtesy reception of the Macedonian official by the ambassadors of the 16 member-states of the Northern Atlantic Alliance is planned for after the formal act of signing.

The news about Macedonia's acceptance to the "Partnership for Peace" program was broadcast by the official Italian agency ANSA yesterday, MAKPRESS reports. The Italian press assesses this news positively, although there are no broader comments. The information stresses that Macedonia has had an agreement for military cooperation with the U.S.A. since 1994 and that U.S. soldiers took part in a military exercise for the first time last Thursday [9 November].

That is regarded as an introduction to bigger Macedonian-American military maneuvers, which, according to the program, are scheduled for March, 1996.

The Commissioner for foreign politics of the European Commission Hans Van Den Broek will ask for a mandate to prepare the agreement on trade and cooperation between the EU and Macedonia at today's meeting of the Commission in Strasbourg.

As the Radio Skopje correspondent from Brussels reports, calling upon diplomatic sources, there are no obstacles to approving Van Den Broek's request.

Military Analyst on Membership

AU1511080795 Skopje MIC in English 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Trajan Gocevski, dean at the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje and former Macedonian Defence Minister, talks to today's VECER about the significance of the acceptance of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] to the "Partnership for peace" program. "The acceptance of Macedonia to the program presents the finalization of an idea which was announced by our state back in the Spring of 1992, when the Yugoslav People's Army finished moving out of the Republic and when the model of our defence system was defined, which, beside the armed forces and civil defence, also promotes association in the collective security systems. That was done with the letter to NATO about Macedonia's good intentions for cooperating with this military alliance which takes care of the security and defence of its member-states," Prof. Trajan Gocevski says. According to this top military analyst, following the break up of the Eastern Bloc, a large number of countries wanted to become NATO members in order to be able to get under the protective umbrella of the Western military alliance. However, seeing such membership is based on very strict criteria and high interests of the member-states, association became a very complex question. Therefore, the U.S.A., as a leading power in the alliance, promoted the idea about the "Partnership for Peace" as an anteroom to NATO. All the members accepted to the initiative acquire certain privileges, but many obligations as well. According to Gocevski, the obligations are even greater than the privileges. "By entering the program, the member-states are enabled to plan joint exercise activities, to draw certain experiences from the structure and organization of the NATO pact, and to take care of an adequate personnel policy. Beside these privileges, the member-states will also have to take over a part of the obligations that all the NATO members have. For instance, they are obliged to coordinate their defence systems and functions of every defence ministry with the NATO standards. The military budget of every member-state is subject to NATO control, while the armament and military equipment in the defence system must be coordinated with the standards of the NATO pact. Furthermore, the connections system must become compatible with the NATO system, and the military organization and formation itself should be subordinated to the military alliance," Prof. Gocevski says.

Intentions of Ethnic Albanian Coalition Questioned

AU1511093895 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 11 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by J. Dukovska: "Who Said Dialogue?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "We are not addressing you in the Macedonian language, this being our considered decision." This is what representatives of the NDP [People's Democratic Party] and the PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians] told reporters in Macedonian at their recent news conference to explain the recent alignment of these two ethnic Albanian parties in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] with the formation of the

NDP-PDPA parliamentary group in the Macedonian Assembly. The fact that Dzevad Halimi of the NDP and Sazim Memeti of the PDPA spoke to reporters in Albanian was probably intended to demonstrate their great desire to assert their ethnic language, which deserves respect, of course, but there can be no rational justification for their bypassing the official language of the state in which they live and work—particularly, not now, as they themselves pointed out, when they want to establish a dialogue and find their place in Macedonian political public life.

Clearly this gesture represents a part of the image of the alleged difficult struggle of the Albanians in Macedonia, and this is what these two parties of the Albanian parliamentary opposition claim to be—even at the cost of being misinterpreted by the public they were addressing in the first place, but perhaps this was not their real aim. It was, perhaps, more important to publicize the formation of the right parliamentarian bloc between the PDPA and the NDP, which is actually an expansion of the flock of "Tacists," [PDPA] who of all the parties of the "Albanian bloc" have been the loudest in their extremism and radicalism. Namely, at this time the NDP has only two members in the Macedonian Assembly—Rami Tuda, who was appointed coordinator of the parliamentarian group, and Zekir Kadriu, after their former members Mersel Biljali and Abduljadi Vejseli abandoned them. In the future, we can expect from these right oriented ethnic Albanian representatives more evidence of their calls for the "abolition of state discrimination against Albanians," which certainly also includes language discrimination. This is something that we have already witnessed, because in the past period, we have been mainly faced with radical nationalist positions of the NDP and the PDPA, like their calls for "Ilirida" [calls for autonomous Albanian territory within the framework of Macedonia] and for the federalization of Macedonia, for the phantom Tetovo university, as well as with other irrational concoctions from their kitchen. The question that arises and that was put to the gentlemen from the NDP and the PDPA at the news conference is: Why are they addressing the Macedonian public at all if they are masters of leading a "dialogue of the deaf?"

Reasons for PDPA-NDP Group

AU1411200895 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 13 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the reasons for the creation of a parliamentary group between the Party for Democratic Prosperity for Albanians [PDPA] and the People's Democratic Party [NDP] is the possibility of establishing contacts with representatives of international institutions to present the Albanian issue in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] in a more dignified way. For more details, here is a telephone report by Imer Ismajli from Skopje:

[Ismajli] The formation of a parliamentary group by these two parties implies that this can be considered a step toward uniting the two parties outside the assembly of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Considering the similar concepts by the two parties and the realization of the demands of Albanians in this republic, this is deemed to have been a natural and understandable step. That these two parties will run in future local elections with a common candidate can serve as an argument in favor of this.

After the great splits within the Albanian political parties and institutions in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which a priori means a weakening of the political action, the creation of the parliamentary group by six PDPA and NDP deputies and the cooperation of the policy of both parties in the future is a step toward a coordinated political action in meeting the demands of the Albanians in this republic. For the time being, however, we can speak only of a political front among Albanians in this republic.

Butrus-Ghali on Warsaw Visit, UN Reform

WS1411153795 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 9 Nov 95 p 4

[Interview with UN Secretary Butrus Butrus-Ghali by Tomasz Surdel in Geneva; date not given: "Polish Trump Cards on the International Arena"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Surdel] You are visiting Poland in the most heated period of the election campaign. Is it a coincidence or a covert form of supporting the incumbent president, especially because the agenda of your visit provides for numerous speeches delivered with Lech Walesa?

[Butrus-Ghali] The Polish visit is very important to me. It is primarily designed as an expression of the UN's gratitude to Poland, gratitude for your contribution to the peace operations, gratitude to the Polish experts who have been implementing UN projects for years.

The fact that I am visiting Poland just before the elections is a pure coincidence. The date was set in June, when it was still unknown when the elections would be held. Besides, you should remember that I am visiting Poland at the invitation of the president and the government. One of the basic principles of the UN is that it does not interfere with the domestic affairs of particular states. The UN and its secretary are neutral.

[Surdel] Many years ago, before you became the UN secretary-general, you visited Poland. What do you remember from that visit?

[Butrus-Ghali] That was a long time ago. In 1958 or 1959. I met many dignitaries, among them Krzysztof Skubiszewski, who later became foreign minister, and several professors. I gave lectures on the nationalization of the Suez Canal at universities in Warsaw, Krakow, and Poznan. From then on, I closely followed developments in Poland. I devoted a lengthy chapter to your country in a book I once wrote.

[Surdel] Foreign Minister Bartoszewski is to present you with his project of reforming the UN. Do you know what it is to consist of?

[Butrus-Ghali] We have received reform projects from more than a dozen countries. Please remember that it is the UN members, and not the Secretariat, who decide about any changes. If, for example, you want to increase the number of members of the Security Council, reform the Socioeconomic Council, or dissolve any organ, you first have to amend the UN Charter. Amendments to the Charter require the consent of two-thirds of the member states, five of which have to be permanent members of the Security Council.

[Surdel] Considering the procedural complexities involved, do any reforms stand a chance of success?

[Butrus-Ghali] Procedures are slow, the members divided in their opinions. Yet we do want change. The difficulties do not imply we should not make any effort.

[Surdel] What role do you think Poland could play on the international arena?

[Butrus-Ghali] If we want a strong UN, states with longstanding traditions in international politics should play a significant role. It is thus important for Poland to take an interest in international affairs. This is my appeal to the countries I visit: Take an interest in international politics. I know this is difficult because I myself was foreign minister in my home country for 14 years. I learned back then that public opinion is not overly interested in foreign policy. Poland has splendid traditions, soldiers, experts—it may thus come to play a significant role. Naturally, you have your own problems and it is not easy, but the Polish diaspora in the world is a huge force. You have all of the trump cards to play an important part in world politics. This lies in the interest of the international community. The political changes that have taken place in your country in themselves set a marvelous example and are a recommendation for your country.

Poll Shows Kwasniewski Leading Walesa by 3%

LD1411204695 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest Public Opinion Research Center [OBOP] poll shows that Aleksander Kwasniewski has a 3-percent lead over President Lech Walesa. This is the first poll conducted after the first round of the elections but before last Sunday's television debate.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Lukasz Perzyna] Three out of four of those polled by OBOP declared their readiness to participate in the second round of the presidential elections. Some 51.5 percent of those who know who they will be voting for and intend to cast a valid ballot paper will support Aleksander Kwasniewski. Lech Walesa can count on the support of 48.5 percent of OBOP respondents.

[Tomasz Zukowski, OBOP] It transpires from our research that the Democratic Left Alliance leader had a slight edge over the incumbent president toward the end of the first week of this rivalry. One could say that both rivals began the second and decisive week of this rivalry, the week with debates and clearly escalating campaign, with almost the same chances.

[Perzyna] From Thursday to Sunday—that is, before the TV debate of both presidential candidates—OBOP polled 1,300 adult Poles. The margin of error of such a poll is 3 percent, exactly as much as Kwasniewski's lead over Walesa. [end recording]

Kwasniewski Outlines Economic Program

BR1411152095 Paris LE FIGARO (LE FIGARO-ECONOMIE supplement) in French 14 Nov 95 p 10

[Interview with Polish presidential candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski by Christophe Turowski in Warsaw; date not given: "Kwasniewski: A 'Socioliberal' Economic Vision"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Turowski] International observers are often concerned about the influence Poland's political instability could have on the country's economy. Do you share this fear?

[Kwasniewski] I am convinced that, during the past five years, the Polish economy has acquired a great deal of autonomy. This is a positive result not least because, during this period, Poland has formed a new parliament three times and a new government six times, and still the economic results have improved. In particular, we have seen a steady rise in the GDP and exports.

On the other hand, the political situation still influences certain sectors that have not been reformed: social security, agriculture, and the state budget. But these are all problems that are experienced in other countries of the world.

[Turowski] Is your economic vision socialist or liberal?

[Kwasniewski] I would say it is rather social democrat or even socioliberal.

[Turowski] What are the values of social democracy today?

[Kwasniewski] It must accept everything that exists in the modern world: the free market, free competition, and the rules of political democracy. Where the development of the economy is concerned, I cannot see any great difference between the liberals and ourselves.

Divergences only appear when you examine the methods for distributing public resources acquired through economic development. In other words, in the way of resolving all social problems, starting with unemployment and the impoverishment of certain social categories.

[Turowski] What are you actually proposing to resolve the most painful problems—inflation, unemployment, social security reform—which weigh so heavily on the state budget?

[Kwasniewski] I am prepared to support any initiative that could reduce inflation, revive investment, and encourage privatization. In fact, we will have to increase the number of tax breaks.

[Turowski] We have often heard statements to that effect, but they have rarely had any real consequence.

[Kwasniewski] I do not agree. Output is up by 40 percent, as are exports, proving that economic trends are generally quite favorable.

Nevertheless, there are some key issues that have to be tackled—in particular, the question of taxes. When and how will we be able to cut them? In any case, I do not think we will be able to raise taxes. On the contrary, we are going to have to bring them down gradually. We will start next year by cutting the tax rate for the lowest income bracket.

Where social security reform is concerned, this should be a real revolution looking to make in-depth changes to the role of the state with regard to social payments. The state budget should help guarantee these payments instead of actually financing them.

Finally, the fight against unemployment will take the form of a massive youth training scheme, tax breaks for those who create new jobs, and a regional policy that would give the local authorities more options in this area.

[Turowski] You cannot talk about fighting unemployment when employers' charges stand at approximately 50 percent. In light of this, what would possibly encourage companies to create new jobs?

[Kwasniewski] I agree. Employers' charges are pegged too high, but already we have a certain number of measures designed to encourage job creation. For example, if an employer can offer a job to a young person for 12 months, all of his charges will be paid back to him. He will even receive a sum equal to one year's unemployment benefit.

If he takes someone on for 18 months, in return he will be reimbursed all of his charges plus at least 18 months of wages. These methods have already made for the creation of 50,000 jobs this year, but it is only by continuing to improve Poland's economic performance that we can hope to render the fight against unemployment more effective.

[Turowski] Will Poland's future membership of the European economic structures profit the country?

[Kwasniewski] Yes, without any doubt.

[Turowski] What about membership ofinhe EU itself?

[Kwasniewski] That, too. While Poland is a market of 40 million consumers, it is also a bridgehead for future investment, even more so to the East. However, both conditions must be met—political stability and continued economic development.

[Turowski] While you claim to be in favor of opening up the country to foreign capital, there are many examples proving that it is not so easy for foreign companies to set up shop in Poland. Movotel won a call for tender that was subsequently canceled. Bull has been kicked out of Poland after four years. France Telecom has invested millions of dollars in the country but now has no chance of expanding its business there.

[Kwasniewski] Each of the examples you quote has a different cause, and these French companies also made mistakes. However, without going into too much detail, I should stress that the climate for foreign investors in Poland is now much better than it was.

Already, $6 billion has been invested by foreign concerns, including French companies such as Alcatel, Thomson, and others.

However, if I am elected president of the Republic, I will see to it that the tax and legal provisions are made even clearer.

Walesa-Solidarity Cooperation Agreement Signed

WS1411135695 Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 10 Nov 95 p 5

[Text of "Declaration of Cooperation Between the National Commission of Solidarity and Lech Walesa"; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] In line with Instruction No. 79/95, the National Commission of Solidarity is presenting Lech Walesa, president of the Polish Republic and presidential candidate, with the following declaration on the joint objectives to be implemented by Solidarity and the president of the Polish Republic in the years 1995-2000.

In recognition of their legal capacity and limitations, both parties declare:

1. To prompt the National Assembly to pass a constitution of the Polish Republic that would be consistent with the will of the majority of the nation and convergent with the civic draft constitution of the Polish Republic as developed by Solidarity.

2. To endorse the implementation of legislative initiatives of the union and the president by, among other things, developing the texts of legal acts and promoting legal solutions among unionists and in the media.

3. To further the implementation of mass enfranchisement.

4. To implement the goals and objectives elucidated in the Solidarity Questionnaire presented to Lech Walesa, to which there is consensus.

In the course of implementing the aforesaid objectives, Solidarity shall maintain close contacts with the Presidential Office through its representatives.

Lech Walesa, President of the Polish Republic, Presidential Candidate

Marian Krzaklewski, Chairman of the Solidarity National Commission

Government Security Chief Appointed General

WS1311155095 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 8 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by Luiza Kowalska and "KAC": "BOR. Commander Nominated to General; The Exceptional Career of an Exceptionally Talented Officer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Miroslaw Gawor, chief of the Government Protection Office [BOR], will soon sew general stripes onto his uniform, we learned from unofficial sources. The very talented 40-year-old has recently never served in an officer's rank for more than a year.*

The BOR chief will probably be nominated to general on 11 November, Independence Day. Chief of Police Jerzy Stanczyk confirmed this information yesterday.

If this is so, 40-year-old Miroslaw Gawor will be an example of one of the most remarkable and brilliant careers in postwar Poland. Piotr Szczypinski, spokesman of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, refused to give us the BOR chief's curriculum vitae, but, after a search in our editorial archives, we were able to establish that, in 1992, Gawor headed BOR as a major, in 1993 as a lieutenant colonel, in 1994 as a colonel, and in 1995 most probably as a brigadier general.

This means that in each of these ranks Miroslaw Gawor served for a year at the most—this never happens in the military formations BOR is a part of. "He is simply the best professional we have had in this institution for the past 20 years," we were told at the Belweder.

BOR, employing nearly 600 people, protects top state authorities. Lately, it was often mentioned in connection with the trial of BOR officers who stole luxury cars and smuggled them to Lithuania. One and a half years ago, BOR officers protecting the then Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak in Poznan did not allow an ambulance with a woman with the symptoms of a heart attack to pass through. Most recently, the Supreme

Chamber of Control [NIK] discovered that BOR does not in any way coordinate the flights of Polish VIP's.

Many politicians claim that BOR is closely connected with the Belweder. When (former head of NIK) Lech Kaczynski's security unit was dismissed, he refused the services of an officer suggested by BOR.

Early on in the current presidential campaign, Aleksander Kwasniewski's staff refused to accept the services of BOR officers who were to protect the presidential candidate. "What do we need is Mietek's ear here," said politicians of the Democratic Left Alliance, referring to Mieczyslaw Wachowski, former head of Lech Walesa's Cabinet.

No Discussion of Compensation for German Expellees

LD1311213495 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 13 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] has said that the Polish side does not envisage any talks with the German Government on the issue of post-German property in Poland. The German foreign minister recently told a Polish radio correspondent that the Federal Government had never accepted the expropriation of German property on Poland's present territory without compensation.

MSZ Spokesman Pawel Dobrowolski said that Poland considered the issue of property in Polish-German relations as closed.

[Begin Dobrowolski recording] Our position has been known to the government of the Federal Republic of Germany for a long time and cannot be undermined. The Polish Government has not been conducting any talks on the subject, nor is it planning to conduct such talks, with the German side. We hope that, irrespective of the existing legal differences, the position of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning this matter will continue to be consistent with the spirit of the Polish-German agreement and the treaty signed between the Polish Republic and Germany.

I will also add that the MSZ is convinced that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has not changed its position on this issue and that this also concerns Minister Kinkel's attitude to this issue. [end recording]

Cabinet for Ciech Part in Oil-Sector Privatization

WS1411112395 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 8 Nov 95 p 19

[Article by Artur Morka: "Oil-Sector Restructuring; Ciech To Be Part of Nafta?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sejm deputies do not want the Export-Import Center for Chemicals and Chemical Equipment [Ciech] to become part of Nafta Polska SA. The government claims that Ciech should belong to the holding company because it has considerable commercial experience and capital.

The Ownership Transformations Commission held a session yesterday [7 November] to become familiar with the government reply to its desideratum regarding the oil-sector restructuring. Among other things, deputies proposed that the government do the following:

—Begin negotiations as soon as possible with the EU on prolonging the effectiveness period for barrier tarrifs on fuel imports and on the custom-free import quotas.

—Agree to separating the Cistern Exploitation Board [DEC] and Naftobaz from the Petroleum Products Center (before commercialization).

—Specify the arguments in favor of the inclusion of Ciech in the program.

—Submit a schedule of privatizing the Nafta Polska holding company.

As usual, the issue of Ciech aroused the greatest interest. Against the participation of Ciech in the holding company are the Privatization Ministry as well as the Gdansk Refinery and the Plock Petrochemical Plant. However, the government likes the idea. According to unofficial information, the Foreign Economic Cooperation Ministry treats the issue of "squeezing" Ciech into Nafta Polska as a priority.

In August, Foreign Economic Cooperation Minister Jacek Buchacz (Polish Peasant Party—PSL) proposed to Industry Minister Klemens Scierski (PSL) that, in return for incorporating Ciech shares into Nafta Polska, the ministry receive, among other things, at least 30 percent of Nafta Polska SA shares and Ciech receive an exclusive license for foreign trade in oil and oil products needed by the chemical industry.

Yesterday the idea of incorporating Ciech into Nafta Polska was also defended by Deputy Industry Minister Roman Czerwinski. "Ciech should become part of Nafta Polska because is has experience in fuel exporting and high financial over liquidity," he argued.

According to representatives of refineries, incorporation of Ciech in Nafta Polska would mean imposing a trade broker on refineries. "The Plock Petrochemical Plant and the Gdansk Refinery are doing very well without Ciech acting as a broker," Wladyslaw Babak, one of the Petrochemical Plant directors, said yesterday. He believes that Ciech's offer is simply not competitive for them. Babak also fears that incorporation of Ciech in the holding company is an attempt to monopolize the fuel trade.

Deputy Minister Czerwinski also claims that, by the end of December, our negotiations with EU representatives should yield the desired result and that we should obtain consent to prolong the effectiveness of barrier tariffs on fuel imports and for custom-free import quotas.

"Privatization of Nafta Polska will not be carried out within the next two years," Czerwinski said. It has not been decided yet whether the holding company will be privatized.

NATO Peacekeepers' Use of Arad Airport Suggested

AU1511105895 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 11 Nov 95 p 5

[Article by Irina Zidaru: "Although Some Countries in Central Europe Are Crowding To Send Troops to Bosnia, Romania Prefers To Put at NATO's Disposal the Airports Located in the Western Part of the Country"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Alliance's Planes Will Take Off at Arad Airport

The act of Romania signing the SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement] Accord, which regulates the legal status of civilians and military personnel of NATO partners and NATO member states for the duration of their stay on the territory of another state, acquires a particular significance after the consultations that U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry held with the NATO ambassadors of the 28 states that signed the Partnership for Peace.

William Perry announced to the Central and East European diplomats that the prospect of sending 60,000 NATO soldiers as a peacekeeping force to Bosnia is very close, mentioning that the states that will supply troops for this contingent are going to support the expenses of maintaining those troops. The Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden, Finland, and Austria expressed their willingness to send troops to this peacekeeping force. The 60,000 soldiers will be divided into three divisions, the French, British, and U.S. divisions, and in an organization that recalls the situation of Berlin in 1945, the Russian troops will be under the command of a Russian general.

Romania abstains from engaging in this peacekeeping operation; however, this does not mean that it will not participate in the effort of the warring forces and international mediators to put an end to the conflict. According to sources that wish to remain anonymous, Romania will act in the spirit of another accord concluded between the Bucharest Government and NATO, which allows the Alliance's military transport planes to fly over Romania. The Arad International Airport, refurbished in summer 1994 and approved by NATO military experts, might be used by the Alliance's airplanes to take off for the ex-Yugoslav space. Romania's participation in this way in the attempts of the international community to strengthen the future peace accord gives Bucharest the opportunity to get involved to such an extent as to avoid being accused of siding with one of the warring sides and permits it to take part in the reconstruction of the former Yugoslavia.

Chief of Staff Outlines Army's Reform Goals

AU1511075895 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 8 Nov 95 pp 4-5

[Interview with General Dumitru Cioflina, Army Corps chief of staff, by Valentin Paunescu; place and date not given: "'Model 2000' of the Romanian Army Is the Final Goal of Reform"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Paunescu] Army Corps General Dumitru Cioflina, we civilians, consider the General Staff as the "brains of the Army." 5 To what extent is this perception correct?

[Cioflina] This involves the prerogatives of our General Staff. Our ministry functions on the basis of Law 14 of December 1990, which stipulates, among other things, that the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense is exercised by the ministers, and the organizational structure of the Ministry of National Defense is approved by the government, and includes the General Staff, departments, directorates, the ministry's cabinet, commands, inspectorates, sections, bureaus, and compartments. The law also provides for the prerogatives of the minister of national defense, which are treated in general terms, without clear stipulations for the aforementioned structures. [passage omitted]

The state's basic political options have imposed the need for the Army's reorganization. The experience gradually accumulated through contacts with similar bodies, particularly from NATO countries, has made us advance proposals on changing the ministry's structures, while preserving the law at the same time. [passage omitted]

We mainly aimed at the following targets:

To create an organizational structure allowing the minister of national defense, a civilian, to lead this ministry;

To set up new structures, which we did not have before 1989 and which did not emerge in 1990, structures required by the need to establish links with the rule-of-law state, to implement the concept of civilian control over the Army and ensure the Army's links with the mass media, and to have true transparency in the implementation of measures for the Army's reorganization;

To implement the provisions of the accord on the reduction of troops and armaments;

And last, but not least, to set up structures similar to those extisting in the armies with long democratic traditions, with which we can establish true relations of cooperation.

Following these measures, in December 1993 we told the Supreme Council for the Country's Defense [CSAT] that we are ready, from an organizational viewpoint, to transfer the leadership of the ministry to a civilian personality, something that has been done at the beginning of March 1994 through the appointment of Mr. Gheorghe Tinca. [passage omitted]

To return to your question, I would like to point out that the General Staff, as the Army's leadership structure, has clear prerogatives stipulated in the aforementioned normative acts. If one were to qualify these overall prerogatives, one might say that they confer on the General Staff the privilege of knowing the activity of the military body in detail, and that the General Staff is equally responsible for the way in which it carries out its activity and for its efficiency. Therefore, the civilian perception of the Army is not far from the truth. This is all the more obvious in a rule-of-law state, with civilian control over the Army. This concept presupposes a delimitation between the functions (prerogatives) of the civilian minister (a politician) and the chief of staff, who is responsible for the situation prevailing in the national military institution. Nevertheless, one should realize that the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense is insured by the minister of national defense.

[Paunescu] In concrete terms, what are the specific duties of the General Staff?

[Cioflina] The General Staff, as the main structure of the Ministry of National Defense, exerts the leadership of activities pertaining to the organization, training, and supply of the Army in accordance with the programs endorsed by the Ministry of National Defense.

The main prerogatives of the General Staff are: to ensure the leadership of Army actions both in times of peace and war; to work out and advance to the minister of national defense the drafts of the national military doctrine, the general concept of the country's defense, and the concept for the Army's organization; to draw up plans and programs for the Army's supply and to take measures to ensure their implementation; to set up and improve the Army's organizational structures and to prepare and carry out the training and educational program; to decide on requirements for supplies, technology, and infrastructure and to participate in working out budget proposals, which it then submits to the minister of defense; to submit proposals for the deployment and redeployment of the commands of large units, units, and other formations; to run personnel affairs; and to carry out control and inspection activities. [passage omitted]

[Paunescu] Mr. Army Corps General, has the presence of the civilian minister at the head of the Ministry of National Defense brought about functional changes to the activity of the General Staff?

[Cioflina] First of all, I would like to say that this democratic way of ensuring civilian control over the Army has not constituted a first in our military history. Until 1990, of the 108 defense ministers historically registered since the union of 1859, some 14 were civilians. [passage omitted]

In our current leadership structure, the spheres of competence were rigorously delimited. For instance, the minister of national defense is responsible for implementing the defense policy worked out by the government. He represents the ministry in the relations with the Parliament, presidency, government, and so forth, as well as in foreign military relations. In exercising this leadership, the minister is assisted by the chief of staff, two to three state secretaries, and the ministry's general inspector.

[Paunescu] Mr. General Cioflina, let us go back to prerogatives. Would you be so kind as to list the spheres that are directly in your charge?

[Cioflina] The chief of staff issues instructions, orders, and dispositions on the Army's strategic and operational training. He draws up plans for the deployment of national armed forces in various defense scenarios, checks, through mobilization drills, the defense readiness of the population, economy, and the country, and coordinates the training of ministers, state secretaries and subsecretaries, other dignitaries, and managers of economic and public units for mobilization tasks in the sphere of national defense. With the transition from peace to a state of war, the role of the General Staff increases. It ensures the Army's mobilization, activates the leadership structure of the military operations (the General Headquarters), and takes the necessary measures to heighten the military effort in order to attain the strategic goal of the war. [passage omitted]

[Paunescu] Competent people have often said that the Romanian Army is currently going through a profound process of change, which involves both its structural and functional modernization as well as making it compatible with the armies of the countries from the European and Euro-Atlantic security structures, into which Romania has politically pledged to integrate. Would you be so kind as to talk about some aspects of the Army's reform?

[Cioflina] The reform of the Romanian Army is necessary, in the wake of the basic changes that have taken place in the country's political, social, economic, and cultural life after the December 1989 revolution and the profound changes that have occurred in the international system, particularly in the central and eastern European space, which have had an impact on Romania's national security. The general goal of reform is to build a modern army, under the democratic control of society, that is capable of meeting the country's military security interests and of participating in the all-European efforts to strengthen security on the continent. In practical terms, the reform aims at modernizing the Army and creating the optimal conditions for Romania's military integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

[Paunescu] As a matter of fact, what concept guides the Army's reform?

[Cioflina] The Army's reform was conceived as a need for the Army's structural and functional change. Its final goal is to project the "Model 2000" of the Romanian Army. The reform process — practically one of the most comprehensive operations of this kind experienced by our Army in its history — includes the following stages:

1. The preparatory stage, 1991-92;

2. The stage of structural reform, 1993-1995;

3. The finalizing stage, 1996-2000.

The first stage is aimed at: eliminating our obligations arising from our belonging to the Warsaw Pact; conceptually substantiating the Army's restructuring and modernization; abrogating the normative acts that limited and canceled the rights and freedoms of the Army personnel; ensuring the Army's equidistance vis-a-vis the political parties and organizations; and rebuilding the military legislative framework. The second stage, namely the reorganization, practically started with the CSAT's approval in 1993 of the concept on the Army's organization. The General Staff was reorganized in such a way as to have in its subordination all kinds of operative troops. Regarding the land troops, the army corps was reinstituted, the mechanized and tank divisions were turned into brigades, and the mechanized and artillery regiments were turned into battalions and divisions. These measures ensure a greater mobility, instill greater dynamism in various actions, and also provide for a more supple and auspicious leadership. To ensure the country's air defense, the two extant independent commands — the Aviation Command and the Anti-Aircraft Defense Command — were merged. Two aviation and anti-aircraft corps were set up and the aviation regiments were reorganized on the basis of the principles of separating the flight components from logistics. Two different commands were setup in the navy: the Sea-Going Fleet Command and the Danube Fleet Command. For the joint defense of the maritime space of Dobrogea, which we call the South-East Operations Zone, the Sea-Going Fleet Command took in its subordination an army corps similar to the ones subordinated to the Land Troops General Staff, which also trains marine infantry troops. Likewise, we finalized the organization of regional troops, set up peace-keeping structures, and proceeded to employing soldiers by contract. [passage omitted] The program "Army 2000" aims at achieving a flexible military body, capable of optimally fulfilling the missions entrusted to it.

[Paunescu] Mr. Army Corps General, you said that the current process of modernization of the Army is one of the most comprehensive in its history. We would like you to give a brief history of the efforts made in this respect, in order to better understand the dimensions of the current reform.

[Cioflina] Yes. A first reform in the Army was done after the 1877-1878 war. [passage omitted] However, the current changes in the Romanian military body are multidimensional, compared to the previous ones. They imply both a reduction of the volume of military forces as well as new training methods. These changes are taking place parallel to the efforts to integrate ourselves into the European and Euro-Atlantic security structures.

[Paunescu] How does the Romanian Army respond to this national objective of integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic security structures?

[Cioflina] As a matter of fact, the entire ongoing process of the restructuring of the Romanian military body meets two requirements, which are logically interrelated: the Army's modernization and its compatibility with the aforementioned security structures. The process of ensuring the Army's compatibility and interoperational links with the modern European armies has accompanied the reform process from the very beginning. We have actively participated in the meetings of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC], from its creation in 1991. On 26 January 1994, Romania was admitted to the NACC as a country that has signed the framework-document of the Partnership for Peace [PFP]. In September 1994, we submitted the Individual Partnership Program and the Presentation Document, which were approved by NATO. The PFP is seen as a significant step along Romania's gradual integration in the Euro-Atlantic security structures. As of this year, our participation in the PFP is taking place on the basis of yearly and prospective programs convened with the North-Atlantic alliance, which basically provide for gradually achieving the interoperational targets.

[Paunescu] Therefore, one can talk about an upward course of the relations of cooperation between the Romanian Army and NATO.

[Cioflina] Of course, like the other countries in central and eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War, Romania has shown interest in obtaining security guarantees. At this time, NATO plays a special role in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures and it conducts a policy of partnership and cooperation. Romania and its Army have also adhered to these ideas. [passage omitted]

The number of military cooperation actions with the NATO structures is the following: 10 actions in 1991; 28 in 1992; 36 in 1993; 80 in 1994; and approximately 200 in 1995, of which 140 have already been carried out in the first three quarters of the year. I would like to point out that, in 1995, many Romanian officers have participated in courses on peacekeeping operations organized at the training centers for UN missions in Norway, Austria, Germany, Finland, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark. An equally telling proof of the upward course of our relations with NATO is provided by our bilateral ties with the member countries of the North-Atlantic alliance. Here are a few examples: 124 bilateral Romanian-U.S. actions were carried out in the first three quarters of 1995, along with 50 joint Romanian-French actions in the same period, and 19 Romanian-Dutch actions. This indicates an ever-growing volume of joint actions with the main NATO countries, but also with the PFP countries. Here is another example: If the Romanian Army participated in only six large-scale military drills within the PFP in 1994, their number increased to 18 in 1995, of which 11 took place abroad, while seven took place on our national territory.

In conclusion, thanks to such activities, Romania's political option for joining NATO is acquiring a concrete shape, concurrently with the Romanian Army's broad opening and participation in defining the new security structures on the continent.

[Paunescu] Thank you Mr. General Dumitru Cioflina, and I wish you much success in your important activity. I also wish success to the Romanian Army in general.

Campaign To Undermine Patriciu as Opposition Leader

AU1511083095 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 10 Nov 95 p 1

[Note by Oana Stanciulescu: "Patriciu Will Become the New Leader of the Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dinu Patriciu [member of the Steering Committee of the Liberal Party 1993-PL'93] is the only leader in the Romanian political scene around whom the opposition might rally if Corneliu Coposu [president of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party-PNTCD] retired from political life. According to sources at the Cotroceni presidential palace, this is a conclusion that was reached by the political analysts of Ion Iliescu and the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] some time ago. That is why a campaign of steady attacks has been launched of late against the PL'93 leader, according to the strategy worked out at Cotroceni. These attacks are meant to compromise him and decrease his credibility. The latest example is the investigation of Patriciu for alleged fiscal evasion following an article published in the newspaper of the Paunescu brothers [George Constantin Paunescu, chairman of the Romanian National Employers Confederation and of the General Union of Romanian Industrialists], CURIERUL NATIONAL. If the enquiry does not yield the expected results, the attacks against the liberal leader will continue in order to block his ascent, the aforementioned sources claim.

Maramure Police Uncover Drug Trafficking Network

AU1511075795 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 10 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by Mihail Bobocu: "Military Union 0215 and the Maramures Police Uncovered the Largest Network of Drug Traffickers in Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Colonel Mircea Chirila, Chief of the County Intelligence Section of the Ministry of the Interior, Closely Supervised the Entire Operation

At the start of 1994, the Maramures County Police, together with Colonel Mircea Chirila, head of the Maramures Intelligence Service from Military Unit [UM] 0215 Bucharest, obtained data and information about the existence of a network of drug traffickers.

The enquiry led to a wide-scale anti-drug trafficking operation undertaken by the Maramures Police Inspectorate under the direct leadership of the Police General Inspectorate Command and UM 0215 Bucharest.

The operation led to the uncovering in 1994 to 1995 of a Mafia-type network involved in the trafficking of more than 5 metric tons of drugs and to the confiscation by the Maramures Police of 392 kg of hashish worth about 7 billion lei. Twenty-six drug dealers and people found in possession of drugs were taken in custody.

Here is a chronology of the events:

In 1993, 353 kg of hashish were confiscated in Maramures County and 19 people arrested. In July 1995, a further quantity of 25 kg of hashish was confiscated and other 6 people were arrested, also in Maramures County. In October 1995, under the coordination of Colonel Calin Mateescu, chief of the Anti-Organized Crime Brigade, and Lieutenant Colonel Vasile Muresan, chief of the Maramures County Police Inspectorate, the investigations were extended to previous unsolved cases, and the members of the Anti-Organized Crime Brigade and of the Maramures Anti-Organized Crime Service, together with Colonel Mircea Chirila, head of the Maramures Intelligence Service of UM 0215 Bucharest, managed to gather evidence about the criminal activity in Arad County of a drug dealer who was caught red-handed and arrested by the Maramures Police, on which occasion 12 kg of hashish was confiscated.

Danut Jurje, Key Figure Involved

The detection of these networks was made possible thanks to a complex supervision and control action taken against a certain Danut Jurje, an individual with dual Dutch and Romanian citizenship, who arrived in Maramures County at the end of 1993. Jurje, whose permanent address was in the Netherlands, belonged to an international drug dealers' network. His mission was to facilitate the entry, transit, and exit from Romania of drugs originating from the Near East, with the final destination being the West, especially the Netherlands.

The confirmation of the suspicion that Danut Jurje was involved in organizing drug trafficking networks on our country's territory came at the end of 1993, when 500 grams of hashish was "intercepted" in Bucharest, thanks to a Turkish citizen who did not want to become involved in the criminal activity run by Danut Jurje and his connections in Maramures. At that time, the gangsters were looking for sale outlets in Bucharest, but later focused on Maramures, where their Mafia-like activities were curbed through the intervention of the Maramures Police, especially the members of the Anti-Organized Crime Service, who were professionally led by Major Ioan Cupsa, an officer who has had great merits in discovering and proving this illegal drug trafficking.

Justice, an Accomplice of the Traffickers

We want to emphasize the seriousness of the drug trafficking phenomenon and the particular implications of drug consumption in general, given the extremely light punishments stipulated for this deed, namely prison terms of six months to five years (Article 312 of the Penal Code) and the possibility that — in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of Decree 218/1977 and Article 359 of the Penal Procedure Code — certain drug dealers may serve their sentences "at their place of work" or be convicted, but their sentences conditionally suspended.

That is why we want to point out that, during the legal investigation procedures, 11 traffickers were set free, thanks to the mildness of our legislative system.

Impact of Dayton Talks on Succession Issue Feared

AU1411183095 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 10 Nov 95 p 1

[Article by Miha Jenko: "Will SFRY's Succession Also Be Discussed in Dayton?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 9 November—We received firm guarantees that the organizers of the conference in Dayton and the European Union, which is taking part in the meeting, do not intend to include the issue of the Yugoslav succession in the talks, says Dr. Miran Mejak, head of the Slovene delegation in the Geneva negotiations on this issue.

"This means that we cannot expect any sort of official standpoint by any of the international associations on the succession in Dayton. It is true, however, that some of the diplomats and experts of individual successor states who are taking part in the Geneva talks are also present in Dayton. They were invited there as experts, which implies that they will attempt—primarily the Serbs, probably—the raising of the succession issue. When we learned all the names of the people who travelled to Dayton from other successor states, we requested an explanation from Geneva. According to our information, the succession question is not contained in any of the 11 documents that are expected to be passed in Dayton. They also assured us that it was out of the question that Serbia and Montenegro would be recognized as the successors of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]."

It can happen, however, that the negotiators on succession issues will meet and talk informally there. Therefore, it is possible that they will also raise—without the participation of the organizer of the conference in Dayton—the issue of succession and also attempt to find some solutions, Mejak says. "It is difficult to envisage what can come out of this, even though those with whom we cooperate well have promised us that they would not agree to anything that would be contrary to Slovenia's interests. It can happen, however, that they will try to agree on something without us and later try to present this as a sort of a joint compromise position. We cannot do anything against this. We can only warn our friends who are taking part there not to do anything against us, just as they promised." Promises in diplomacy are, of course, something that can change with interests....

Meeting on Issue in Ljubljana

AU1411180695 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The members of the Slovene negotiating team on the issues of succession met with foreign ambassadors accredited to our country in Ljubljana today. They agreed to hold the meeting because of some signals that have come from Dayton, Ohio, that there is a possibility that, in the quest for peace in the Balkans, certain unprincipled solutions that would harm Slovenia could also be agreed upon.

The meeting with the foreign ambassadors was closed to the public. It was learnt, though, that they discussed ways of preventing agreements that would harm Slovenia. The organizers of the Dayton peace conference gave assurances that the succession would not be discussed at the talks.

Federal

Second Land Army Maneuvers on Bosnian Border

LD1511105395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0935 GMT 15 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 15 Nov (TANJUG)—The information service of the Yugoslav Army's 2d Land Army command said in a statement issued today that units of the 2d Land Army, mainly belonging to the Podgorica Corps, are carrying out maneuvers in the areas of Grahovo, Vracenovici, Mt. Golija, and Mt. Njegos in cooperation with the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense Forces.

Saying that several-day long "Golija-95" maneuvers are in progress, the statement describes them as scheduled activities designed to train the command and units of the army in carrying out complex combat tasks and special assignments in cooperation with the Yugoslav Army's Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense units.

So far, the maneuvers have demonstrated a high degree of motivation and the ability of the units to carry out combat tasks in poor weather conditions, the statement says.

Montenegro

Ruling Party Welcomes Agreement on East Slavonia

LD1411141995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1315 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 14 Nov (SRNA)—The Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS] supports the agreement on eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem because it "creates preconditions for a definite conclusion of the war in the region," top DPS official Zeljko Sturanovic said.

According to Montena-fax, he told today's edition of Podgorica-based POBJEDA that "the document is valuable because it is based on respect of human rights for all those living in the area."

He said that this "secures the freedom and equality of the Serb people, provides guarantees for their property, and enables all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes." [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Albanian Party Leaders Want End to 'Passivity'

AU1511090795

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian on 10 November carries on page 3 a 1,500-word report by M.K. and D.K. on a meeting of the Coordinating Council of Prishtina Branches of Political Parties held in Prishtina on 8 November, under the headline, "We Will Not Surrender One Millimeter of Independence."

The meeting was chaired by Frrok Kristaj, chairman of the council and chairman of the Association of Christian Democratic Party Branches. The participants in the meeting included Christian Democratic Party Chairman Mark Krasniqi and Fehmi Agani and Hydajet Hyseni, deputy chairmen of the Democratic League of Kosovo.

Fehmi Agani is reported as stating in his speech, "The Serbian occupier is trying to establish contacts with individual Albanians, in order to discuss the issue of Kosovo. But I do not think that any Albanian who carries weight in Kosovo's political life will dare to ignore the legal authority of the Republic of Kosovo. In fact, it is those whom the people elected who legally represent the Republic of Kosovo in international circles.

"Our greatest achievement is that we have succeeded in establishing the legitimacy of our independence and our claim for political independence. Under this occupation, we act as a national movement and have succeeded in building state institutions and authorities that are important to us. Perhaps there were dissenting voices among us a little while ago, but it has been seen that what we require at this stage is genuine and total unity, because the times we live in are hard and decisive for the coming generations."

The report continues, "Mark Krasniqi said that today more than ever we need total national unity, both internally within our parties, and among them. The division of our parties into wings weakens our national movement. I do not say that we are not united, but we must nevertheless demonstrate our unity at the highest possible level. Not one of us has a mandate to whittle away our national rights, and we must say 'stop' to all those who are inclined to strike bargains over Kosovo, even if this means saying so to Europe itself, which brought us into these straits.

"Krasniqi went on to say that independence for Kosovo is our minimal demand, because our real demand would be the unification of the Albanian territories, and our maximum demands would be the return of the Albanians to their ethnic lands from the Sandzak to Nis. We must internationalize our demand even more, because at the moment we have stood out for realistic demands, not maximum ones. Any option offered to us by international circles that keeps us under the Serbian umbrella means continuing occupation for us and is a reward for Serbia. We would sooner be a parish under Western Europe than a kingdom under Serbia. We must therefore make foreigners aware that the destiny of

Europe's most ancient people cannot be trifled with to suit anybody's whims or aspirations.

"Mark Krasniqi said in conclusion that it is more than high time for the representatives of the Albanian political parties to unite and to draw up documents and standpoints and demands to be sent to international bodies."

The report continues, "Selatin Novosella said that we are worried about many tasks left half-done. We held presidential and parliamentary elections, but did not convene the parliament. We failed to hold local elections. We formed a government, but failed to make up the cabinet. Behxhet Brajshori said that we must be more determined in making our mark internationally. We must show that we have a program. It is not important whether we are at Ohio or not; it is important to be organized for other international conferences. We must also find forms of public demonstration and dignified protest, because with our passivity we are failing to stir the hearts and minds of foreigners. Naim Hoxha said that we are facing a crossroads, and I do not believe we have exhausted all our resources of action. Albert Mirdita asked how long we will be represented by leaders of political parties, and how long we will organize protests and demonstrations abroad under the auspices of political parties and not the state of Kosovo, and why the Coordinating Council of Albanian Political Parties in the former Yugoslavia does not act at a time when new states are being formed and recognized, and the fate of our brothers in these states has still not been settled. Isa Kastrati said that our council here in Prishtina needs a new look, while Mustafe Halili asked how long we will allow cultural events to take place under the patronage of private firms and in halls guarded by the Serbian police. Xhafer Xhaferi added that the people demand the creation of a full range of institutions. This is an obligation for all political parties. Aziz Pacolli said that we have support from abroad, but our internal organization is not up to the mark. Agim Smakaj said that we are suffering from a plague of emigration, which directly favors the Serbian occupier.

"The council concluded by deciding to celebrate 28 November, flag day and Albania's independence day, on 27 November. The festival will be marked at republican level in Prishtina."

Albanian Radio Reports 'Dangerous' Troop Movement

AU1411162995 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Kosova Information Center reports that, yesterday afternoon, a convoy of Serb military forces made up of more than 50 vehicles for transporting troops and accompanied by helicopters passed along the streets in Peje [Pec] and Prishtina [Pristina] in a demonstrative way, later heading toward Podujeve [Podujevo].

Such a deployment and redeployment of troops, varying from area to area of Kosova, is very dangerous because it is being carried out at a time when the situation in Kosova is very tense due to the intensification of the Serb police violence. These actions speak of combined police and military activity aiming at further increasing tension and provoking the unprotected Albanians. The open provocations launched by the Serbian military forces of the Milan Decan military unit during the maneuvers in August this year, when they fired twice on the houses of Albanians near Prizren district in Ferizaj [Urosevac], testifies to this.

Vojvodina

Hungarian Leader Discusses Minority's Problems

LD1411175195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 14 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Ferenc Csubela, the chairman of the Association of Vojvodina Hungarians, the Hungarians of Yugoslavia have been squeezed out of the leading posts of the economy, and positions they get at the head of customs offices, police, and schools are not in proportion with their number either. Csubela told all this to the Helsinki Committee's legal expert, who has been preparing a report on the situation of the minorities in Vojvodina and will forward the study to international organizations as well.

The chairman of the Hungarian association also called attention to the fact that the situation of the Vojvodina Hungarians is also disadvantageous with respect to using their language.

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